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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
ASSESSING ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL FACTORS  
 
IN IMPLEMENTING A LIVING WAGE ORDINANCE 
 
by 
Teodoro Enrique Carrasco 
Florida International University, 2008 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Howard A. Frank, Major Professor 
       Since 2000, the number of living wage ordinances has steadily increased throughout 
the country.  While most of the current research has focused on the beneficial outcomes 
of living wages, little has been published on their administrative practices.  To address 
this shortcoming, this study focused on the identification of key administrative and 
political factors involved impacting the implementation of living wage ordinances in 
Miami-Dade and Broward Counties.   
       The study utilized a triangulation of interviews, surveys, and direct observation.  The 
author conducted interviews of administrators and members of the living wage oversight 
boards in both counties and observed the monthly meetings held by each county‟s 
oversight board from January 2006 to June 2007.  These findings were buttressed with a 
national survey of senior staff in other living wage communities.  The study utilized 
descriptive statistics, Chi Square, Cronbach‟s Alpha, and Spearman‟s Rank Correlation 
Coefficient (Spearman‟s rho). 
       Interviews indicated that administrators in Dade and Broward are seriously under-
staffed and budgeted.  Ambiguities in the enabling ordinances have lead to loopholes that 
  vii 
undermine implementation and accountability for participating contractors. Survey 
results showed that policy ambiguity, organizational politics, and a lack of organizational 
capacity were significant negative factors in the implementation process while an 
organizational culture emphasizing consistent enforcement was a positive factor.  
       Without the proper inputs, an organization hinders itself from meeting its outputs and 
outcomes.  This study finds that Broward and Miami-Dade Counties do not provide the 
necessary administrative support to implement a living wage effectively – in stark 
contrast to the high hopes and strong political support behind their passage.  For a living 
wage to succeed, it first needs an organizational culture committed to providing the 
necessary resources for implementation as well as transparent, consistent accountability 
mechanisms.   
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PREFACE 
       Several events occurred during the course of writing this dissertation having 
potentially significant implications on the living wage ordinances in Miami-Dade and 
Broward County.   
       In January 2007, the County‟s organizational structure shifted to a strong-mayor 
form of government.  This in essence removed some authority for the Board of County 
Commissioners and resulted in the evaluations of most departments within the County.  
As a result, the County dissolved the Department of Business Development (DBD) in the 
wake of the release of its director and transferred all responsibilities to the Department of 
Procurement Management (DPM) in April 2007.  The transfer appeared to be seamless 
whereby County administrators continued to monitor and enforce the living wage 
ordinance as they had under DBD.  While this study focuses on DBD and its efforts to 
manage the living wage ordinance, the situation facing the County remains unchanged 
and the policy recommendations provided would apply the same to DPM as it would 
have for DBD. 
       Another major incident taking place is the continuing efforts by the State Legislature 
to reduce property taxes.  In June 2007, the Legislature approved a reduction in property 
taxes that resulted in the rollback to the operating funds of every jurisdiction in Florida.  
In January 2008, Florida‟s electorate subsequently voted in favor to amend the state‟s 
constitution for additional property tax relief and further municipal operating revenue 
reductions.  As a result, most jurisdictions in Florida made drastic personnel and service-
related cuts to meet these changes.  Specifically in Broward County, the property tax 
issue forced it to review its services and explored eliminating its living wage ordinance as 
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a cost-saving measure.  While still in its early stages, Broward County appears to have 
some support to eliminate the living wage.  However, the possibility exists if further 
property tax cuts continue to affect the operating budgets of Florida‟s municipalities. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
       The aim of this study is to develop a model identifying the principal factors involved 
when jurisdictions implement a living wage ordinance.  That said, examining the 
administrative and political dynamics of the process is the primary focus.   
       From an administrative perspective, an organization‟s structure should help to outline 
roles and responsibilities to establish specific guidelines for the implementation process.  
From a political perspective, stakeholders (elected officials, contractors, etc.) represent 
those responsible for the political complexities that define organizational culture and 
action.  Organizational culture represents how the organization understands its purpose 
and prioritizes its objectives and methods to fulfill this purpose.  Consequently, 
organizational politics influences an organization‟s decision-making process by filtering 
stakeholder preferences and balancing power struggles and conflicting interests.  It also 
dictates an organization‟s internal and external relationships because of such bargaining.  
A combination of these political and administrative perspectives determines the style of 
implementation which bounded by legal and financial capacities.  These organizational 
capacities relate to specific factors that can limit implementation efforts (time, funding, 
labor, and knowledge).  This study proposes that a combination of administrative and 
political factors plays positive and negative roles when implementing a living wage 
resulting in a deficient effort to address the poverty situation in South Florida.  
Research Issue 
       The purpose of the ordinance is to make certain that county and third-party 
employees earn a reasonable salary to support themselves and their families without the 
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threat of living in poverty.  In addition to increasing wages, living wage ordinances help 
provide workers with health insurance options they would possibly not have otherwise.  
In 1988, Des Moines, Iowa, took the first step towards implementing a living wage 
ordinance.  Since that time, over 140 jurisdictions and other government entities adopted 
living wages.  In fact, since 2000, 89 jurisdictions implemented living wage-related 
legislations with 116 more campaigns currently seeking enactment throughout the 
country.  (http://www.livingwagecampaign.org)
1
  However, passage of these living wage 
ordinances offers no indication or guarantee of enforcement or implementation.  
According to Luce (2004), upon ratifying most ordinances, governments demonstrate 
little effort in monitoring and/or evaluating implementation because of a low level of 
commitment by the governments to implement the ordinance successfully, political 
conflicts, and/or the lack of organizational capacity.    
       In May 1999, the Miami-Dade County Commission unanimously approved a living 
wage ordinance fixed on increasing minimum wages from $5.15 an hour to $8.56 per 
hour with health benefits or $9.81 without benefits for all county employees.  (Nissen, 
1998)  Moreover, this ordinance also covers service-oriented workers subcontracting 
through the county (janitorial, food service, security, parking lot attendants, and clerical 
workers) and airport licensees.   
       According to Luce (2004), Miami-Dade County is perhaps one of the most active 
local governments in the country implementing its living wage ordinance and strives to 
improve its administrative policies continuously.  Regardless, the Miami-Dade County 
                                                 
1
 The current campaigns comprise of jurisdictions, universities, and states in general seeking to create 
living wage legislation. 
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Living Wage Commission (LWC) believes that the county needs to be more diligent in 
executing a more comprehensive monitoring and evaluating initiative.  (Miami-Dade 
County Living Wage Commission, 2004)  At present, the County does not acknowledge 
deficiencies in its effort to implement its living wage ordinance.  (Miami-Dade County 
Living Wage Commission, 2004)  Based on its needs assessment report, the county 
cannot meet expectations because of poorly trained employees, inaccessible data, and 
insufficient staffing.  Efforts by the LWC to make County Commissioners aware of the 
situation are unsuccessful in garnering the necessary resources to implement the 
ordinance as expected and pose the question of how committed Miami-Dade County is to 
the living wage.  As a result, the opportunity presents itself where contractors fail to 
comply with the provisions stated in the ordinance. 
       Miami-Dade County‟s Departments of Procurement Management (DPM) and 
Business Development (DBD) shared the responsibilities of monitoring and enforcing the 
ordinance directly.  However, DPM is accountable for ensuring that living wage 
standards are applicable to all relevant county contracts while DBD performs the 
necessary monitoring and enforcement of the ordinance.  Additionally, the Miami-Dade 
Board of County Commissioners (MDBCC) occasionally reviews and passes legislation 
to expand the scope of the county‟s living wage.  For the purposes of this study, "Miami-
Dade County" refers to the relevant departments together since each department 
collectively represents Miami-Dade County‟s efforts to implement a living wage 
ordinance.  However, categorizing interview responses into the following respondent 
groups allows the author to identify the respondent‟s role in the implementation process 
while preserving their anonymity: 
  6 
 Contract Compliance Officers – represents every contract compliance office in 
Miami-Dade County regardless of seniority or rank. 
 Living Wage Committee Members – represents all current and former members 
of the Living Wage Committee regardless of seniority or rank. 
 Senior-Level Management – represents those within DPM and DBD who possess 
management responsibilities within their respective departments. 
       This study‟s findings indicate that Miami-Dade County‟s main challenge is to 
coordinate its personnel to monitor and evaluate the outcomes of the ordinance.  (Living 
Wage Commission Meeting, September 16, 2004)  This results from poor communication 
and inconsistent data collection.  As a result, the county claims it cannot generate an 
accurate assessment of the ordinance‟s cost and/or effectiveness.  (Miami-Dade County 
Living Wage Commission, September 16, 2004)  DBD has also admitted that its limited 
staff cannot enforce the ordinance to its fullest.  (Living Wage Commission Meeting, 
September 16, 2004)  These factors have lead to various instances of living wage contract 
noncompliance.  In fact, since the ordinance went into effect in 2000, there have been 62 
reported instances of noncompliance, 71% of which occurred in 2005 alone.
2
  Miami-
Dade County reports an estimated 90% compliance rate; however, administrators believe 
that some instances of noncompliance go unreported.  (Miami-Dade County Department 
of Business Development, 2006)  Unfortunately, Miami-Dade County is not the only 
government having this problem.  In fact, Luce (2004) states that more than 80% of other 
administrations face similar challenges.   
                                                 
2
 As of January 19, 2006.  
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       Broward County passed its ordinance in 2002.  Much like Miami-Dade County, 
Broward County has taken similar approaches in its efforts to implement its ordinance.  
The Purchasing Division is responsible for all procurement transactions in Broward 
County.  It also has the Office of Professional Standards (OPS) to investigate complaints 
and monitor contract compliance.  The Broward County Commission (BCC) is 
responsible for any legislative issues that might arise with the living wage.  For the 
purposes of this study, "Broward County" refers to the relevant departments together 
since each department collectively represents Broward County‟s efforts to implement a 
living wage ordinance.  However, categorizing interview responses into the following 
respondent groups allows the author to identify the respondent‟s role in the 
implementation process while preserving their anonymity: 
 Contract Administrators - represents the contract administrators in Broward 
County interviewed regardless of seniority or rank. 
 Living Wage Advisory Board Members – represents all current and former 
members of the Living Wage Advisory Board regardless of seniority or rank. 
 Department Directors – represents the department directors identified as critical 
actors in Broward County‟s living wage implementation process. 
 Purchasing Personnel – represents those within the Purchasing Division that 
manage or oversee the implementation of the living wage to some capacity. 
       While Broward County is similar to Miami-Dade County (Broward used Miami-
Dade‟s ordinance as a model to develop theirs), the challenges faced appear more 
pressing internally than externally.  Miami-Dade County seems to struggle mostly with 
contractors at Miami International Airport and inadequate resources dedicated for living 
  8 
wage implementation, while Broward seems to have communication gaps amongst its 
personnel in addition to a non-supportive culture impeding the process.  Thus, both 
counties offer different perspectives as to the political and administrative challenges 
jurisdictions face when implementing a living wage.  This case study will also 
demonstrate how jurisdictions and their policies evolve as time passes since the creation 
of their ordinances. 
Significance to Public Administration 
       As both Goodnow (1900) and Wilson (1887) explain, the political/administrative 
dichotomy in public management and policymaking is at the foundation of most public 
actions.  Their argument is that a symbiotic relationship exists where the administrative 
portion concentrates on order and consistency while the political side represents the 
interests of the parties involved and how power is distributed.  Neither has a purpose to 
exist if not for the other.  However, Waldo (1948) argues that a fusion between politics 
and administration presumes the dichotomy does not exist since all administrative actions 
are inherently political.   
       Nevertheless, while both intertwine, they each possess distinguishing characteristics.  
This debate concerning the relationship between politics and administration eventually 
formulated a theory examining the rationality of bureaucratic behavior.  Long (1949) 
believes the administrative rationality theory depends on a spectrum of acquiring, 
managing, and losing of power.  Each component cannot exist without the other and still 
manage to define and produce effective governance.  That said, as the primary focus on 
living wages is on the administrative processes involved, living wages are driven mainly 
through political forces and the culture in which they operate.  In fact, Koven (1999) 
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states that political cultures and subcultures are fundamental drivers in public and 
budgetary policymaking.  Understanding how these forces affect policies will help to 
explain the administrative processes more clearly.  
       One of the essential goals in public administration is to bring about order from 
disorder – to manage individuals, organizations, and resources in a manner that 
maximizes effectiveness and efficiency.  Another goal discussed by Wilson (1887) and 
Goodnow (1900) relates to public service and state that a public administrator's primary 
concern is to address the needs of the public through organization and a systematic 
approach to governance.  Wilson (1887) mentions that politics corrupts bureaucracy and 
impedes the process of effective governance.  It brings about confusion and diverts 
government from its intended purpose of instilling order and not pandering to political 
interests.  Straightforward policies are capable of bridging administrative principles in a 
way that would bring about clarity and understanding to policy objectives.  Weber (1946) 
applies the same argument in his theory of bureaucracy and states that only through 
clarity and control can an organization act rationally and efficiently.  However, if we 
were to accept Goodnow‟s (1900) statement, the will of the state would represent the 
aggregate interests and demands of the public.  This means that regardless of the amount 
of administrative control possible, political negotiations and conflict still play a vital role 
in legitimizing the bureaucracy. 
       Frederickson and Smith (2003) mention that political control of bureaucracy is 
limited and contingent on what the bureaucracy permits.  It would appear that 
bureaucratic restraint controls political influences as politics affects administrative factors 
similarly.  It is in this political arena that budgets are developed and approved to allocate 
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resources; however, it is through rational administrative practices that governments 
execute their budgets.  (Mikesell, 1999)  Overall, a common assumption is that politics 
has a negative influence on governance, hindering the effectiveness of authority and 
administration.  Lowi (1969) argues that it skews government‟s focus from policymaking 
to cater towards interest groups.  Simon (1946) suggests that it prevents an organization 
from achieving administrative efficiency since it brings about conflict and ambiguity in 
policymaking.  However, negotiations and bargaining help the parties involved to reach a 
common ground providing a clearer understanding as to the issue(s) government needs to 
address.  In this case, it is possible to prevent politics from playing a negative role in 
governance and perhaps even motivates government to act more effectively.  In fact, 
Lipsky (1978) mentions that politics helps to promote innovation and discussion in 
policymaking.  Living wages are an example as Luce (2004) explains that most emerge 
from aggressive grassroots campaigning.   
       It appears that the challenges to living wage implementation are both political and 
administrative.  On the one hand, there are significant political complexities resulting 
from conflicting demands by stakeholders.  On the other hand, the legislation 
implemented tends to develop ambiguous goals and conflicting policies while placing 
more responsibilities on already inadequate organizational capacities for implementation.  
Luce (2004) attributes the ambiguous goals to policymakers appeasing other stakeholders 
in order to get the living wage ordinance passed.  While the administrative portion should 
resolve itself through the language stated in the ordinance, the resulting policies are so 
diluted that it only provides uncertainty as how to place it into action.  Pfeffer (1981) 
states that similar to any situation where authority‟s range fades organizational politics 
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takes its place.  This means that there is a constant struggle between politics and 
administration and it ultimately reflects on policy and decision-making.  Politics can play 
a major role in the way living wage ordinances are passed and implemented, however, it 
is the administration‟s responsibility to keep these influences at bay, focus on its intended 
goal, and accomplish as much as possible through the organizational culture.   
       Both political and administrative facets of policymaking have their strengths and 
weaknesses.  An administrator‟s challenge is utilize to determine a feasible balance that 
offers the best opportunity for a policy to be effective.  According to Matland (1995), 
policy conflict occurs from differing views as to how one approaches an issue.  Policy 
ambiguity arises from unclear goals, procedures, and roles that provide vague commands 
as how to carry out certain objectives.  To address the effects of policy conflict and 
ambiguity during implementation, Matland recommends one use a combination of 
implementation methods that invoke the rationales of political and administrative control.  
Thus, incorporating administrative controls, such as strict rules and procedures, and 
political tactics, such as bargaining stakeholder preferences allows one to reach a 
negotiated policy focused on clear goals and measures. 
       Living wages apply similarly to Pressman and Wildavsky‟s (1973) case study.  
Living wages need transparent legislation passed and funds committed to secure the 
outcome intended.  It is important for stakeholders to interact with each other to set goals 
and procedures in hopes of achieving them.  Communication from internal and external 
stakeholders is a critical component that allows administrators to understand the scope of 
the implementation challenge facing them, and determine the best course of action when 
considering these administrative and political factors.  Prior research and experience 
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suggest that policymakers overlook the administrative challenge of implementing and 
enforcing a living wage when developing legislation.  Such a politically symbolic piece 
of legislation is prone to ignore the complex dynamics of political relationships revolving 
around organizations that define the implementation scenario.  In creating living wage 
ordinances, as with any legislation, there needs to be as much consideration to the means 
implemented as to the policy‟s desired objectives.  Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) stress 
that without a properly designed plan, the implementation of any policy would like end in 
failure.   
Purpose 
       The criticisms of current living wage research regard the focus on the legislation‟s 
potential rather than on actual effects and costs.  This is because government officials 
interested in implementing a living wage policy have been more concerned with short-
term economic forecasts than with long-term potential outcomes.  This argument supports 
the thesis that living wage ordinances serve more as a public demonstration by officials to 
help their constituents rather than a sincere, properly funded effort that addresses the 
long-term well-being of those the ordinance intends to cover.  In fact, elected officials 
publicly support legislation increasing wages for low-income workers, but lose interest 
shortly upon adopting the ordinance and public interest disappears.  (Luce, 2004)  
Unfortunately, those who diligently pressed for the ordinance are not critical actors 
during the implementation process.  This is because of a need to pass the legislation 
elsewhere and supporters assume that the government would effectively implement and 
enforce the ordinance.  For the most part, passing living wage laws has generally been 
more symbolic than substantive causing the ratification and implementation process to be 
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politically driven.  As a result, the administrative component lacks sufficient power to 
establish order and direction.  As Luce (2004) states, by the time jurisdictions adopt a 
living wage ordinance, the result is a weak and diluted policy that makes the law even 
tougher to monitor and enforce.  The vague policy not only causes conflict amongst 
stakeholders, but also exploits the policy‟s limitations and potential for failure.  
Consequently, contractors take advantage and work around the system causing workers 
not to collect the wages as stated in the ordinance. 
       In summary, the objective of this study is to develop a model explaining the 
implementation process for living wage legislation.  Overall, this study is important to 
public administration because it examines how the political/administrative dichotomy 
influences policymaking and organizational behavior.  It also examines the relationship 
between bureaucracy and democracy while contributing to the general research of living 
wage policy.  
       To determine if a jurisdiction implemented its living wage ordinance according to the 
goals set, one must first define the contexts.  The primary objective is to identify the 
administrative and political factors that influence the implementation process.  
Identifying the contexts would allow for a better understanding as to how the relevant 
administrative and political factors apply.  For the purposes of this study, administrative 
factors will relate to organizational structure and capacity.  Politics plays an equally 
important role in policymaking in conjunction with organizational culture.  
Implementation policy is context specific in that it is dependent on specific issues, goals, 
and stakeholders related to the problem.  How these factors influence the policy‟s 
implementation and outcome will be the focus of this study.   
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Research Question(s) 
       This study examines the following question and sub-questions: 
Which administrative and political factors influence living wage 
implementation and to what extent? 
 
Research Sub-questions 
 
 How does organizational capacity influence living wage implementation? 
 How does organizational culture influence living wage implementation? 
 How do stakeholder interests influence living wage implementation? 
 Does a deep-rooted, permanent, political commitment exist in support of a living 
wage in Broward and Miami-Dade Counties?  What is the impact of its presence 
or absence? 
 How do grassroots movements influence living wage implementation? 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
       This section focuses on defining the terms and theories relevant to this study as well 
as reviewing literature on implementation.  First, the author addresses a need for 
clarification as to what successful implementation means.  Understanding this context is 
essential if one is to assess the effectiveness of living wage efforts.  Second, examinations 
of the administrative and political factors explain how these factors can play significant 
roles in living wage implementation.  Third, a discussion on New Public Management 
concepts and Luce‟s (2004) theory on living wage implementation helps to provide better 
knowledge of the literature on implementation and organizational theory.   
       This dissertation frames itself on Daft‟s (1998) definition of an organization where 
an organization is a social arrangement linked by its internal components (departments, 
workers, and so forth) and common goals and priorities to address the demands of its 
external environment.  When discussing the organization, the concept will pertain to an 
organization‟s structure, goals, personnel, culture, and capacity.  Even as the concept of 
sub-organizations arises, these would follow the same properties as a general 
organization would.  Sub-organizations are entities within organizations specialized to 
manage particular issues that allows the larger organization to accomplish its objectives.  
An example of these sub-organizations would be the different agencies and departments 
that make up a government hierarchy.   
Policy Implementation 
       Brewer and deLeon (1983) state that defining implementation can be relative.  Put 
into a problem-solving context, implementation is a linear step in a rational model 
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designed for initiating, planning, implementing, and evaluating a strategy to address a 
problem.  (Brewer and deLeon, 1983)  According to Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), 
policies also imply theories.  Therefore, a chain of causality would determine if the initial 
condition representing (X) would eventually produce the desired outcome (Y) by means 
of implementing the policy.  This is what makes implementation critical since the 
application of such a treatment to a problem determines the likelihood of accomplishing 
an outcome.  Successful implementation results from addressing a particular issue 
through policy while achieving desired results in the process.  It consists of 
accomplishing goals and/or objectives by utilizing clear orders to outline organizational 
roles and responsibilities.  These orders must take into account the organization‟s 
capabilities as well as how workers in lower hierarchical levels would apply the policy.  
However, as part of this study, the additional goal is to understand how the driving 
administrative and political factors discussed would influence the implementation of 
living wages. 
       In regards to living wages, the compliance rate set by the amount of contractors 
adhering to the provisions of the ordinance is the primary measure of success for 
implementing a living wage.  For example, Broward and Miami-Dade Counties claim 
that 100% and about 90% of their contractors respectively pay their employees living 
wage rates on a consistent and timely basis, post information regarding the ordinance 
visible to employees, and provide health benefits when applicable.  These actions 
combined define contact compliance in Broward and Miami-Dade Counties. 
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    Figure 1 – Living Wage Implementation Drivers 
 
       However, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) state that implementing a policy is more 
challenging than one might believe given the level of complexity involved during the 
process.  Specifically, policy implementation consists of diverse administrative and 
political factors that can support and/or hinder the execution of a plan.  Figure 1 
illustrates how each of these factors would apply to living wage implementation upon 
passage of legislation.            
       Consistent with prior research in this area states that policy conflicts and ambiguities 
influence living wage implementation efforts.  (Luce, 2004)  Matland (1995) defines 
policy conflict in which actors have incompatible views on how to define and carry out 
goals.  The less conflict, the greater the possibility for successful implementation.  Policy 
ambiguity refers to a vagueness of either goals and/or means.  However, Matland (1995) 
states that the clearer the goals and/or means are the more susceptible they are to conflict.  
This relates to the idea that ends and means are rarely agreeable by most stakeholders.  
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Ambiguity can make roles and responsibilities unclear, as well as the level of 
involvement by each stakeholder.   
       Brewer and deLeon (1983) also state that politics and ambiguity complicate matters 
by interfering with the implementation process.  For scholars like Brewer and deLeon and 
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), implementation consists of meeting desired goals 
through rational, controlled, and/or scientific processes.  These authors support the idea 
of strict protocol and control among events, individuals, and resources dedicated towards 
implementing a policy.  Policy ambiguity and conflicts force policymakers to deviate 
from their original course of action.  Strong administrative control would help to regulate 
the effects of policy ambiguities through clear organizational roles, structural design, and 
worker compliance.  In addition, open communication and clear policy objectives would 
also help to limit political influences on policymaking.     
       Conversely, Bardach (1977) states that the implementation process is a game of 
bargaining and negotiations in response to unknown conditions and circumstances.  
Under ambiguous situations, stakeholders use their power to collect as much control as 
possible to ensure the policy‟s outcome accommodates most to their favor.  While 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) disagree and argue that politics is a minor factor in 
implementation, Boleman and Deal (2003) state that politics is an integral component for 
most organizational operations.  Rather than trying to eliminate politics from the 
implementation equation, the best course of action is to accept it and manage it as best as 
possible.  Contrary to the belief that politics encourages inefficiency and corruption, 
Boleman and Deal mention that it actually provides an opportunity for innovation and 
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competition.  Regardless whether politics is a positive or negative influence, it plays an 
important role in policymaking.    
       Lipsky (1978) admits that a rational, administrative approach is actually how policy 
implementation should occur; however, there are circumstances when a “street-level” 
perspective would be more effective.  Even when basing implementation on a worker‟s 
discretion, policymakers should take those delivering the policy into consideration when 
planning.  Success depends on how they apply the policy themselves.  This means that 
those working to deliver the policy are the focal point of implementation. 
       Matland (1995) states that a workforce facing implementation challenges firsthand 
must do what is necessary as long as it remains consistent to the prescribed goals.  
However, the critical juncture separating both viewpoints occurs when workers begin to 
think and act for themselves.   At this point, the instance when workers act independently 
would depend on the degree of policy conflict and ambiguity.  Increased conflict and 
ambiguity result in workers using more discretion in accomplishing its objectives.  In the 
case of living wages, the lack of clarity would present the opportunity for contractors not 
to comply with the ordinance.  Matland believes that rules and regulations can limit the 
effects of ambiguity.  Nevertheless, he supports the idea that the right balance of 
bargaining and central authority can help to control both conflict and ambiguity 
depending on the situation. 
Organizational Capability/Capacity 
       Aside from conflicts, politics, and administrative control, organizational capability is 
also a critical factor to consider when defining implementation.  Ulrich and Lake (1990) 
state that organizational capability relating to an organization should be flexible to adapt 
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quickly to different internal and external threats.  Flexibility, or lack thereof, by the 
organizational structure would play a significant role in successfully dealing with both 
types of threats.  Other constraints are staff sizing and training, as well as political 
influences.  The purpose for understanding the capabilities of an organization is to know 
what its strengths and limits are.  Doing so not only allow managers to handle resources 
efficiently, but also set feasible goals based on the organization‟s capacity and time 
available.  Figure 2 illustrates a model by Horton, et. al (2003) demonstrating how 
organizational capacity affects organizational performance.  Technological, economic, 
cultural, and other managerial constraints limit an organization when implementing a 
policy.  How an organization manages its capabilities to reach a goal determines its 
success and effectiveness.   
 
Figure 2 – Organizational Capacity Effect on Organizational Performance 
 
       How does this apply to living wage ordinances?  By passing a living wage ordinance, 
the public‟s expectation is for the jurisdiction to effectively enforce, monitor, and 
evaluate its progress.  In most cases, elected officials pass the legislation and then shift 
responsibility through the bureaucracy for implementation.  Rules and regulations 
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delineate how orders pass from administrators to lower departments to execute.  That 
said, living wages require an implementation process consisting of clear and strict 
administrative controls for developing the ordinance and outlining roles and 
responsibilities during its execution.  However, Ulrich and Lake (1990) state that a 
situation having policy conflicts and/or ambiguities provide workers more discretion as 
how to carry out their tasks.  No approach can be effective if it is not within the capacity 
of the organization to incorporate it in the first place. 
       For living wages, one threat to organizational capability is the lack of resources 
dedicated to their implementation.  This is a circumstance noted in living wage 
implementation efforts as explained by Luce (2004).  Even as policies are developed, 
there are no guarantees that the resources would be available to carry them out especially 
if those able to provide the resources do not support the policies themselves.  As Luce 
(2004) mentions, in some cases, policymakers preferring to see the living wage fail 
would allow the ordinances to be passed and not provide the necessary resources - a 
result of a resistant organizational culture.   
       Political influences in this case would play a negative role in the living wage 
implementation culture because of a lack of political commitment.  Administrators would 
be prone in cases to delay policy decisions, provide minimal enforcement, neglect to 
monitor and enforce, and/or remain accountable to the policy‟s success or lack thereof.  
As to why this would occur, Tullock (1965) and Downs (1967) suggest that bureaucrats 
tend to utilize their own self-interest at times to administer a policy.  In addition, Downs 
(1967) mentions that a bureaucrat‟s personal goals could also interfere by establishing the 
amount of responsibility one would be willing to accept over implementing such a policy.  
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Combinations of these factors without internal organizational checks or external 
stakeholder pressures limit the living wage‟s effectiveness. 
       To implement a policy successfully, there is a need for a rational approach at the core 
of the process to provide a structured and organized method of decision-making.  
Bowsher (1985) and Daft (1998) believe that a rational model for effective and efficient 
policymaking and implementation should consist of the following five components:   
 Defining the goal/objective – Daft (1998) mentions that one must properly 
identify goals or objectives before taking further steps.  Identifying them would 
allow policymakers to decide on the appropriate course(s) of action in anticipation 
to potential challenges during implementation.  
 Planning – Bowsher (1985) describes this step as systematically sifting through 
alternatives to determine the best approach to address the problem.  It is also the 
point where personnel and objectives are clearly drawn and tied together.  Daft 
(1998) identifies this step as developing and evaluating the alternatives through 
statistical techniques or prior personal experiences.   
 Budgeting – As mentioned, resource allocation is critical for the success of any 
policy.  At this point, one must identify the necessary funding, personnel, and 
technology while developing a plan to ensure their availability when required.  
Bowsher (1985) believes that this is required in addition to justifying their 
purpose to allocate the right resources to implementing the policy correctly.    
 Execution – With a course of action determined and the necessary resources 
allocated, one then carries out the policy.  Daft (1998) mentions that the 
monitoring phase begins during implementation to evaluate its effectiveness 
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eventually.  Also, Bowsher (1985) states that the purpose of identifying roles and 
objectives in the planning phase is to monitor them during implementation.   
 Evaluation – Bowsher (1985) states that the purpose of designing a policy 
“roadmap” is to hold those accountable to the objectives assigned to them.  In this 
phase, one identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the entire process and 
develops solutions to improve the policy.   
       Figure 3 illustrates how each step relates to each other and how the rational process 
is cyclical in nature.  Daft (1998) mentions that the rational approach is a continuous 
process wherein an organization must assess the effectiveness of the policy and identify 
areas for possible improvement.  This is part of a learning process the organization must 
partake to improve its policies.  Senge (1990) states that an organization should strive to 
learn from its actions in order to meet future demands and changes.  It is a collective 
effort that goes beyond an organization‟s continued evolution, but that of human 
intelligence itself. 
 
Figure 3 – Rational Management Process 
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Administrative Factors 
       This section examines the administrative component of implementation, its 
fundamental factors, and approach.  To begin with, an organization‟s structure serves as a 
foundation illustrating how divisions of labor are developed and managed.  By delegating 
authority to subordinates, it details roles and responsibilities downward through the 
hierarchy to execute a policy.   
       Organizational Structure 
       Boleman and Deal (2003) define organizational structure as “a blueprint for formal 
expectations and exchanges among internal players (executives, managers, employees) 
and external constituencies (customers and clients).”  (p. 46)  It is essentially the 
fundamental instrument for an organization to achieve its desired outcome.  Weber 
(1946) envisioned organizational structure as a means for managing power and 
accountability.  The authority that emerges from this type of structure establishes specific 
rules and procedures for subordinates to adhere to for establishing control within the 
organization and minimize political hurdles.  Burns and Stalker (1961) mention that 
structure can support an organization in a stable environment in the following ways: 
 Specialized differentiation of functional tasks 
 Vertical interaction – superior to subordinate 
 Precise definition of roles, responsibilities, and procedures to each functional role 
 Reinforcement of hierarchical levels from higher levels 
 Chain of command where decisions are made by supervisors only 
 Loyalty and faith in supervisors by subordinates 
 
One purpose of an organizational structure is to standardize processes based on clarity 
and understanding amongst every level within the organization thus allowing for an 
effective managerial approach to link policies with organizational action.  Hummel 
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(2008) supports Weber‟s idea and states that the purpose of organization and information 
sharing is to distinguish simple actions from rational organized action.  The difference is 
that through rational, organized action, one understands how it relates to a goal or 
objective.  Understanding one‟s role would allow for better productivity in the end.  
Taylor‟s (1916) idea of scientific management utilizes a well-organized structure with 
hierarchical levels of authority that would allow the organization to perform at optimal 
levels.  Therefore, it would represent the most efficient design intended to coordinate 
systematically all organizational efforts to a common purpose.   
      While Weber (1946) argues that the bureaucratic structure, like Taylor‟s (1916), is the 
most efficient organizational model available, hierarchies of authority bring about 
promise that a properly structured organization can optimize its effectiveness.  As 
Mintzberg (1979) mentions, a hierarchy of authority develops as organizations become 
more complex.  It evolves from managers to workers outlining roles and responsibilities.  
Moreover, Jacques (1990) believes that hierarchies create a system that would allow 
organizations to infuse accountability, allowing workers to stake claim to the products 
and services produced.  Its intention is to maximize knowledge and skill as it relates to 
the complexity of the work accomplished.  However, the effective way to apply authority 
is to focus on the ends more than the means.   
       Contrary to Weber‟s (1946) and Taylor‟s (1916) arguments, Blau and Scott (1962) 
argue that tasks should flow through guidelines and suggestions and not as orders to give 
workers the needed flexibility to do the task while remaining within the desired control of 
those higher in the organization.  Follett (1926) mentions that providing workers with this 
flexibility would grant them a sense of empowerment that would ensure greater 
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productivity and efficiency.  This establishes some limitations on structure itself that 
would allow for some flexibility in cases when internal and external environments shift 
rapidly.   
       Luce (2004) mentions that accountability is an important factor usually missing in 
implementation.  Accountability is applicable to living wages from an internal and 
external organizational perspective.  Externally, contractors must comply with the 
ordinance and provide applicable employees with the living wage.  Internally, 
organizations expect their administrators to fulfill their roles meaning that contract 
administrators should monitor contractors; living wage advisory members are to oversee 
the implementation process and report their status to commissioners; commissioners are 
to allocate the necessary resources to departments to fulfill their roles as expected.  As a 
result, an organization instituting a sound structure emphasizing clear and simple 
methods of control, communication, and accountability is essential for policy 
implementation success.  
       For this to occur, a rational approach towards implementation is necessary for an 
organization to function appropriately.  However, implementation does not occur on its 
own.  It is necessary to have a policy in place beforehand with clear goals and means to 
apply it.   
      Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) identify six components to effective 
implementation.  These components relate to the rational models provided by Daft (1998) 
and Bowsher (1985): 
 Healthy environment supporting actors and the implementation process 
 Incentive for actors to carry out the implementation 
 Formal structures and procedures 
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 Policies representing goals and purpose 
 Committed implementation performance 
 Feedback on policies and performance 
 
       A strong culture and healthy environment supporting these components would limit 
the politics and ambiguity capable of opposing the implementation process from its 
intended purpose.  Assuming the necessary commitment to implement the plan was 
available, clearly outlined schedules and procedures would help to ensure everyone 
understood their role and purpose.  This coincides with Weber‟s (1946) idea that clarity 
allows for more commitment and participation by workers, thus increasing an 
organization‟s overall level of performance.  Lastly, feedback is critical not only for the 
final evaluation of the process, but also its continuous monitoring.  Periodic evaluations 
during implementation are essential in order to spot problems in their early stages. 
       There are several factors for the implementation process critical to simplifying the 
procedure: (1) a capable staff to carry out the policy; (2) hierarchical control; and (3) 
open communications.  Overall, administrators at the top of an organizational hierarchy 
should be capable of making decisions and entrust their subordinates to carry their 
directives into action.  However, even if workers faithfully adopt the directives, Van 
Meter and Van Horn (1975) believe that managers should monitor the implementation 
progress closely.  Palumbo, et al. (1984) acknowledge that superiors are somewhat 
disconnected from the lower levels of an organization‟s hierarchy.  Trusting workers to 
implement a policy as expected relies mainly on the regulations in place rather than the 
subordinates themselves.  There is a need for transparency not only in the directives 
handed down, but also in the feedback to decision-makers by participants throughout the 
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organization and external stakeholders.  This allows for better understanding all-around 
and the likelihood of a stronger implementation process because ambiguity is limited. 
Political Factors 
       This section focuses on the political component of the administrative/political 
dichotomy.  It aims to examine the dynamics of politics and organizational theory as to 
how negotiations and bargaining can serve as a critical component during 
implementation.  To begin with, an explanation on organizational politics outlines the 
potential effects on organizational decision-making.  The following section dispels the 
negative typecast relating to how politics hinders implementation when in fact it can offer 
the potential for flexibility and innovation.  Second, the discussion on organizational 
culture and stakeholders helps to define the concepts and examine their abilities to 
influence policies.          
Organizational Politics 
       Organizational behavior is the result of the confluence between two or more parties.  
This is contrary to the beliefs of those favoring an administrative approach based on 
authority and compliance.  In fact, the administrative perspective is viewed as being 
naïve and unrealistic from the political perspective.  Politics result from having scarce 
resources where two or more parties share a common interest.  Mintzberg (1983) 
mentions that there are five bases of power aiming to control (a) a resource, (b) a 
technical skill, (c) knowledge, (d) authority to control, and (e) access to these four.  Each 
of these bases of power represents a conflict for a limited resource or advantage one party 
might have or want over another.  Nevertheless, these conflicts can be a necessary and 
healthy component to an organization‟s effectiveness.  Politics can play a negative role 
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given its characteristic of being self-serving; however, it does provide a positive 
influence by creating a positive scenario for networks and communication linkages to 
succeed.  Nevertheless, Boleman and Deal (2003) mention that if the conflict cannot be 
resolved, the question then becomes how to manage it.  Ultimately, the organization 
would have to act in the interests of those with the most collected power in order to 
appease the stronger stakeholders. 
       A fundamental aspect in understanding how organizations operate is first to 
recognize the influence power has over authority and management theory.  Pfeffer (1981) 
believes there are certain ways in which power can influence an organization.  For 
instance, authority manages to impose values and guidelines on people.  Authority is 
legitimate power once subordinates choose and accept its influence.  This explanation 
simply describes how power influences the organizational decision-making processes.  
When combining this process with administrative controls, one can have a better 
rationalization as to how and why organizations act as they do. 
Organizational Culture 
       Organizational culture defines the nature of an organization.  Schein (1992) believes 
there are two dimensions of organizational culture – internal and external.  The internal 
culture concentrates on integrating needed changes in order to allow the external culture 
to adapt to environmental changes.  From an external perspective, the culture can be 
multifaceted to reflect the external environment‟s dynamics.  It serves to control behavior 
and encourage stability in how an organization manages its resources and objectives.  At 
that point, organizational culture can possess a strong influence on both administrative 
and political components of the policy dichotomy.  The culture strength, as Daft (1998) 
  30 
states, represents an organizations acceptance or rejection of its organizational values.  
The stronger the consensus, the more fluidly an organization should operate.  Conversely, 
the stronger the opposition, the more likely the process could run into challenges and 
potential failure.  Overall, organizational culture helps to rationalize how an organization 
identifies its purpose, develops courses of action, resolves conflicts, and responds to 
change.  It helps to promote consistency and character, however, its reluctance to accept 
change and diversity can explain why organizations may fail. 
       Another point to consider is the fact that organizations are capable of having more 
than one culture.  As Trice and Beyer (1993) explain, detailed divisions of labor in large 
organizations that sub-organizations develop their own subcultures to function properly.  
Consequently, the larger organization‟s culture represents all the subcultures combined.  
Subcultures, like normal organizational cultures, have internal and external dynamics 
focused on internal integration and external adaptation.  In their case, subculture 
adaptations relate to fulfilling the roles demanded by the larger organization.  Similar to 
regular cultures, subcultures also define the nature of the sub-organization.  In fact, even 
as its primary focus is to work towards the goal of the general organization, how it 
perceives and manages its tasks can differ from that of the organization.  The subculture 
can diverge from the general culture.  That said, how a sub-organization integrates and 
interacts can be different from other sub-organizations.  This means that their interactions 
and reactions to external factors beyond the general organization can be completely 
different from how the organization responds.  As a result, the administrative and 
political factors driving each sub-organization can be different and one must recognize 
these distinctions accordingly. 
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       The culture defining the external environment also plays a significant role in defining 
an organization‟s internal culture, as illustrated in Figure 2.  South Florida‟s economic 
and political culture, for example, is not conducive to support living wage legislation.  As 
Koven (1999) explains, Southern states, like Florida, tend to support a more conservative, 
traditional, individualistic budgeting and political culture.  This means budgetary and 
public policies follow a hierarchical system responsive mainly to elites and their interests.  
For example, Florida is a right-to-work state.  This suggests that Florida‟s economic and 
political conservative culture might not generate adequate support for living wages to 
succeed and continuously receive political support.  Even if this type of legislation 
passes, it could be susceptible to inadequate enforcement due to budget policies based 
heavily on social ties and longstanding business relationships.     
       South Florida also has an extensive history of mismanaged social programs in which 
political cronyism diverts most benefits to elites rather than to those originally designed 
to help.  In 2007 alone, the Miami Herald exposed the Miami-Dade County Housing 
Agency and the Miami-Dade Empowerment Trust for questionable contracting practices, 
cronyism, and failed to assist the projects actually intended.  In fact, Miami-Dade County 
recently surrendered control of the Housing Agency to U.S. Housing and Urban 
Development to investigate the extent of the corruption and to develop better ways to 
ensure the department is effective and accountable.  (Pinzur, 2007)  The Empowerment 
Zone has been a major disappointment in the community by failing to meet any of its 
expectations.  Instead, the Empowerment Zone funded pet projects of local officials, 
failed to attract or maintain businesses in its target area or support the local labor force.  
(Grotto and Hiassen, 2007)  These examples demonstrate that the political culture is not 
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entirely conducive to support such socially targeted projects and Miami-Dade County 
may not support an implicitly redistributive policy such as the living wage. 
Stakeholders 
       Daft (1998) mentions that satisfying stakeholder groups is one way to measure 
organizational effectiveness.  Stakeholders are any interested and/or affected parties 
resulting from an organization‟s policies and/or performance.  Pfeffer (1981) points out 
that to understand the political climate surrounding a policy, one must focus on the 
stakeholders involved and their influence.  He explains that power flows within an 
organization and those staking a claim to an organization‟s policy.  Mintzberg (1983) 
believes that internal and external stakeholders play an equal role in determining how an 
organization acts.  Internal stakeholders jockey their positions to maintain their place or 
move higher in the organizational hierarchy.  External stakeholders maneuver to 
influence the decision-making of an organization in attempts to develop policies in their 
favor.  Figure 2 demonstrates this idea.  Luce (2005) states that advocates have the 
influential power over governments with living wages to promote strict monitoring and 
enforcement in addition to transparent policy evaluations.     
       From a living wage standpoint, the stakeholder interests involved complicate the 
policy implementation process.  Since these interests are motivated by distinct political 
economies, implementing a policy is not as simple as forcing it down an organizational 
hierarchy.  Mill (1863) states that it is human nature for an individual to maximize his/her 
utility.  From a governing perspective, this also relates to both legislators and the public.  
Downs (1957) argues that legislators would act on the preference of the median voter.  
  33 
Since the public is trying to maximize its utility, the public official will side with what 
the majority of the public wants to increase his/her chances of political victory.   
       These groups create alliances to consolidate their power and become a stronger force 
to influence government action.  This is evident in most living wage campaigns since 
they normally begin at the grassroots level.  Given Luce‟s (2004) skepticism concerning 
government efforts to implement a living wage effectively, the extent to which a 
community involves itself in the implementation process can help to determine a policy‟s 
success.  The benefit of a strong community presence is that it can serve as a watchdog 
overseeing a policy's implementation.  Moreover, communities also command an 
influence over policymaking through “protest politics” where complaint letters and 
demonstrations serve as effective methods to voice their opinion over government action.  
In cases where individual voices are ineffective, one could see where the emergence of 
such alliances and community action would evolve. 
Living Wage Implementation 
       Roles and responsibilities remain in question since the focus in living wage policy is 
to pass the ordinance while leaving implementation overlooked.  As Luce (2004) 
mentions, “city councils may pass the ordinances, but support for policy passage is not 
the same thing as support for enforcement.”  (p. 99)  While she believes that clear lines of 
authority and a manageable political environment are needed, a key factor overlooked in 
living wage implementation is how the “street-level bureaucrats” play a critical role in 
the process.  Luce (2004) explains, “while it is useful to distinguish between the role of 
the legislators and administrators, the bulk of this research misses one crucial aspect of 
policy implementation: the role of the community.”  (p. 5) 
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       Luce (2004) asks, “How is it that a policy can be passed with enthusiastic support 
and then never be implemented?”  (p. 95)  The factors that lead to living wage 
implementation failures are a combination of policy ambiguity, miscommunication, 
incongruent goals, organizational capacity, and failure to commit necessary resources.  
(Luce, 2004)  The administrative effort to draft and pass living wage legislation simply 
gets the process started.  How stakeholders accept the legislation and how far they are 
willing to participate should be the primary concern.  One solution is through strict and 
consistent penalties compelling contractors to comply, an idea shared by Van Meter and 
Van Horn (1975).  Another would be to have the opportunities for communication and 
negotiations amongst stakeholders to develop acceptable means and ends to the policy.  
New Public Management 
       Since the 1990‟s, governments have taken a different approach in providing public 
services by supporting better customer service, greater accountability, and improved 
service quality through decentralization, performance measurements, and open 
competitive bidding processes.  The aim was not only to provide better public service, but 
also to redefine government and closely monitor the policy inputs, outputs, and outcomes 
that determine how effective and efficient governments actually are.  Measuring these 
factors is critical to an organization‟s success as well.  Joyce (1993) mentions that by 
properly defining its measures, an organization is capable of accurately assessing its 
strengths, limitations, challenges, and objectives.  Performance measurements serve as 
motivational tools to encourage organizations to strive to meet performance goals.  These 
concepts not only “reinvented” government management and service provisions, as 
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Osborne and Gaebler (1993) explain, but public policymaking as well.  (Frederickson and 
Smith, 2003) 
       Kettl (2000) provides six core issues that define the New Public Management (NPM) 
movement.  They serve to identify a government‟s policy mission, role, capacity, and 
internal and external relationships.  These core issues are: 
 Productivity – With demands for public services increasing, it is a challenge for 
governments to provide a consistent level of service with limited resources.  
Governments are aware of the public pressure more than ever to “do more with 
less.”  This calls for an assessment of services and processes to determine better 
and more efficient practices allowing governments to reallocate resources to 
provide additional services without sacrificing their current levels of provision. 
 Marketization – Governments began to contract their services out to other 
organizations by utilizing the markets to develop competitive biddings and 
benchmarking and compelling potential bidders to provide public services.  
Utilizing scorecard methodologies and other criteria, governments are able to 
choose objectively the lowest bidding contractor capable of providing the best 
quality service. 
 Service Orientation – Governments have had to implement a more customer-
friendly approach in dealing with the public.  The aim has been to redevelop the 
public trust and improve customer satisfaction of public services.  Efforts made 
by governments to determine what the public needs and work towards meeting 
those goals in addition to serving other public demands is a priority. 
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 Decentralization – The intention of decentralizing services is not only to 
restructure governments by flattening hierarchies and making them more 
responsive to public demand, but also to create a productive partnership with 
other organizations in providing public services.  In the process, greater 
accountability placed on contract selections, performance benchmarks, and policy 
inputs and outputs ensure that services provided are at the best quality and 
efficiency possible. 
 Policy – By becoming more efficient, governments are able to be more successful 
seeing as strategically allocated resources can address additional public demands 
while not sacrificing the quality and effectiveness of current policies. 
 Accountability – Government must accomplish what they promise to garner the 
public's trust.  There needs to be an emphasis on developing clearer roles, 
policies, and procedures to make government‟s overall processes more transparent 
to the public.  The shift would make specific agencies and individuals directly 
responsible for the success of a policy.  In the process, this would help to identify 
policy strengths and weaknesses better during policy evaluations. 
       Aside from these core issues, several strategies reflect the NPM ideals suggested by 
Osborne and Plastrick (2000) that would be applicable to living wage implementation.  
One goal is to apply greater clarity to policy goals and objectives to simplify processes.  
Osborne and Plastrick (2000) state that communication and transparency are critical to 
policy evaluation.  Another is to create an incentive-based methodology that allows for 
greater transparency and competition amongst public, private, non-government 
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organizations delivering public services.  The following examples briefly explain how 
performance measurements help to make organizations more effective. 
 Competitive Benchmarking – Benchmarking serves as an effective tool to manage 
a policy or organization strategically.  Based on a specific criterion, one can 
assess strengths and weaknesses and develop best practices to ensure the 
achievement of the most effective and efficient outcome.  Competitive 
benchmarking relates to comparing several organizations to the criteria set to 
determine the better organization.  Two benefits stand out by doing this.  First, 
organizations clearly understand what their expectations are and they need to plan 
accordingly.  Second, given the competitive nature of the process, organizations 
are compelled to outperform other organizations in order to gain an advantage.  
The result is a rational, transparent process developed through systematic 
planning and evaluation that encourages organizations to perform at their best.  
Osborne and Plastrick (2000) 
  Performance Contracting – A part of the competitive benchmarking process is to 
develop an agreement with a contractor to perform a service and to meet certain 
results.  The performance benchmarks serve as a measuring tool to determine 
whether an organization‟s performance was above, below, or simply average.  
The benefit of this approach is that top managers are accountable for the 
organization‟s performance and meeting the contract‟s goals.  Osborne and 
Plastrick (2000) 
 Employee Suggestion Programs – These are programs where employees have an 
open line of communication with top administrators to make suggestions to 
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improve performance and implement better practices.  In some cases, like 
whistleblower programs, they help to identify improper, even criminal, actions.  
Living wage enforcement depends heavily on contracted workers reporting if they 
receive adequate and consistent payment for their labor.  However, many refuse to 
do this out of fear possibly losing their jobs.  Ensuring that such programs exist 
and that workers are safe to notify when a contractor is not complying with the 
ordinance is critical to the living wage‟s success.  (Luce, 2004) 
       NPM‟s goal is for organizations to understand how inputs, outputs, and outcomes 
formulate a successful policy during which performance measurements would serve as 
the measuring tool to evaluate an organization‟s capabilities for success.  To implement a 
policy successfully, there needs to be a clear understanding as to who is involved and to 
what capacity.  There also needs to be a clear delineation of goals, objectives, and 
procedures to prevent the policy from deviating from its intended course.  Another 
critical component NPM emphasizes is communication and information sharing by all 
parties involved.  The more open the lines of communication are, the better one can 
assess the challenges, capacities, and effectiveness by each stakeholder to remain 
successful.  In other words, without proper communication there cannot be accurate 
information that would allow an organization to remain aware of the status of both its 
internal and external environment.  Lastly, organizations must be fully attentive to their 
strengths and weaknesses (and performance measures would serve as the rational tool 
throughout the entire process) in order for them to plan their objectives and course(s) of 
action accordingly.  The result is an organization designed to learn from its experiences 
and those of others in order to improve its service delivery and implementation. 
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       The ability and willingness for an organization to learn is essential to its 
development.  Cook and Yanow (1993) state that individuals within an organization must 
first demonstrate the capacity and willingness to learn before the organization has a 
chance.  In other words, the aggregate effect of what individuals learned would represent 
what the organization learns.  Schön (1983) believes that to learn, one must reflect on the 
problem faced, examine the steps taken to resolve the problem, redefine the problem after 
post-implementation, and make any necessary adjustments if needed until one solves the 
problem.  This relates to the rational management process discussed earlier, however, the 
emphasis at this point is that organizations purposely make the effort to understand its 
past actions to improve on them in the future.  However, having individual development 
equate to organizational learning and developing is a challenge if the organizational 
culture is not supportive.  Cook and Yanow (1993) and Schön (1983) agree that having a 
culture unsupportive of reflecting on organizational actions would hamper organizational 
development.  To counter such a culture and allow the organization to evolve, Senge 
(1990) believes that communication is critical to share ideas, express concerns, and allow 
feedback to travel throughout the organization.   
Overall, policy ambiguity and conflict confound and hinder administrators from 
implementing a policy as effectively and efficiently as possible.  The administrative and 
political factors discussed in this chapter represent stakeholder interests and 
organizational protocols that reflect in mixed, and at times inconsistent, internal and 
external organizational cultures that amount to an organization‟s effort to implement a 
policy.  Applying the New Public Management ideals would allow for more 
accountability and strategic planning of a policy, however, without communication, an 
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organization is not capable of assessing a policy‟s progress accurately.  Ultimately, a 
policy‟s implementation depends on open lines of communication where clearly defined 
roles and responsibilities, in conjunction with stakeholder input, allow for strategically 
planned policies meet their intended goals. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
       This chapter provides an overview of the qualitative and quantitative methods 
employed in this study.  Through a qualitative approach, this study examined the 
relationships and actions influencing the living wage implementation processes of 
Miami-Dade and Broward Counties.  Through a quantitative approach, the survey 
utilized helped to generalize the case study findings to jurisdictions nationwide.  This 
chapter provides the rationale for each approach.  In addition to the comprehensive 
description of the research design, this chapter examines the dependent and independent 
variables and survey instrumentation.  
Research Question 
       The literature review concluded that research is limited in living wage policy.  This 
study examines the following research question to help fill this research gap: 
Which administrative and political factors influence living wage 
implementation and to what extent? 
 
The purpose is to develop a model detailing the complexities of living wage 
implementation.  This study aims to examine the effects administrative and political 
factors can have on living wage policy.  As a result, the sub-questions presented below 
examine these contexts: 
 How does organizational capacity influence living wage implementation? 
 How does organizational culture influence living wage implementation? 
 How do stakeholder interests influence living wage implementation? 
 Does a deep-rooted, permanent, political commitment exist in support of a living 
wage in Broward and Miami-Dade Counties?  What is the impact of its presence 
or absence? 
 How do grassroots movements influence living wage implementation? 
 
  42 
       Three theories – Wilson (1887) and Goodnow‟s (1900) Administrative/Political 
Dichotomy, Matland‟s (1995) Ambiguity/Conflict Matrix, and Luce‟s (2004) living wage 
implementation model – were presented in the literature review to serve as foundations 
for this study‟s premise in order to help detail the intricacies of living wage 
implementation.  These theories apply to this study‟s assumptions as such: 
 Wilson (1887) and Goodnow (1900) state that a combination of administrative 
and political factors exist in all facets of public policy decision-making.  This 
study plans to detail these factors and their significance in living wage 
implementation.  For example, Broward and Miami-Dade Counties claim that 
100% and about 90% of their contractors respectively pay their employees living 
wage rates on a consistent and timely basis, post information regarding the 
ordinance visible to employees, and provide health benefits when applicable.  
However, to expand on the theory, this study intends to show that the more 
prevalent factors can dictate the implementation approach (top-down or bottom-
up). 
 Matland‟s (1995) matrix argues that the level of policy conflict and ambiguity 
determines the effectiveness of administrative and political factors in policy 
implementation.  The greater the level of conflict and ambiguity that arises, the 
more political the implementation process becomes. 
 Luce‟s (2004) implementation model emphasizes the importance of grassroots 
movements.  The presence of grassroots influence can increase the likelihood of 
successful living wage implementation; however, their presence and influence 
tends to diminish as time passes upon an ordinance's adoption.   
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Research Design 
      Rosenbloom (1995) states the following regarding case studies: 
“Case studies of the implementation of reforms can potentially tell public 
managers what to do and what to avoid; what works and what does not in 
specific circumstances.  They can improve understanding of the changes 
that are under way.  Cases may also help the field to frame concepts, 
theories and research in ways that advance systematic knowledge about 
public administration.” (p. 44) 
 
The evaluation of policy implementation can be context-specific.  Yin (1994) explains 
that case studies serve best to answer “how” and “why” questions regarding the situation 
being examined.  The case study approach incorporated for this study examines the 
administrative and political contexts of implementing a living wage in Miami-Dade and 
Broward Counties.  
       A qualitative approach is applicable to examining policy implementation 
emphasizing the contexts involved.  As the literature review explains, the contexts to 
which policy implementation must adhere to can determine the course of action and 
ultimate outcome.  Matland‟s (1995) matrix can explain the degree of policy conflict and 
ambiguity based on the implementation situation at hand.  The aim is to emphasize the 
importance of analyzing contextual categories and variables to understand living wage 
implementation at a greater depth.   
       Specifically, qualitative studies concentrate more on complex interactions and 
relationships than quantitative methods do.  Qualitative methods seek to understand the 
intricacies that make cases unique while quantitative methods focus on how to generalize 
to larger populations.  This demonstrates that both methods have their strengths and 
weaknesses. (Ragin, 1987)  Nevertheless, Yin (1994) states that what dictates the 
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methods of choice depend on the research question(s).  Given that this study intends to 
identify significant factors that influence policy implementation and how they relate to 
each stakeholder, a case study design is the most applicable approach to achieve this. 
       A benefit of case study research is the rich and detailed data it is capable of 
collecting and analyzing.  However, a limitation case studies have is the poor ability to 
generalize results to a larger population.  Different variables are attributable to a 
phenomenon beyond what a single case study might be able to examine.  Therefore, 
drawing comparisons through surveys on how both Counties, as well as jurisdictions 
nationwide, apply similar ordinances would increase the significance of the findings.   
       The objective here is to simplify the complexities resulting from the holistic 
approach of case studies while still managing to induce causality.  In other words, since 
they reinforce each other, qualitative studies gather support through quantitative analysis 
and vice versa.  As Ragin (1987) states, quantitative and qualitative research methods can 
achieve one objective, but hardly ever both.  The case-oriented strategy incorporating 
qualitative measures attempts to interpret contextual factors to explain a particular 
phenomenon.  The variable-oriented strategy utilizing quantitative methods dissects cases 
into variables for the sake of testing hypotheses for a general population.  Ragin (1987) 
proposes a combination of both that would utilize each strategy‟s strengths in order for 
case study findings to be more wide-ranging. 
Site Selection 
       There are several reasons for the selection of Miami-Dade County.  First, the County 
has had its ordinance in place for eight years.  Second, the Living Wage Commission 
overseeing the implementation efforts indicates that the County is committed to ensuring 
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the ordinance's proper enforcement.  Luce (2004) notes that the County has taken an 
expansive effort in its implementation process by having an oversight committee and 
attentiveness to payroll audits of contracted businesses.  Third, the County currently has 
over 300 open living wage-applicable contracts that affect thousands of workers 
throughout Miami-Dade.  These facts demonstrate that the living wage ordinance is an 
established law that has the potential of making a strong impact on the local community 
and its economy. 
       Broward County's selection regarded its proximity to Miami-Dade County and for 
other reasons.  Broward implemented its ordinance in 2002 and relied heavily on Miami-
Dade County when developing its ordinance and implementation plan.  Broward County 
also handles a fraction of the number of contracts that Miami-Dade County does (roughly 
60).  There are also differences in the political climates in each county given the number 
of living wage contracts and efforts by external stakeholders to influence the policy‟s 
implementation.  Still, their similarities (and differences in some cases) in policies, 
presence of advisory boards, and implementation plans, and to Miami-Dade County made 
Broward County a practical jurisdiction to compare and contrast.   
Qualitative Analysis 
       Yin (1994) suggests that one follow a structured approach when developing a case 
study incorporating interviews, participant observations of events and interactions, as 
well as the collection and content analysis of relevant archival documents.  Janesick 
(2000) states a similar point in that a systematic approach to collecting and analyzing data 
is essential for a rigorous qualitative study.  In essence, what both Yin (1994) and 
Janesick (2000) are proposing is that a solid case study should consist of a triangulation 
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of data collection methods.  The purpose of triangulation is to strengthen a study‟s 
findings by utilizing several methods or data sources to arrive at the same conclusion.  As 
Padgett (1998) states that triangulating research methods adds to the credibility of the 
eventual findings given that the approach benefits from the strengths of the methods 
utilized.  Patton (1993) adds that it also helps to test for consistencies in the data collected 
and aids in curtailing the effects of validity threats as further explained below.  The result 
produces a more rigorous study that addresses the limitations of its methods by 
complimenting it with the strengths of others.  That said, this study triangulates data 
sources by conducting interviews, participant observations, and examination of County 
records - one of the more applicable and commonly used triangulation approaches 
according to Patton (1993).  The following explains these methods, their purpose, and 
their application in regards to this study: 
 Interviews – Lofland and Lofland (1984) note that interviews are a valuable 
qualitative research source of information.  Interviews will be the main qualitative 
data collection approach for this study.  The benefit of interviewing is that one has 
greater control over the data collection. (Padgett, 1998)  This study‟s goal is to 
interview administrators from both counties involved with implementing the 
living wage to generate a direct perspective as to the critical challenges and 
relationships influencing how decisions and actions take place within the County 
governments.  Conversely, there were interviews conducted with local labor 
activists and other stakeholders to develop the external perspective. 
 Participant Observation – Lofland and Lofland (1984) state that observations 
consist of “the interweaving of looking and listening.”  Living wage commissions 
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for both counties conduct monthly meetings in conjunction with several County 
departments to discuss pressing living wage matters such as violations, 
legislation, and resident and business concerns.  Moreover, both county 
commissions occasionally discuss living wage issues in their meetings.  In 
keeping with Yin‟s (1994) case study principles, there was no obtrusive 
participation conducted in both cases.  These observations will consist of 
attendance as these meetings and informal interviews with government officials 
and contractors.  Padgett (1998) states that the benefit of directly observing a case 
is to “capture all of the nuances” and collect rich data from different perspectives.  
(p. 66) 
 Archival Records – Patton (1993) states that to understand the context of an 
organization‟s actions, it is important to examine its history.  With contexts 
playing such an integral role in case studies, historical analysis is required.  
Archival records, such as past meeting minutes, memos, and other data, provided 
a historical perspective that will help to develop a fuller understanding of how 
each county has responded in implementing its living wage ordinance.   
       In addition to the research question, Table 3-1 outlines the supporting questions 
relating to the factors examined.  The aim is to develop a better understanding as to how 
these factors play roles in the implementation efforts by each county and why.  
Table 3-1 – Qualitative Factors of Interest in Living Wage Implementation 
Factor Question 
Policy Ambiguity/Conflict How does policy ambiguity and conflict influence 
policymaking? 
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Table 3-1 (continued) – Qualitative Factors of Interest in Living Wage Implementation 
Factor Question 
Symbolic Implementation Does this apply to living wage implementation? 
Organizational Culture What role does this play overall in the implementation 
process? 
Stakeholders How do they influence government action?   
  
Organizational Politics How do politics factor into the decision-making process? 
  
Organizational Capacity How could limited funding and personnel affect how each 
county implements the living wage? 
 
Quantitative Analysis 
 
       A survey administered to jurisdictions nationwide implementing living wage 
ordinances aimed to assess how other jurisdictions apply their own living wage 
ordinances and the factors they face in comparison with the findings provided in the case 
studies.  While case studies examine the complexities of dynamics derived from 
qualitative research, surveys provide researchers with the ability to generalize their 
findings to larger populations.  Fowler (2002) believes that surveys are especially useful 
in conducting unbiased sampling and standardized measurements. An unbiased sampling 
would ensure the validity of the data as to how precise the results would represent the 
population as a whole.  Standardized measurements would make certain that the 
information and measurements were consistent amongst all respondents.  Overall, 
surveys are capable of collecting additional information that qualitative methods perhaps 
could not do as effectively.   
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       As mentioned, the foundation of policy analysis depends on the applied contexts.  As 
a result, a critical goal is to define the constructs applying to living wage implementation.  
That said, Table 3-2 presents the independent variables that define the constructs. 
Table 3-2 - Independent Variable Definitions and Constructs 
Construct Ind. Variable Definition 
Policy Ambiguity Language Clarity The degree of clarity in the ordinance‟s 
language 
   
 Loopholes The effect loopholes have on the 
implementation process 
   
 Policy Ambiguity Degree ambiguity leads to political challenges 
   
 Policy Clarity Administrative orders are clear to those 
enforcing and monitoring the LWO 
   
 LWO Understanding The degree to which contractors understand 
what is expected of them 
   
Policy Conflict Resistance Degree of resistance by contractors to 
changes to the LWO 
   
 Policy Conflict Degree to where contractors are usually at 
odds with LWO regulations 
   
 Exploiting Loopholes The extent to which contractors would go 
to exploit loopholes in the LWO 
   
 Information Sharing The extent to which contractors would 
inform their employees about the LWO 
   
Stakeholders  Elected Officials The level of influence elected officials have 
on the implementation process 
   
 Contractors The level of influence contractors have on 
the implementation process 
 
 Grassroots The level of influence grassroots leaders 
have on the implementation process 
 
 Bureaucracy The level of influence county officials have 
on the implementation process 
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Table 3-2 (continued) - Independent Variable Definitions and Constructs 
Construct Ind. Variable Definition 
Org. Culture 
(Information) 
Improvements Level of commitment to address LWO 
policy errors and shortcomings 
   
 Information Access Degree to which information can be 
accessed or shared 
   
 Sufficient Data The amount of data collected meeting the 
jurisdiction‟s needs 
   
 Stakeholder Input The amount of input all stakeholders have 
in the implementation of the LWO 
   
 Consistency Enforcement is constant regardless of 
vendor 
   
 Penalties for Repeat 
Offenders 
The degree to which penalties increase for 
repeat offenders 
   
 Proportionate 
Penalties 
Severity of penalty is relative to the 
significance of the violation 
   
 Investigations Violations investigated in a timely manner 
   
 Timing of Penalty Timing of penalties after adjudication 
   
 LWO Waivers Extent vendors try to obtain waivers 
exempting themselves from the LWO 
 
Organizational 
Capacity 
  
Staffing Sufficient staff to manage the LWO 
   
Funding  Adequate funding dedicated towards 
implementing the LWO 
   
Organizational 
Politics 
Political Support Degree elected officials supported passing 
the LWO, but not its implementation. 
   
 Political Influence The degree to which politics interferes in 
the implementation process 
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Instrumentation 
 
       Interviews conducted from January to August 2006 focused on key administrative 
personnel from Miami-Dade and Broward Counties.  These respondents consisted in 
Miami-Dade County of senior-level administrators in the Department of Business 
Development and the Department of Procurement Management, Living Wage 
Commission members, and the contract compliance officers.  In Broward County, the 
respondents consisted of Living Wage Advisory Board members, senior-level 
administrators in the Purchasing Division, contract administrators, and department 
directors whose departments played vital roles in the implementation of the LWO.  
Meetings with administrators in both counties helped to provide the internal 
administrative perspective to understand the process necessary to manage a living wage.  
The information collected from advisory board members served to develop the external 
and/or grassroots perspective.  Many, if not all the members on each county‟s advisory 
boards identified themselves as living wage advocates, business owners, and generally 
concerned residents who were concerned to see the ordinance succeed in their counties.  
Overall, 29 interviews were conducted (16 in Miami-Dade County and 13 in Broward 
County). 
       The author taped the interviews requested each respondent to sign a consent form 
(Appendix D).  Only two respondents preferred not to participate in taped interviews.  
Upon completing the interviewing phase, the author transcribed and coded each 
interview.  As Patton (2002) mentions, coding is essential to organize and classify data 
into a framework.  Overall, coding proved to be useful in preserving accurate details from 
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the interviews and identifying trends amongst respondents to various questions and it was 
these trends that helped develop the basis of the survey administered.   
Table 3-3 – County Administrator Interview Questions 
Area of Focus Interview Questions 
Defining Success Define “successful implementation.” 
  
 Do politics play a part in your work?  How so? 
  
Contract 
Compliance 
Define “contract noncompliance.” 
  
 How do you resolve noncompliance? Explain your approach to 
monitor and enforce the living wage.  What do you particularly do?  
Provide examples. 
  
 What is the cause of noncompliance? 
  
 What is the strategy to correct this?  Do you support your strategy? 
  
Work Experience How long have you been a part of the implementation process? 
  
 Explain your relationship with co-workers and other departments. 
  
 What are your challenges to fulfilling your obligation to the LWO? 
  
 What do you think of the following statements? 
“Project managers are to blame for this.” 
“Enforcement is too lenient.” 
“Not enough is being done.”  
“We need more dedicated staff.” 
  
Work Experience 
Ambiguity & 
Conflict / Org. 
Culture 
Is staff turnover an issue? 
 
 How clear is the language in the ordinance? 
  
 How well does the county understand the factors it needs to address?  
  
 How clear are the ordinance provisions to contractors? 
  
 How much weight does the ordinance have in the contracting 
process? 
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Table 3-3 (continued) – County Administrator Interview Questions 
Area of Focus Interview Questions 
 How committed is the county to implementing the living wage? 
  
Org. Capacity How does this play a role? Are there any limitations? 
       
       Table 3-3 presents the interview questions posed to county administrators.  Table 3-4 
does the same for living wage advisory board members.  While both groups were asked 
similar questions, the questions differed somewhat given that both groups represent 
different aspects of the implementation process.  For instance, advisory board members 
are mainly responsible with overseeing the implementation of the ordinance while county 
administrators are mainly responsible for monitoring and enforcing the ordinance on 
contractors.  The aim is to develop different perspectives from both groups on the 
ordinance's implementation. 
Table 3-4 – Living Wage Advisory Board Interview Questions 
Area of Focus Interview Questions 
Defining Successful 
Implementation 
Define “successful implementation.” 
 
 What are your challenges in implementing the ordinance? 
  
 What are the strengths of your implementation approach? 
  
 How do you work alongside other departments?   
  
 Describe your relationship with your commissioner. 
  
 What else could there possibly be done to improve the approach? 
  
Org. Structure Do you agree or disagree with the way the County is organized to 
implement the ordinance? 
  
Org. Capacity How does this play a role? Are there any limitations? 
  
Contract 
Compliance 
Define “contract non-compliance.” 
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Table 3-4 (continued) – Living Wage Advisory Board Interview Questions 
Area of Focus Interview Questions 
 What are the reasons for non-compliance? 
  
 Describe the relationship with the contractors. 
  
 Describe the efforts currently taken to improve compliance. 
  
Stakeholders 
 
Are there any groups or individuals of the county/contractor 
relationship that play a role in how the policy is implemented?  
  
 Are they supportive or obstructive? 
  
Ambiguity & Conflict 
/ Org. Culture 
How clear is the language in the ordinance? 
 
 How well does the county understand the factors it needs to 
address?  
  
 How clear are the ordinance provisions to contractors? 
  
 How much weight does the ordinance have in the contracting 
process? 
  
 How committed is the county to implementing the living wage? 
 
       A standardized open-ended interview approach allowed respondents to detail their 
experiences and assessments of implementing a living wage ordinance.  Bickman and 
Rog (1998) state that standardizing interview questions and techniques are essential to 
have uniformity in the data collected and validity to the study‟s results.  Patton (2002) 
also mentions that grouping questions into particular topics helps to provide more 
structure to the interview and allows the respondent to concentrate more on the topics at 
hand.   
       The author conducted the survey from June to October 2006 (Appendix B) and 
contacted each jurisdiction listed by ACORN on its living wage website 
(http://www.livingwagecampaign.org) by phone and/or email to participate in the survey.  
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For those reached, each jurisdiction participated online through a website provided by the 
author.  Overall, 87 of the 118 jurisdictions were contacted (eight ordinances had been 
repealed or overturned
3
 and 23 jurisdictions could not to be reached).  Of those 87 
jurisdictions, 45 responded to some degree.  Of the 45 respondents, 12 specifically 
requested not to participate in the survey.  This is a systematic pattern included into the 
final analysis.  In addition, there were six cases removed for providing incomplete 
information thus leaving the sample size at 27 cases and the response rate at 31%.  This is 
an acceptable sample size given the population and accuracy percentage of 50%. (Weiss, 
1999)  Chapter 6 explains the specifics on the survey instrument in further detail. 
Reliability and Validity 
       Validity is crucial to any study as Shadish, et.al (2002) in order to generalize 
inferences made from this study to general populations and circumstances.  They also 
state that given the lack of a single approach to eliminate the possibility of validity threats 
triangulating qualitative and quantitative methods as Ragin (1987) proposes would help 
to control for these threats.  Chapter 6 explains the construct and variable reliability 
measured.  However, the application, documentation, and analysis of the methods taken 
towards each respondent group either interviewed or surveyed are identical to preserve 
consistent research methods and ensure reliability of each instrument. 
       Constructs are “the central means of connecting the operations used in an experiment 
to pertinent theory and the language communities will use to inform practical action.” 
(Shadish, et. al, 2002)  Construct validity refers to how operationalized measures can be 
                                                 
3
 The following jurisdictions overturned, dissolved, or repealed their living wage ordinances between 2002 
and 2005: Eau Claire County, WI, the City of Eau Claire, WI, Hazel Park, MI, Hempstead, NY, Louisville, 
KY, Monroe County, MI, New Orleans, LA, and Pittsburgh, PA. 
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inferred to define and explain theoretical constructs.  Since implementation policies are 
context-specific, it is important to a context's validity to properly measure, define, and tie 
the concepts to the study‟s conceptual framework.  Patton (2002) mentions that probing 
beyond the basic answers given by respondents would help to expand on the information 
provided and exposes other details needing focus.  This approach helped to identify other 
factors and groups in the process during interviewing.  Shadish, et. al (2002) also 
recommend that one should “pattern-match” where instances explaining a construct 
deserve note.     
       Tables 3-2 through 3-4 present the survey and interview questions used to define 
certain concepts in an attempt to classify these ideas properly.  The approach of utilizing 
several constructs and various measurement approaches to explain the implementation 
process also meets another recommendation by Shadish, et. al (2002).  This study 
incorporated different approaches thus allowing different results to combine into one 
comprehensive definition for each construct.  In addition, the survey plays an important 
role in strengthening the validity that these construct have been adequately defined and 
operationalized.  Bickman and Rog (1998) explain that there is always some degree of 
error when defining constructs.  The survey and quantitative analysis helped to properly 
define these constructs.  However, evidence presented in Chapter 6 suggests that 
combined methods resulted in reliable constructs. 
       External validity concerns generalizing inferences to variations of populations, 
settings, and/or outcomes.  (Shadish, et. al, 2002)  The author pretested the survey by 
distributing it to several county administrators before its administration to the entire 
known population.  Upon collecting the data, statistical analysis verified whether 
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inferences made were comparable to other settings, populations, and outcomes.  The 
author believes that the triangulated methods resulted in a model that obviated threats to 
internal validity.    
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     CHAPTER IV 
BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA 
       This chapter presents the results collected through interviews conducted between 
February and August 2006 with the Broward County Living Wage Advisory Board 
(LWAB) and County personnel directly involved in the implementation of the living 
wage ordinance (LWO).  To begin with, this chapter offers an examination into Broward 
County‟s LWO implementation process, the individuals involved, and their participation.  
Second, the author provides the interview results from the LWAB and Broward County 
personnel.  
       The focus of this chapter is to develop a comprehensive definition as to what a 
successful implementation of the living wage means in Broward County.  The objective 
is to illustrate how LWAB members and County personnel view the LWO and what their 
priorities and objectives are.  Identifying the administrative and political factors 
surrounding the implementation process is also a key point.  The aim is to examine the 
effect each dynamic has on the County‟s LWO implementation efforts.  
Broward County‟s Living Wage Ordinance 
       This section introduces the living wage implementation process in Broward County.  
It offers information as to the provisions contained in the ordinance and summarizes the 
roles of key actors involved in the implementation process. 
       The Broward County Board of County Commissioners (BCC) adopted its living 
wage ordinance on October 1, 2003, by a vote of 5-4.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, July 14, 2006)  As stated in the ordinance, County contracts valued over 
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$100,000 annually providing the following services must comply with living wage 
regulations: (Broward County Living Wage Ordinance 2002-45, 2002) 
 Food preparation and/or distribution 
 Security Services 
 Routine maintenance services (custodial, cleaning, refuse removal, repair, 
refinishing, and recycling) 
 Clerical or other non-supervisory work, whether temporary or permanent 
 Transportation and parking services 
 Printing and reproduction services 
 Landscaping, lawn, and/or agricultural services 
       Provisions in the ordinance also apply to all Broward County employees.  At its 
inception, the ordinance ensured that covered employees working a minimum of 20 hours 
a week would receive an hourly minimum wage of $9.57 with an additional $1.25/hour 
towards health benefits or $10.82/hour without benefits.  The County indexes the living 
wage payroll rate to inflation each year based on the Miami PMSA Consumer Price 
Index.  As of October 2007, the living wage is currently at $10.63/hour with an additional 
$1.39/hour dedicated to employee health benefits or $12.02/hour without benefits and 
Broward County had 65 applicable contracts with 900 workers on these contracts earning 
the living wage or higher
4
.  (Broward County Purchasing Division, 2007) 
                                                 
4
 A Purchasing administrator explained that of the 900 workers about 300 are earning higher wages because 
of the ordinance.  The rest of the workers were already earning well above the rate because of their 
specialized labor (mechanic, elevator repairman, etc.).  (Anonymous, personal communication, October 9, 
2007) 
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Figure 4 – Broward County Living Wage Implementation Organizational Model 
       Figure 4 illustrates the implementation process in Broward County.  The following 
outlines the roles and responsibilities of each actor and the execution of the overall 
process. 
 Board of County Commissioners (BCC) – the BCC represents the legislative arm 
of the LWO, is responsible for passing the ordinance initially, and possesses the 
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authority to amend it.  The BCC is also accountable for providing sufficient 
resources to all County departments through budgetary approvals and resolutions. 
 County Attorney’s Office (CAO) – The CAO handles all legal matters related to 
the LWO.  It is responsible for drafting the language contained in the ordinance, 
as well as, any other amendments to it.  The CAO also provides legal opinions on 
the applicability of covered services to the BCC, Purchasing Division, and the 
Living Wage Advisory Board.   
 Living Wage Advisory Board (LWAB) – The LWO created the LWAB with the 
responsibility of overseeing the County‟s implementation of the ordinance.  The 
Board consists of nine members appointed by each of the county commissioners 
and serve as BCC representatives that eventually report to the BCC.  The LWAB  
meets once a month to review reports by other County departments regarding the 
LWO, address any pressing matters concerning the implementation process, and 
monitor the ordinance‟s overall effectiveness and efficiency.  The LWAB is also 
able to advise staff departments and make recommendations regarding the 
implementation policy. 
 Purchasing Division – The Purchasing Division manages the implementation of 
the living wage contract requirements by including the LWO provision where 
applicable in County service contracts.  It also provides orientation, training, and 
policy updates to agencies and covered employers.  For example, Purchasing 
provides voluntary pre-bid conferences for all contractors to inform them of the 
LWO provisions.  It also determines and publishes the annual indexing of the 
living wage rate, which it then notifies all parties involved.  Purchasing serves as 
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Staff Liaison and Coordinator to the LWAB, provides monthly and/or quarterly 
staff reports to the Advisory Board, and works with other departments to address 
LWO matters.  Lastly, it coordinates with contract administrators to monitor 
covered employer audits and compliance issues. 
 Human Resources Division – This unit oversees that all County employees earn at 
least the living wage.  It also reports to the LWAB monthly on its status and any 
noncompliance issues. 
 Office of Professional Standards (OPS) – OPS also reports to the LWAB5.  This 
unit investigates covered employee complaints relating to any matters of living 
wage noncompliance.  It also takes final action in penalizing employers who do 
not comply with the LWO if the appointed contract administrator cannot first 
resolve the issue. 
 Contract Administrators – Contract administrators oversee the compliance aspect 
of the LWO to about 70 applicable service contracts.  They perform site visits, 
payroll audits, and verify proper displays of LWO signage in addition to resolving 
any issues of noncompliance and report their findings to the Purchasing Division.  
They also attend pre-bid and contract start-up meetings organized by Purchasing 
to help inform covered employers of the County‟s expectations of them and their 
contractual responsibilities in regards to the LWO.   
 Covered Employers – These are contractors awarded service contract(s) by 
Broward County applicable to the LWO.  As a result, aside from paying all 
                                                 
5
 OPS used to report to the LWAB on a monthly basis, however, this office recently became part of the 
Office of Equal Opportunity.  It still performs the same functions as before but does so now as a division of 
this office.   
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employees at least the living wage rate, they must post signage informing 
employees about the ordinance, as well as provide contract administrators with 
payroll information every six months to show their compliance under the LWO. 
 Covered Employees – These are individuals working for the covered employers 
who are the direct recipients of the living wage.  In the case that the employee 
does not receive the living wage that he/she is entitled to, they can file a 
complaint with the employer, contract administrator, and/or OPS to correct the 
matter. 
       Overall, the central focus of the implementation process is on the Purchasing 
Division and the LWAB.  The BCC and CAO are only involved when called upon.  The 
remaining staff departments dedicate time monthly to attend the LWAB meetings and 
comply with any recommendations made by the Advisory Board.  Beyond that, contract 
administrators deal with covered employers and their employees as need be.  Their 
interaction consists mostly on their six-month payroll audits that the Purchasing Division 
reviews and approves. 
Broward County Living Wage Advisory Board 
       This section focuses on assessing Broward County‟s implementation effort from the 
LWAB‟s perspective.  Specifically, how the Advisory Board perceives to execute the 
ordinance successfully, as well as the current challenges hampering the County‟s 
progress. 
       To define what implementing the living wage ordinance successfully means to 
LWAB members, or at least the essential factors needed, each member provided varied 
responses while identifying common themes.  A response by three of the five members 
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interviewed was that there needed to be public awareness promoting what the ordinance 
guarantees, its application, and how the administrative process works.  (Anonymous, 
personal communications, February 2; February 10; March 1, 2006)  Overall, every 
LWAB member interviewed believed that the County needed to promote the living wage 
more and work towards expanding it.  In addition, they recommended that the County 
should be more aggressive in enforcing the ordinance by systematically monitoring how 
contractors pay their employees, provide them with helpful information about the 
ordinance, and enforce more accurate reporting of employee records.  (Anonymous, 
personal communications, February 2; February 10; February 22; March 1; March 28, 
2006) 
       However, only one LWAB member mentioned that there are two additional critical 
factors needed to attain better enforcement, expand living wage coverage, and generate 
greater awareness.  First, there needs to be more support from the Board of County 
Commissioners (BCC).  The member states, “I think they direct staff and it seems to me 
that [County] staff needs a spirited commitment to not just be doing a job, but to make 
sure that all [of the County‟s] vigor and enthusiasm is behind the implementation.”  
(Anonymous, personal communication, February 10, 2006)  The LWAB member 
suggested that political influence on this issue flows mainly from top to bottom within the 
County government and explained that the BCC must provide support by allocating 
sufficient resources to departments needing sufficient personnel to monitor and enforce 
the ordinance.  This member also recommended that the County develop clearer policy 
directives and outcomes measuring the ordinance‟s outcome.  Such support by the BCC 
would help to set the example and develop an organizational culture where the living 
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wage would be an administrative priority.  (Anonymous, personal communication, 
February 10, 2006) 
       Two LWAB members mentioned that the LWO needs an avid grassroots movement 
that could direct public influence towards convincing the BCC to make the living wage a 
greater necessity.  BCC members would prioritize the living wage more if there were 
more supportive public displays for the LWO.  (Anonymous, personal communication, 
February 2; February 10, 2006)  This member suggested that community groups must get 
involved to contact workers, businesses, advocates, and public officials to develop a 
structured network committed to having a presence at the County‟s monthly living wage 
meetings and living wage lawmaking opportunities.  To accomplish this, a community-
driven movement would ensure that County administrators remain accountable to the 
public and committed to implementing the living wage while developing additional 
strategies to improve its effectiveness and broaden its scope.  However, maintaining such 
a level of interest is admittedly a daunting task since people tend to lose interest with time 
especially when they assume that the living wage issue is resolved with the BCC passing 
the ordinance.  (Anonymous, personal communication, February 10, 2006) 
       While the factors mentioned could help to strengthen the effectiveness of the 
ordinance, each LWAB member believed that there are several pressing challenges that 
could limit the long-term effect of the County‟s implementation effort and the 
ordinance‟s impact.  When asked if Broward County was successfully implementing their 
living wage ordinance, the common response by Board members was negative.  No 
member was able to say that the County‟s progress has been effective.  (Anonymous, 
personal communications, February 2; February 10; February 22; March 1; March 28, 
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2006)  Two members admitted to being unable to make a clear determination because 
there is no information outlining the ordinance‟s effect on workers or the local economy.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, February 2 and February 22, 2006)  Each 
member emphasized the fact that research is needed to evaluate the effect the living wage 
is actually having.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 2; February 10; 
February 22; March 1; March 28, 2006) 
       There were also concerns as to the ordinance‟s limitation in coverage.  “First of all, I 
can tell you that I wouldn‟t define ours as successful,” one member mentioned in regards 
to the number of living wage contracts the County currently manages
6.  “…We hope to 
make significant changes as opposed to helping one person at a time.” (Anonymous, 
personal communication, February 2, 2006)  To a certain extent, this member believed 
that the County is to blame for ineffectiveness because of its lack of commitment to make 
the living wage a high priority.  Three LWAB members agreed with this idea and feel 
that there is not enough administrative support provided to improve the implementation 
process. (Anonymous, personal communications, February 2; February 10; February 22, 
2006)  They admitted that County administrators are purposely slow in responding to 
LWAB requests.  Members also did not single any person or department as being solely 
responsible for the state of the ordinance‟s implementation; however, four LWAB 
members mentioned that Purchasing has given the Board misleading and/or incomplete 
information in response to several of their requests and the BCC was not as committed as 
                                                 
6
 Broward County had 37 living wage contracts at the time of this interview.  The County had 69 living 
wage contracts as of October 2007. 
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it should be in overseeing the implementation.  (Anonymous, personal communications, 
February 2; February 22; March 1; March 28, 2006)   
       It is the author‟s opinion that as a result, poor communication has lead to a tense 
relationship between some of the LWAB members and County administrative staff to the 
point where three Board members admitted to not trusting the County administration.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, February 2; February 22; March 1, 2006)  These 
members get the sense at times from Purchasing and other County departments that their 
requests add to what is already an administrative burden for them and feel as if they are 
imposing on them, or at least it is the impression they get from the County.  There is 
suspicion among three members that County personnel are deliberately not providing 
them with accurate information partly because departments are choosing to preserve the 
status quo in the County and they do not want to increase their workloads by 
implementing enforcement that is more stringent and monitoring practices.  (Anonymous, 
personal communications, February 2; February 22; March 1, 2006)  Each Board member 
did not blame County departments immediately for this, but cited the fact that the BCC 
was not as supportive as it should be and administrators accomplish the least expected of 
them.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 2; February 10; February 22; 
March 1; March 28, 2006) 
       Four LWAB members discussed that a lack of transparency related to certain 
administrative policies affects the ordinance‟s effectiveness and managed to frustrate 
them.  A general concern by these members was that the language in the ordinance was 
not clear, which allowed for the ordinance‟s implementation and enforcement to be open 
to interpretation.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 2; February 22; 
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March 1; March 28, 2006)  This issue created loopholes in the legislation that two 
members believed contractors are exploiting while County personnel did little to resolve 
it
7
.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 2 and February 22, 2006)  Each 
Board member believed that County administrators needed to be more straightforward in 
their policies and practices related to the living wage while being more aggressive in its 
monitoring efforts.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 2; February 22; 
March 1; March 28, 2006)   
       Leadership within the LWAB also came into question.  While every member praised 
the commitment of the Chair and other members, there was some criticism as to the 
LWAB‟s focus and direction.  As one member stated, “I will say that [the Chair] is 
passionate about this and that‟s one thing I really do like about her.  There are just times 
when I just walk out of the meeting and wonder what did we accomplish and I hate 
feeling that way.” (Anonymous, personal communication, March 1, 2006)  Another 
member suspected that the LWAB leadership might be overwhelmed with trying to 
oversee the current ordinance, expanding its scope, and dealing with County 
administrators at the same time.  (Anonymous, personal communication, February 10, 
2006)  Still, it is the author‟s opinion that it appears the LWAB is trying to do more that it 
actually can.  There seems to be confusion as to what the primary objectives are and how 
to approach them.  This results in each member working on separate projects and rarely 
taking further action.  Part of the reason perhaps is the poor attendance leading to 
                                                 
7
 For instance, part of the covered services in the LWO regarding “routine maintenance services” refers to 
custodial, cleaning, repair, and other services.  (Broward County Living Wage Ordinance 2002-45, 2002)  
What the ordinance does not specify is what it actually means by “routine.”  Many of the LWAB members 
brought up this concern that there are certain clauses in the ordinance not specific as to its coverage and 
scope and could be providing vendors with opportunities to circumvent the ordinance.   
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cancelled meetings.  As one member mentioned, “We can keep storing numbers but we 
still don‟t know what our objective is.  We get all this information but it‟s just 
information without knowing what to do with it.  No one knows how to use these 
numbers.  It‟s just very frustrating.” (Anonymous, personal communication, March 1, 
2006)   
       Even as members admitted that there is room for improvement on their part, they 
each agreed that their biggest obstacle was dealing with the County bureaucracy.  They 
felt that the County tended to suppress any momentum the Board had to improve the 
living wage.  LWAB members believed that the County takes too long to react to 
suggestions or requests by the Board.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 
2; February 10; February 22; March 1; March 28, 2006)  Three LWAB members 
suspected that the County is purposely hampers the progress of the living wage and/or the 
Board itself.  (Anonymous, personal communication, February 2; February 22; March 1, 
2006)  These members believed that this was politically motivated where a conflict for 
support existed among County administrators.  As these LWAB members mentioned, the 
County was publicly in support of the living wage, however, there was mixed support 
internally that prevented the LWO to progress as the LWAB expected in general.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, February 2; February 22; March 1, 2006)  
Overall, each LWAB member believed that some County administrators do not support 
the living wage, as they would expect.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 
2; February 10; February 22; March 1; March 28, 2006) 
       The BCC‟s hesitation has been a source of aggravation for the LWAB members 
interviewed as it also attempted to expand the scope and coverage of the living wage.  
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(Anonymous, personal communications, February 2; February 10; February 22, 2006)  
One factor that has lent to the BCC‟s wavering was an article by the South Florida Sun-
Sentinel published on March 12, 2006, questioning the progress and cost of the County‟s 
implementation efforts.  The article estimated that the County had done a poor job in 
monitoring the ordinance while costing it almost $30 million at the same time.  (Wyman, 
2006)  In response to the article, the County worked to develop a report refuting the 
article‟s facts.  County administrators and the LWAB believe that the estimate is highly 
inaccurate and overestimated.  Still, administrators were not able to determine the cost or 
impact of the living wage on the County by the time of this writing. 
       Bargaining and negotiations managed to play a significant role in the implementation 
process.  Ironically, what helped to get the living wage ordinance passed is what might be 
impeding its success given that some administrators are questioning its purpose and 
effectiveness.  One member agreed with this idea.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, February 22, 2006)  “We had to make a lot of compromises to get it 
passed and you find yourself settling for incremental change, which you can tell yourself 
that it‟s better than nothing.” (Anonymous, personal communications, February 2, 2006)  
Four LWAB members mentioned that their efforts continue in hopes of expanding the 
LWO‟s scope and increasing the wage rates aside from improving on its enforcement.  
They admitted that the policy appears diluted in comparison with the legislation they 
envisioned when campaigning for its passage.  Overall, any attempts to improve the 
ordinance faced certain conflict with the County.  (Anonymous, personal 
communications, February 2; February 22; March 1; March 28, 2006) 
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       Internally within the Board, there seemed to be some division as to supporting the 
living wage ordinance.  Individuals from “the other side,” as two Board members label 
them, applied an opposing view toward expanding the ordinance‟s scope.  (Anonymous, 
personal communications, February 2 and February 22, 2006)  County Commissioners 
who voted against the living wage, coincidently, appointed these members.  These Board 
members did not respond to requests to take part in this study.  The general assumption 
by three LWAB members that those from “the other side” were only there to interfere 
with the ordinance‟s implementation by either voting against Board proposals or making 
continuous requests for additional information and analysis to question the current policy 
in an attempt to delay the Board‟s progress.  (Anonymous, personal communications, 
February 2; February 22; March 28, 2006) 
Broward County Administrative Personnel 
       This section focuses on assessing Broward County‟s implementation effort from the 
perspectives of department directors and other administrators directly involved with the 
LWO, including contract administrators.  The focus is on their accomplishments and 
challenges to implementing the ordinance, as well as, its relationship with the LWAB and 
with other County departments.   
       County administrators from each department mentioned that there are several 
challenges hampering the progress of the LWO‟s implementation.  First, the language in 
the ordinance is vague at times failed to specify clearly which services apply to the living 
wage. (Anonymous, personal communications, July 14; July 17; August 20, 2006)  While 
it might be a challenge for the Purchasing Division to act, the County Attorney can offer 
support through his legal opinions as it related to the legislative intent of the ordinance 
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and the contract‟s scope of services to set precedence.  Over time, as more of these cases 
are resolved, the issue will resolve itself.  Still one administrator in the County Attorney‟s 
Office agreed with statements made by LWAB members and several County 
administrators that the ordinance was vague at times and can be open to interpretation.  
(Anonymous, personal communication, August 20, 2006)   
       Another concern was the accuracy of the information collected.  A Purchasing 
administrator stated that there was too much faith placed on contract administrators 
without the County conducting a comprehensive audit of their procedures.  As the 
respondent mentioned, “the fact is that we have no way of knowing whether the 
information that we are getting is accurate.  We are leaving it to the contract 
administrators to go out into the field, do their audits, and report to us.  But we don‟t do 
any audits of the contract administrators.  I know that for sure.” (Anonymous, personal 
communication, July 13, 2006)  In fact, the Broward County Auditor uncovered in 2006 
that the contract administrators were treating vendors inconsistently and discovered 
several instances of contract noncompliance.  Of the ten contracts examined, the Broward 
County Auditor found three incidents of noncompliance where contractors did not 
provide the required documentation (copies of employee paychecks and payroll records) 
to the County for proof of compliance.  (Broward County Office of the County Auditor, 
2006)  It is the author‟s opinion that while this does not necessarily mean that Broward‟s 
compliance rate is 70%, it does raise the question on the accuracy and diligence of the 
contract administrators and Purchasing‟s efforts to monitor their practices. 
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       Even as the County‟s overall implementation policy is “reasonable” according to the 
County Auditor, monitoring and enforcement of the LWO needed improvement
8
.  
(Broward County Office of the County Auditor, 2006)  In addition, each person 
interviewed in Broward County failed to recall any incidents of noncompliance.  The lack 
of accurate information can be detrimental to the success of the LWO‟s implementation 
for several reasons.  First, there were incidents of noncompliance occurring and not 
properly channeled throughout the County.  Second, the lack of clarity regarding roles 
and responsibilities exposed inconsistencies in monitoring and enforcement.  
(Anonymous, personal communication, September 29, 2006)  For example, with the 
contract administrators detailing their methods of enforcement, it is the author‟s opinion 
that they approaches differed from each other.  One contract administrator was aggressive 
going beyond what the Purchasing Division required to ensure that contractors were 
complying with the LWO. (Anonymous, personal communication, September 29, 2006)  
The other contract administrator performed the minimum to an extent that he took 
contractors at face value and did not verify if the contractors were actually complying 
with the ordinance.  The latter administrator believed as long as a contractor provided the 
necessary payroll information in a timely manner and made the administrator aware of 
the posted signage that it qualified as sufficient living wage monitoring.  This contract 
administrator took no further action to confirm the contractor's claims or if payroll 
records were accurate.  (Anonymous, personal communication, September 29, 2006)  
                                                 
8
 It is the author‟s opinion that is either an oversight on the County‟s part or administrators chose not to 
know, but it raises the question.  Regardless, the fact that their responses contradict the results from the 
Broward County Auditor‟s reports showed that both LWAB members and County administrators were not 
aware of specific instances of noncompliance.  This begs the question whether the County‟s data collection 
and analysis efforts are transparent and consistent. 
  74 
       However, the third issue mentioned by senior-level management was that 
implementing the LWO was an administrative burden for County administrators in 
addition to dealing with the LWAB.  (Anonymous, personal communications, July 14; 
July 17; August 20, 2006)  High expectations from the BCC coupled with their lack of 
political and financial support caused a strain on some departments.  As one administrator 
states: 
“Government keeps preaching that we have to do more with less and they 
keep pouring more and more on us and expect to do it with even less.  
Everything cumulatively is seriously impacting our abilities to serve our 
best to the agencies and get things done.  We do need more resources and 
so far they are not forthcoming.  You can only stretch it so thin and still 
try to do things effectively and we are reaching that point where we are 
behind and we are not generally as effective as we could be or should be.”  
(Anonymous, personal communication, July 17, 2006)   
 
Some Purchasing personnel were dedicating 15 to 30 percent of their time to the LWO by 
producing reports for the LWAB, attending meetings, and tracking data while still having 
to attend to other County service contracts they managed prior to the ordinance going into 
effect.  (Anonymous, personal communication, July 14, 2006)  Moreover, department 
directors felt that the BCC imposed the LWO responsibilities on them. (Anonymous, 
personal communications, July 14; July 17; August 20, 2006)  The BCC never asked if 
they wanted or were capable of taking on the responsibility and felt that criticisms by the 
LWAB and BCC were unwarranted at times because their departments were at capacity 
to begin with.  (Anonymous, personal communications, July 14; July 17; August 20, 
2006)  One administrator related the LWO as a “stepchild” that has been forced onto 
departments to manage.  (Anonymous, personal communication, July 14, 2006)   
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       The fact that implementation responsibilities fell on Purchasing and other 
departments without adequate administrative support has left several county 
administrators with a negative view of the LWO.  (Anonymous, personal communication, 
July 14; July 17; August 20, 2006)  As a result, senior-level administrators admitted that 
they would not try purposely to sabotage the LWO implementation, but one should not 
expect them to prioritize it over their other responsibilities unless directly ordered to do 
so by the BCC.  However, the LWO was not a high priority for the BCC and some 
administrators attempted to reflect that lack of commitment in their own LWO 
implementation efforts.  (Anonymous, personal communication, July 14; August 20, 
2006)   
       This reaction by department directors attributed to a tense relationship with the 
LWAB.  As mentioned, Advisory Board members expressed some frustration as to the 
County‟s level of commitment to implement the LWO.  While senior-level County 
personnel credited the LWAB for taking the time to analyze the implementation process 
closely, they stated that some of the criticism by the Board is misplaced.  They feel that 
the LWAB underestimated what the County does to support the LWO. (Anonymous, 
personal communications, July 14; July 17; August 20, 2006)  Purchasing administrators 
understood the LWAB members consisted of advocates for the LWO; however, the 
County is limited in its level of support as a public entity.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, July 14 and August 20, 2006)  As one Purchasing administrator stated, “I 
think the Advisory Board needs to understand that the ordinance reads the way that it 
does because it‟s what the [BCC] agreed to.  Advocates for a model [LWO] find the 
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County‟s ordinance to be too limited.” (Anonymous, personal communication, August 
20, 2006)   
       Two department directors believed that the LWAB‟s frustration was a sign of how 
disconnected they were with the administrative process and regulations in place.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, July 17 and August 20, 2006)  Nevertheless, 
meetings in late 2007 with County administrators and several of the LWAB members 
helped to develop a better understanding between both sides even though conflicts and 
tension remained. (Anonymous, personal communication, October 7, 2007)  The author 
believes that this situation illustrated the challenge certain County administrators faced 
trying to balance their administrative duties along with their personal opposition to the 
living wage.  As one Purchasing administrator stated, his job is strictly to execute the 
ordinance as specified by the BCC and not advocate for or against it.  (Anonymous, 
personal communication, July 14, 2006)  Ironically, this attempt to be bureaucratically 
neutral manages to attract criticism from BCC members and the LWAB for not 
advocating in favor of the LWO.  (Anonymous, personal communication, July 14, 2006) 
       Several Purchasing administrators expressed concern that the increasing number of 
living wage contracts will be a problem for the County. (Anonymous, personal 
communications, July 14; July 17; August 20, 2006)  Prior to the LWO became effective, 
many contractors renewed their contracts and grandfathered into the previous policy that 
excluded them from paying the living wage.  These contracts are renewable and the 
County has seen the number of living wage contracts nearly triple since 2005.  This is 
problematic since the County was nearly at its capacity to effectively monitor and enforce 
every contract.  (Anonymous, personal communication, July 14, 2006)  Additional 
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contracts meant more of a strain on Purchasing and other departments.  This would only 
add to the frustration each department has to deal with and cause them to be less 
effective.  (Anonymous, personal communications, July 17 and August 20, 2006)  
However, Broward took steps in 2007 to examine the living wage‟s impact from an 
economic and administrative perspective.  However, the results of that study were not 
available at the time of this writing. 
Summary of Findings 
       Interviews revealed several themes highlighting the accomplishments and 
shortcomings of the LWO‟s implementation in Broward County.  This section outlines 
these themes and provides suggestions on how to improve the implementation policy. 
       First, Broward‟s experience related to the implementation literature.  As mentioned, 
policy conflict and the lack of understanding of roles and responsibilities are factors in 
the outcomes of an implementation policy.  Broward County demonstrated that both were 
to some extent accountable for frustration present between the County‟s administration 
and LWAB.  A conflict on how to implement the policy was evident in what the LWAB 
tried to achieve and what the County actually accomplished.  As for the contractors, 
according to a Purchasing administrator, some were openly supportive with the LWO 
regulations while others complained of having to comply with the ordinance when they 
were already paying above the living wage before the LWO went into effect.  
(Anonymous, personal communication, July 14, 2006)  For example, elevator technicians 
earn well above the living wage and did so before Broward adopted the ordinance.  
Nevertheless, repairing elevators is an applicable service according to the living wage.  
The County required vendors to provide proof of compliance regardless of the 
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circumstance and believed it is senseless work to prove they were in compliance.  
(Anonymous, personal communication, July 14, 2006) 
       Policy ambiguity was another issue affecting how the County monitored and 
enforced the LWO.  While the Purchasing Division served as the central point for this 
action, it expected the contract administrators to manage the vendors they are responsible 
for at their own discretion.  The Purchasing Division simply required that they contact the 
vendors every six months to verify that they were complying with the ordinance.  
However, interviews with contract administrators and Purchasing administrators showed 
that the level of enforcement was inconsistent and limited.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, September 29, 2006)  This finding supported claims by some LWAB 
members and senior-level County administrators that monitoring and enforcement efforts 
were sketchy at best.  (Anonymous, personal communication, February 2; February 22; 
July 14; July 17, 2006) 
       For example, one contract administrator randomly checked payrolls throughout the 
entire six-month period while another reviewed just the current payroll.  The first contract 
administrator also networked with building managers throughout the County to help in 
monitoring contractors and their employees, while the other checked with contractors 
every six months.  In the latter contract administrator‟s defense, that person believed that 
the County did not have the authority to request private company records even though the 
ordinance does permit Broward to do so when needed.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, September 29, 2006)  The LWO states that the County can review all 
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records as long as it relates to the living wage and it is for monitoring compliance
9
.  
(Broward County Living Wage Ordinance 2002-45, 2002)   
       Moreover, some contract administrators preferred not be as aggressive and limited 
enforcement so as not to damage their working relationships with other departments.  In 
fact, one contract administrator admitted that the County should not pressure its vendors 
to comply with the ordinance.  He believed that imposing living wage regulations on 
contractors would eventually dissuade that company from doing future business with the 
County.  As that person stated, “I'm not sure the law gives anyone in the government the 
right to do a total payroll audit on a company.”  (Anonymous, personal communication, 
September 29, 2006)  The fact is that the County states the LWO's provisions when it 
advertises its bids in addition to explaining it to the vendors at the pre-bid meetings.  
Moreover, contrary to this person‟s statement, the County can perform total payroll audits 
based on the terms and conditions of the contract bid.  These vendors appear to 
understand what the expectations are; however, it is the County‟s responsibility to uphold 
the ordinance.  It is the author‟s opinion that the contract administrator was incorrect in 
his assumption and this was an example of how inaccurate information affects policy 
implementation
10
.   
       While the ordinance did not specify how the County‟s organizational structure would 
apply to the implementation beside the creation of the LWAB, it did make reference that 
                                                 
9
 It is the author‟s opinion that the lack of communication appeared to cause a misunderstanding and 
inconsistent monitoring of the LWO.  The fact that contractors comply every six months by presenting 
copies of their most recent payrolls should not be adequate monitoring given that there is minor supervision 
at best conducted in the meantime.  A possible solution would be to implement random site visits or at least 
more frequent payroll reviews. 
 
10
 It is the author‟s opinion that had County employees been properly educated on the living wage and their 
roles and responsibilities, this contract administrator perhaps might have been more diligent in monitoring 
and enforcing the LWO. 
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all LWO-related provisions were applicable to the procurement portions of the contract.  
(Broward County Living Wage Ordinance 2002-45, 2002)  By default, this would assume 
that the Purchasing Division would be responsible for its implementation.  While this was 
hardly a surprise to anyone, seeing as Purchasing worked with the BCC to develop the 
ordinance in the first place, there was some concern expressed by Procurement senior 
management and a contract administrator that the department was understaffed to 
monitor and enforce the ordinance effectively.  (Anonymous, personal communications, 
July 14; July 17; August 20; September 29, 2006)   
       Two senior-level administrators suggested that other departments might be better 
suited to handle the monitoring and enforcement responsibilities.  The Office of 
Professional Standards (OPS), on the other hand, responded as a final measure of 
enforcement.  Some administrators believed that OPS would be better prepared to handle 
the overall monitoring effort and that it should be their responsibility to coordinate with 
contract administrators, as they were all trying implement the same enforcement policy.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, July 14; July 17; August 21, 2006)  In this 
regard, Purchasing served as the main actor doing work that others could be doing 
themselves.  This only complicated Purchasing‟s situation by trying to balance the 
responsibilities it had before and after Broward adopted the LWO
11
.  (Anonymous, 
personal communications, July 14 and July 17, 2006)   
       The literature review suggests that organizational culture can influence both the 
administrative and political aspects of the implementation policy.  This can be 
                                                 
11
 In the author‟s opinion, for the sake of making the entire process more efficient and effective, the County 
should rethink how it delegates responsibilities and consider whether some departments would be more 
prepared to handle certain LWO issues at a better capacity.   
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determined by examining the administrative support offered to the implementation 
process.  First, the BCC had been reluctant in recent years to provide its departments with 
sufficient resources to effectively monitor and enforce the ordinance.  The Purchasing 
Division made several requests in their annual budgets for more personnel, citing the fact 
that the increasing number of contracts caused the department to falter in its attempt to 
monitor the ordinance and manage their other responsibilities only for the BCC to deny 
its requests every time.  (Anonymous, personal communication, July 17, 2006)  This was 
both an organizational culture and capacity issue.  From the capacity standpoint, there 
were not enough personnel to track the increasing number of contracts.  Two department 
directors stated that the BCC normally denies any attempts to allocate more resources 
because of conflicting interests amongst BCC members.  (Anonymous, personal 
communications, July 17 and August 20, 2006) 
       Morale within the LWAB was also low as demonstrated by the challenge to reach 
quorum for its monthly meetings.  The LWAB only met seven times in 2006 (the 
Advisory Board breaks two months in the summer).  It is the author‟s opinion that this 
sends a message to County administrators about the LWAB‟s overall commitment.  What 
made this situation more trying was that County administrators dedicated their time to 
prepare for these monthly meetings without knowing if they were to take place or not.  
From the County‟s perspective, senior-level administrators felt that they wasted time and 
effort in preparing for meetings that normally failed to take place. (Anonymous, personal 
communications, July 14; July 17; August 20, 2006)  Similarly, one LWAB member was 
frustrated at the poor attendance since members sacrifice their time to attend the 
meetings.  (Anonymous, personal communications, March 1, 2006)  Overall, poor 
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attendance caused tension in the LWAB‟s relationship with the County; however, the 
LWAB discussed this issue in November 2006 to stress the importance of consistent 
attendance and the Board had since improved on its attendance record.  In fact, since 
2007, three consecutive absences or four throughout the calendar year was sufficient to 
remove LWAB members from the Board for poor attendance.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, October 7, 2007) 
       However, three LWAB claimed that County administrators, specifically those in 
Purchasing, do not promote the ordinance, as the Board would prefer. (Anonymous, 
personal communications, February 2; February 22; March 28, 2006)  Some 
administrators admitted that they were in a precarious position since they address the 
LWAB‟s concerns, however, as a member of public organization, county officials serving 
as outspoken living wage supporters would be a conflict of interest on their part.  As one 
Purchasing administrator explained,  
“The Purchasing Division and the County cannot be advocates as much as 
our personal conversations off the record with some of the board members 
would like us to be advocates for the living wage.  We're not advocates, 
we‟re people who are staff-functioned to the county administrators and 
commissioners.  We abide by whatever policies and procedures and laws 
that they have set in place.  We have to take the middle ground by keeping 
in mind that we also have to be the best political servants and civil 
servants for the taxpayers‟ money and there's a lot of cost involved in 
administering this ordinance.”  (Anonymous, personal communications, 
July 17, 2006) 
 
What drew some tension from County administrators is that several LWAB members 
seemed to overlook the fact that County personnel cannot be advocates of the living wage 
to the extent LWAB members can. (Anonymous, personal communications, July 14; July 
17; August 20, 2006)  As a result, the distrust several LWAB members had for some 
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County administrators‟ generated from what these Advisory Board members considered 
lukewarm commitment to the living wage.  (Anonymous, personal communications, 
February 2; February 22; March 28, 2006) 
       The situation in Broward County supported Luce‟s (2004) argument that there is a 
drastic reduction in interest upon adopting a living wage.  Organizations, like ACORN, 
managed to assist local groups to organize the campaign that resulted in the ordinance, 
but quickly moved on once Broward adopted its LWO. (Anonymous, personal 
communication, February 2, 2006)  However, County administrators believed that the 
grassroots presence remained given that the LWAB consisted mostly of those local 
leaders who fought to get the LWO passed in the first place. (Anonymous, personal 
communications, July 14 and July 17, 2006)  To date, the LWAB members remained as 
the only advocates pushing to expand the scope of the LWO and increase its 
effectiveness.  (Anonymous, personal communication, July 13, 2006)  However, interest 
from Broward‟s resident and business communities was almost nonexistent.  Four LWAB 
members believed that this was a concern because many do not know the LWO even 
exists or that they can contribute towards the effort of expanding the ordinance.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, February 2; February 10; February 22; March 1, 
2006)  A department director mentioned that if the living wage had local support to 
influence the BCC of its importance, there would be a stronger commitment by the 
County to implement the ordinance, but there hardly seemed to be any interest at the 
time.  (Anonymous, personal communication, July 17, 2006)  
       It is the author‟s opinion that the overall result was a ratified ordinance supported 
through insufficient resources, lacking clear roles and responsibilities, and an 
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organizational culture that was conflicted.  Most County administrators viewed the LWO 
as more of a nuisance than anything else.  Implementing the LWO has become such a 
burden to most departments, such as Purchasing and Human Resources that it was 
beginning to affect the other responsibilities they tend to as well.  Without additional 
support that only the BCC can provide and the increasing number of contracts, one can 
expect the monitoring and enforcement of the living wage to become less effective over 
time with some interviewees suggesting that it will affect non-LWO responsibilities.  As 
a result, employees felt caught between uncertain aims and other priorities, resulting in 
inconsistent and infrequent monitoring – a necessary action of the ordinance. 
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CHAPTER V 
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA 
       This chapter presents the results from interviews conducted between January and 
July 2006 with the Miami-Dade County Living Wage Commission (LWC) and County 
personnel directly involved in the implementation of the living wage ordinance (LWO).  
Similar to the previous chapter, this chapter divides into four sections.  To begin with, 
this chapter provides a description of Miami-Dade‟s living wage implementation process, 
in addition to explaining the roles each actor performed.  The second section offers an 
assessment of the LWC members‟ perspective to the implementation‟s progress, 
objectives, and challenges while the third section focuses on Miami-Dade County‟s 
administrative personnel experiences.  This chapter concludes by presenting a general 
assessment of the interview findings.  It will also focus defining and identifying a 
successful living wage implementation and identify the administrative and political 
factors involved, in addition to the overall strengths and weakness of the Miami-Dade 
policy and procedures. 
Miami-Dade County‟s Living Wage Ordinance 
       This section offers a description of the living wage implementation approach in 
Miami-Dade County.  It also explains the provisions contained in the ordinance, as well 
as the involvement of each actor throughout the implementation process. 
       The Miami-Dade Board of County Commissioners passed its living wage ordinance 
by a unanimous 12-0 vote on May 11, 1999 and placed it into effect on August 4, 2000.  
(Miami-Dade County Ordinance 99-45, 1999)  The Miami-Dade ordinance covers the 
same services as Broward by designating contracts with a total value over $100,000 
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applicable to the living wage.  All County employees earn at least the living wage as 
well.  The County indexes the living wage for inflation each year based on the Miami 
PMSA Consumer Price Index.  As of October 2007, the living wage rate was $10.27/hour 
with an additional $1.49/hour dedicated to employee health benefits or $11.76/hour 
without benefits.  (Department of Business Development, 2006)  Miami-Dade County 
also had 221 applicable contracts with approximately several thousand workers on these 
contracts earning the living wage or higher
12
. 
 
Figure 5 – Miami-Dade County Living Wage Implementation Organizational Model 
                                                 
12
Even though an accurate worker total was not available, a representative from DBD/DPM stated that there 
are 4,000 to 5,000 workers currently earning living wages under the ordinance.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, October 9, 2007) 
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       Figure 5 illustrates how Miami-Dade County executed its LWO.  Miami-Dade‟s 
organizational structure reflected that of Broward‟s.  Keep in mind that in drafting their 
LWO, Broward approached Miami-Dade for assistance and tried to mirror Miami-Dade‟s 
ordinance as much as possible. (Anonymous, personal communication, July 17, 2006)  
The following explains the fit of each actor to the process and how the County executed 
its policy implementation: (Miami-Dade County Administrative Order 3-30, 2000) 
 Board of County Commissioners (BCC) – As in Broward, the BCC is responsible 
for ratifying all living wage legislation including any amendments to the 
ordinance.  The Board is also accountable for providing sufficient resources to all 
County departments through budgetary approvals and resolutions. 
 County Manager’s Office (CMO) – According to Administrative Order 3-30 
(AO), the CMO is responsible for the overall implementation of the ordinance.  
This includes monitoring and enforcement.  However, the AO grants the CMO 
authority to pass the implementation responsibilities to other departments, which 
it did initially to the Departments of Procurement Management and Business 
Development.  These departments manage to implement the ordinance on their 
own, but they ultimately need final approval from the CMO for any policy 
changes or enforcing significant penalties on noncompliant vendors. 
 County Attorney’s Office (CAO) – Similar to Broward, the CAO handles all legal 
matters related to the LWO.  It is responsible for drafting the language contained 
in the ordinance, as well as any other amendments to it.  The CAO also provides 
legal opinions on the applicability of covered services to County departments and 
the Living Wage Commission.   
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 Living Wage Commission (LWC) – Miami-Dade has a Living Wage Commission 
that serves the same role as Broward‟s LWAB.  It is responsible for overseeing 
the County‟s implementation of the ordinance and reviewing its effectiveness.  
The LWC consists of fifteen members appointed by each of the county 
commissioners and mayor.  The LWC meets monthly to review status reports by 
other County departments while discussing any pressing matters concerning the 
implementation process.  The AO also states that departments like Procurement 
and Business Development are to provide staff support to handle any requests by 
the LWC.  (Miami-Dade County Administrative Order 3-30, 2000) 
 Department of Business Development (DBD) – As authorized by the CMO, DBD 
was mainly responsible for overseeing the LWO‟s compliance.  It was 
accountable for the ordinance‟s monitoring and enforcement.  DBD worked 
closely with the LWC to address any compliance issues and coordinated with 
department project managers to monitor compliance.  Until 2005, DBD shared 
these responsibilities with the Department of Procurement Management; however, 
the County Manager decided to centralize implementation responsibilities under 
this department. 
 Department of Procurement Management (DPM) – DPM is responsible with 
determining whether contracts are applicable under the LWO and applies the 
provision to the appropriate contracts.  It also evaluates the health benefits each 
service contractor provides to allow contractors to pay the low range of the living 
wage rate and determines whether the health policy is acceptable by Florida 
standards.   
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 Employee Relations Department (ERD) – The ERD is responsible for ensuring 
that all County employees earn the living wage.  It reports monthly to the LWC 
on its progress. 
 Public Health Trust (PHT) – The PHT is responsible for ensuring that all 
applicable employees in Jackson Memorial Hospital earn the living wage.  It 
reports monthly to the LWC on its progress. 
 Department Project Managers – According to the AO, each County department is 
responsible for monitoring and enforcing the living wage in their contracts.  Each 
department must designate a contract coordinator responsible for monitoring and 
enforcement in addition to working with DBD. 
 Service Contractors – In addition to regular vendors who receive a contract to 
provide a service for the County, the ordinance includes the General Aeronautical 
Service Permittees (GASP) situated at Miami International Airport.  These 
GASPs provide aeronautical ground services to smaller airline carriers that cannot 
offer the services on their own (ticketing, cargo handling, etc.).  Currently, there 
are six GASPs at MIA.  All services provided by the GASPs require a living wage 
unless the County waives the service.  The responsibilities service contractors 
must comply with are the same as those mentioned in Broward. 
 Covered Employees – As in Broward‟s case, covered employees work for the 
service contractors and are the direct recipients of the living wage and its benefits.   
       Similar to Broward County, Miami-Dade County‟s BCC and CAO only participate 
when required to, however, certain commissioners are supportive of the LWO and 
actively monitor its progress.  The CMO must give final approval to all major policy 
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decisions.  Unlike Broward, the service contractors participate regularly in LWC 
meetings along with the covered employers, who on occasion have filed complaints on 
their employers for noncompliance.  Overall, DBD‟s compliance officers took it upon 
themselves to supervise almost the entire implementation process.  The LWC, along with 
DBD, were strongly committed to ensuring not only that service contractors complied 
with the ordinance, but that all relevant County departments contributed effectively to the 
goal as well.   
Miami-Dade County Living Wage Commission 
       This section concentrates on assessing Miami-Dade County‟s implementation effort 
based on the perspectives of the LWC‟s members.  The focus is on the Commission‟s 
definition for a successful implementation of the living wage, its evaluation of the 
County‟s progress in executing the ordinance, and the pressing issues involved with the 
process. 
       The author asked each LWC member how he or she defined what a successfully 
implemented living wage meant to identify the critical factors needed to achieve such 
success.  The consensus by the majority of the LWC members stated that a successfully 
implemented living wage ordinance is one where all applicable contractors comply by 
providing their employees the standing living wage pay rate as well as practical 
healthcare options.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 1; February 3; 
February 10; February 15; March 2; March 17, 2006)  Members mentioned that in 
addition to having employees improve their qualities of life through higher wages, it was 
the County‟s intention to emphasize healthcare provisions in the ordinance.  The intended 
outcome was to alleviate Jackson Memorial Hospital from the burden of having to treat 
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so many uninsured individuals.  The health benefits guaranteed by the ordinance gave 
those individuals options for medical care.  (Anonymous, personal communication, 
February 1, 2006) 
       As to the critical factors necessary to implement a living wage, every LWC member 
agreed that communication is perhaps the most important factor.  As one member 
explained, “ideally, it would be free-flowing information from the top to the bottom, 
vertically, laterally, between the departments, County Commission, as well as the public, 
businesses, and vendors.”  (Anonymous, personal communication, March 17, 2006)  
Members believed that communication was important to support various channels of 
information that could link each stakeholder to work objectives and regulations 
cohesively.  Each member understood their roles not only as advisors to the 
commissioners that appointed them, but to the County Manager as well.  They also 
acknowledged their responsibility to hear concerns from contractors, employees, and 
other groups at LWC meetings and address them with County administrators and the 
BCC.  LWC members also stated that County administrators support the open 
communication process.  The members admitted that this was a significant advantage to 
implementing the ordinance effectively.  (Anonymous, personal communications, 
February 1; February 15; March 17, 2006)  However, communication was also important 
in regards to employee complaints, as the County relied on these workers to notify the 
County of non-compliance issues.  (Anonymous, personal communication, February 1, 
2006)  It was also important as it applied to grassroots organizations because they 
focused primarily on awareness campaigns to expand the ordinance while ensuring that 
the County remained accountable for its monitoring and enforcement measures.  
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(Anonymous, personal communications, February 3; March 2, 2006)  Conversely, the 
lack of communication/information posed a challenge to monitoring, evaluating, and 
enforcing the ordinance. 
       In addition to communication, members also mentioned other important factors 
needed to implement a living wage.  From an administrative standpoint, three LWC 
members believed that centralizing the process is important.  (Anonymous, personal 
communications, February 1; February 10; March 17, 2006)  This meant that the County 
should have a central point where one department or agency should be responsible for 
collecting and analyzing information, as well as enforcing the ordinance.  Upon creating 
the ordinance, the County Manager assigned living wage responsibilities to both DPM 
and DBD.  It was not until 2005 that DBD became directly responsible for assisting the 
LWC to monitor and enforce the ordinance.  As a LWC member mentioned, this move 
helped to make the process more efficient: 
“In prior year‟s reports, we were not getting the attention and the 
resources from the Department of Procurement where the living wage 
administratively sat.  Then a year ago, when it was moved to the 
Department of Business Development which is now responsible for 
enforcement, interpretation, etc.  The working relationship with DBD has 
been phenomenal.”  (Anonymous, personal communication, February 1, 
2006)   
 
       The language in the ordinance also needs to be as clear as can be to prevent the 
possibilities of any loopholes.  LWC members understood that new situations tend to 
arise where the ordinance‟s applicability might not be specific enough to address them.  
However, members believed a commitment by the BCC and departments was important 
to remain aggressive and proactive in enhancing and expanding the efforts towards 
contract compliance.  To accomplish this, five LWC members believed that the County 
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must support an organizational culture conducive to effective living wage monitoring and 
enforcement.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 2; February 3; February 
10; March 2; March 17, 2006)  Four LWC members believed that DBD would need 
sufficient resources ensuring that there were enough personnel to monitor contractors and 
keep them accountable.  With so many contracts for the County to supervise, there needs 
to be enough people to investigate complaints and keep contractors accountable.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, February 1; February 10; February 15; March 
17, 2006) 
       From a political perspective, awareness and grassroots organizing helped to persuade 
County leaders to ratify the living wage.  The majority of LWC members stated that with 
a consistent level of grassroots involvement there would be more support for an 
awareness campaign to help expand the ordinance's coverage and oversee its current 
progress.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 2; February 9; February 10; 
February 15; March 17, 2006)  As a way to support this idea, two LWC members took it 
upon themselves to coordinate meetings with local businesses and residents to inform 
them of the benefits of expanding a living wage.  (Anonymous, personal 
communications, February 2 and February 3, 2006)  In addition to expanding the 
ordinance‟s scope, four members believed that there needed to be greater accountability 
on the part of contractors to comply.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 
2; February 10; March 2; March 17, 2006)  Members acknowledged the fact that politics 
plays a large part in the implementation process given the business interests and other 
political dynamics involved, such as longstanding relationships between businesses and 
elected officials, which hampers County‟s efforts to remain stern in administering 
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warnings and enforcing penalties consistently.  Four LWC members recommended that 
the BCC and CMO commit more resources by hiring additional contract compliance 
officers.  It would allow the County to expand its enforcement efforts and thereby reduce 
incidents of noncompliance.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 2; 
February 10; February 15; March 17, 2006)   
       When asked about challenges related to implementing the ordinance, aside from the 
County needing additional contract compliance officers, four LWC members believed 
that the County should improve the accuracy and consistency of information shared 
amongst stakeholders.  While they agreed to having a good relationship with County 
administrators, they cited information gaps within the County that prevented the 
ordinance's enforcement.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 1; February 
10; February 15; March 17, 2006)  This, combined with contractors‟ efforts to exploit 
potential loopholes made the implementation process difficult and frustrating.  
       Miami International Airport (MIA) appeared to be a particular source of frustration 
for every LWC members.  In fact, the County has a history at MIA of failed management 
practices – its enforcement of the living wage being another example13.  (Anonymous, 
personal communications, February 1; February 2; February 10; March 2; March 17, 
2006)  As to why LWC members believed that contractors did not comply, members 
offered different reasons.  In some cases, contractors made honest mistakes of not 
                                                 
13
 For over 10 years, MIA has earned the mark for arguably being the most inefficient and corrupt County 
department and facility.  In 1999, the Miami Herald published a series of articles focusing on airport cost 
overruns, cronyism, and money laundering.  (De Lollis, 1999; Morgan, 2000)  The Miami New Times has 
also published several articles exposing corrupt contracting practices and mismanagement throughout the 
airport.  (DeFede, 1993; DeFede, 1998; Korten, 2005)  Since then, MIA has continued to attract negative 
publicity with its expansion cost overruns, corruption, and bond rating downgrades.  Overall, many County 
administrators and LWC members stated that most of the living wage challenges are located in MIA. 
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providing payroll verifications or other documentations on time.  These situations are 
usually resolved quickly with a warning by the County.  In other cases, contractors 
attempted to circumvent the system in hopes of not paying the living wage rate 
altogether.  Contractors argued that they were not obligated to comply and ignored it or 
that it did not pertain to them even though they signed an agreement to abide by the 
living wage provisions prior to receiving the contract.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, February 2 and March 2, 2006)  Contractors were willing to take the risk 
and pay employees below the living wage or not provide health benefits and hoping that 
the County never found out.  In some cases, it was actually more cost effective for the 
contractor to pay the fine than it was to provide employees a living wage given the lax 
penalties and insufficient monitoring and enforcement.  (Anonymous, personal 
communications, February 2 and March 2, 2006)  For example, until 2006, several 
employers at MIA were taking advantage of a glaring loophole related to the employee 
probationary periods where employees earned the low range of the living wage while 
trying to work past their probation to collect health benefits.  One LWC member stated 
the following: 
“The big GASPs [General Aeronautical Service Permittees] are making a 
killing because even though they always provide medical insurance what 
they did was change their probationary period from three months to six 
months.  And after six months, rather than give them the medical 
insurance, they fire the employee.  So for those six months, since they 
were going to offer the employee health insurance, they don't pay the 
living wage without medical insurance, they paid the $9.81/hour.”  
(Anonymous, personal communications, March 2, 2006) 
 
Another LWC member stated, “It‟s just phenomenal how they spend more time and 
money fighting it than it would be to just go along with the covered workers… … they 
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feel that it‟s cheaper to spend millions fighting it than to go ahead and comply.”  
(Anonymous, personal communications, March 17, 2006)
14
   
       Overall, four LWC members believed that the County did not apply enough pressure 
on contractors to comply.  They understood that DBD did not have the capacity to 
monitor each contract at MIA consistently.  They also believed that the County must 
enforce penalties more consistently and hold contractors and other County employees 
accountable for their actions.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 2; 
February 10; March 2; March 17, 2006)  One LWC member believed that the County 
Manager preferred not to address this matter.  By handing the enforcement duties to 
DBD, it is this department, and not the County Manager, that became publicly 
responsible for its deficient enforcement policy.  This disconnect made the 
implementation process more difficult and representative of the emerging rift between 
DBD and other departments regarding to the living wage.  Overall, put into the larger 
scheme of issues and challenges facing the County, the living wage is a low priority.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, February 10, 2006)  The result at MIA, and in 
some cases beyond the airport, was unfair business practices that potentially spurred a 
motive for other contractors not to comply.  If one contractor saw violations taking place 
while the County was unaware or slow to respond, then there was the likelihood of others 
falling into noncompliance as well because of the low risk involved.  The LWO also 
created animosity between workers earning a living wage and those who do not, in 
                                                 
14
 The County amended the ordinance to ensure that all probationary periods last 90 days.  (Miami-Dade 
County Ord. 06-67, 2006) 
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addition to vendors openly complying with the ordinance and those clearly trying to work 
around it.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 2; March 2, 2006) 
       Even standard enforcement of the ordinance can be complicated.  On several cases, 
companies failed to pay their employees the living wage, and if caught, the companies 
threaten the County with massive layoffs because it could not afford the retroactive living 
wage pay differential and subsequent penalties for noncompliance.  The County did not 
want to be in a position where the public would perceive it as being responsible for large 
groups of workers quickly becoming unemployed.  The County‟s response was to 
continue sending notices to the contractor, and in rare cases, executed a stop payment.  
Regardless, three LWC members admitted that these actions rarely diminished the strong 
possibility that contractors failed to pay the wages or penalties.  (Anonymous, personal 
communications, February 2; March 2; March 17, 2006)  In the meantime, resentment 
built amongst airline employees performing the same jobs as MIA employees and earning 
less than the living wage
15
.  Smaller companies complied of fear for penalties while large 
companies could afford to take the risk and exploit the system.  Larger companies were 
also more likely to be repeatedly noncompliant; ironically, the County continued to 
award them service contracts out of fear of losing their business.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, March 2, 2006)   
       In addition, the County had been reluctant to enforce penalties on companies that 
they had been in business with for many years.  As a result, smaller companies believed 
that companies with a long history with the County receive preferential treatment over 
                                                 
15
 Employees who worked directly for airline companies were exempt from the County‟s living wage 
provisions. 
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others and this created an unfair advantage amongst competitors at MIA.  As one LWC 
member involved with MIA business for almost 20 years explained: 
“The people at the airport are big lobbyists.  Companies that have pretty 
big contracts make a stink.  They call their lobbyist, I‟m guessing, but they 
call their legislators and they call people.  Also, some companies have 
long-term relationships with the County.  They‟ve been working for the 
County for almost 20 years.  It‟s not like this is illegal, but it‟s just what 
they do.”  (Anonymous, personal communication, February 3, 2006) 
 
A telling sign about the LWO in Miami-Dade County is that Miguel Diaz de la 
Portilla, former County Commissioner and co-sponsor of the LWO, spent most of 
2006 as a registered lobbyist speaking against the living wage, arguing that it 
posed unfair conditions and financial burdens to airport contractors.  
(Anonymous, personal communication, June 16, 2005) 
       With so many areas for needed improvement, the ordinance was successful to a 
certain extent.  Nissen and Borum (2006) recently determined that the living wage 
managed to have a positive influence and improved the quality of life for a number of 
MIA employees.  In addition, support for the living wage remained strong through the 
years and the County has continued to address matters that could improve the 
implementation process.  Four LWC members acknowledged the fact that having support 
from senior administrators and the BCC is a rare blessing that other jurisdictions do not 
possess.  They credited the County‟s continued efforts, as well as those from individual 
LWC members to improve the ordinance.  (Anonymous, personal communications, 
February 2; February 9; February 10; March 17, 2006) 
       Regardless, each LWC member believed that the County could do more to improve 
the effectiveness of the ordinance.  Highlighted in the annual needs assessment report and 
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in interviews conducted, LWC members recommended four general solutions to address 
the pressing LWO challenges:  (Miami-Dade County Living Wage Commission, 2005) 
 Limited resources – As mentioned, without a sufficient number of compliance 
officers available there will be cases of noncompliance that will go unnoticed or 
not adequately enforced.  Contractors knew this and were willing to take the 
chance of not paying the living wage.  (Anonymous, personal communications, 
March 2, 2006)  Each member mentioned that the lack of personnel was one of 
the greatest challenges hampering DBD and its attempt to enforce the ordinance.  
DBD concurred with this recommendation. 
 Stricter penalties and enforcement – Eventually, the County needs to enforce the 
ordinance to the degree where contractors must pay thousands in penalties for 
noncompliance and do so publicly.  Four LWC members believed that the County 
was too lenient with contractors and were willing to negotiate to resolve the 
matter quietly.  This process was frustrating when the County awarded these same 
offenders new contracts only to find them not complying and the County go 
through the same process again.  (Anonymous, personal communications, 
February 2; February 10; March 2; March 17, 2006)  Three LWC members 
believed that the County should set an example with these security and airline 
companies.  Until then, these companies know that they have an advantage in 
negotiations because the County will not crack down on noncompliant vendors as 
aggressively.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 10; March 2; 
March 17, 2006) 
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 Enhance departmental communication and coordination – Without DBD having 
sufficient resources, added responsibility should fall on project managers and 
other department directors to be more accountable to monitoring their contracts.  
This would allow the County to expand its monitoring capabilities whereby 
contractors might reconsider before not complying and verify that each County 
department fulfills its responsibilities.  This is essential because it helps to 
simplify the process for DBD. 
Miami-Dade County Administrative Personnel 
       This section assesses Miami-Dade County‟s implementation effort from the 
standpoint of County administrators and contract compliance officers and their process to 
monitor and enforce the living wage.  The process relates similarly to that of Broward‟s; 
however, given the fact that Miami-Dade has implemented its ordinance longer and 
currently manages over 220 living wage contracts, its experience with contractors is 
broader and more convoluted than Broward‟s.  Miami-Dade deals with more 
noncompliant contractors than Broward, which has left some administrators and contract 
compliance officers facing a routinely arduous and exhaustive process that in some cases 
does not achieve what they believe to be successful results.    
       The process appears to be simple.  Once contractors place the winning bid for a 
contract, the County invites them to participate in meetings to have the contract process 
explained.  The County takes that opportunity to instruct the contractors on the contract 
provisions, especially any living wage requirements that they must abide by.  If the 
contractor complies, meaning that it provides living wages and benefits accordingly, 
posts living wage information for employees, and responds to County audits in a timely 
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manner, the process runs smoothly throughout the life of the contract.  Overall, the 
majority of contractors manage to comply; however, there are those who make the entire 
monitoring and enforcement process difficult for County administrators, especially 
contract compliance officers.  (Anonymous, personal communications, January 29 and 
April 5, 2006)  Table 5-1 provides the frequency of living wage violations since the 
LWO‟s passage as reported by the County Manager in March 2008.  There have been 97 
reported violations.  The County‟s current compliance rate is 91% 
Table 5-1: Miami-Dade County Living Wage Violations 
Violation Instances % 
Failed to submit payrolls 39 40% 
Underpayment of Employee 27 28% 
Failed to respond to payroll audit 17 18% 
Cashier's check within bi-weekly period 7 7% 
Failure to respond to request for information 5 5% 
Submittal of inaccurate payrolls 2 2% 
 
       In cases where contractors do not comply, they receive a “notices to cure” citing their 
alleged noncompliance issues.  Contract compliance officers or complaints made by 
employees and/or other businesses usually help the County discover these instances of 
noncompliance in addition to random site visits.  (Anonymous, personal communications, 
April 5; April 12; April 14, 2006)  The County grants the contractors time to comply and 
offers assistance to ensure that they eventually do.  If the contractors are unsuccessful in 
becoming compliant, or refuse to do so altogether, the County then issues additional 
letters and notices before it threatens to stop payment or terminates the contract.  The 
majority of the contract compliance officers credited themselves for helping contractors 
to become compliant, but also blame the enforcement process for being too lenient and 
enticing for contractors not to comply.  (Anonymous, personal communication, January 
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29; April 5; April 12, 2006)  The County‟s intention was to reach some resolution with 
the contractors; however, two contract compliance officers and a senior-level DBD 
administrator, along with the majority of LWAB members, believed that these actions 
represented temporary fixes and do not persuade contractors not to violate the ordinance 
again.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 2; March 2; March 17; April 
12; April 14, 2006)   
       When asked about effectively implementing the living wage, County administrators 
provided not only a definition, but also certain factors needed to achieve the expected 
level of accomplishment.  In describing the concept, two DBD senior management 
administrators and four contract compliance officers defined the implementation of a 
living wage as the rate of compliance by contractors to provide the required wage, 
benefits, and information to employees as specified by the terms of the ordinance.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, January 29; April 5; April 12; April 14; July 10, 
2006)   
       To achieve a successful compliance rate, they recommended that the following 
factors are required.  First, there needs to be hands-on research by the County to 
understand how the living wage affects contractors and employees.  Direct 
communication with those involved would provide a first-hand account as to why certain 
challenges emerge and how County measures affect the implementation outcome.  It is 
this face-to-face interaction and the word-of-mouth networking that aids the County in 
identifying violations.  (Anonymous, personal communication, January 29, 2006)  
Second, policies need to be clear.  Inconsistencies or ambiguities in the ordinance have 
caused a gap allowing contractors to exploit loopholes, and County administrators are 
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unable to determine the extent to which they should act accordingly.  Three contract 
compliance officers mentioned that they were afraid that they might overstep their legal 
bounds to enforce the ordinance.  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 5 and 
April 14, 2006)  Lastly, perhaps most importantly, the County should have the necessary 
resources available to enforce the ordinance effectively.  DBD and DPM administrators 
and compliance officers believed that there are simply not enough officers available to 
review each contract in a timely manner to ensure that all contractors comply with the 
ordinance.  Without the necessary staffing, they admitted that contractors were less likely 
to comply unless County compliance officers placed persistent and visible pressure upon 
them.  (Anonymous, personal communications, January 29; April 5; April 12; April 14; 
July 10, 2006) 
       In regards to implementation challenges, DBD senior-level managers and contract 
compliance officers cited several factors that are currently impeding the process.  What is 
interesting to mention is that the factors identified by these County administrators 
mirrored closely to those discussed by the majority of the LWC members.  The first 
factor mentioned is the reasons contractors fail to comply with the ordinance‟s 
provisions.  Whether knowingly or not, some contractors provide inaccurate information, 
if any at all, fail to pay the living wage rate, provide benefits insufficient to meet 
requirements, and/or misinform their employees.  (Anonymous, personal 
communications, January 29; April 5; April 12; April 14; July 10, 2006)  Contractors 
have a reputation for being uncooperative, verbally aggressive to County employees, and 
examine every possible way to avoid paying the living wage.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, January 29, 2006)  When contract compliance officers made an effort to 
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notify and explain to contractors that they must comply, contractors notify senior 
administrators in the County to work around the process.  Two contract compliance 
officers and a senior-level DBD administrator admitted they felt the political pressure 
from superiors or other departments in certain cases to provide added leniency to certain 
contractors given how long they have done business with the County.  (Anonymous, 
personal communications, April 5 and April 12, 2006) 
       Every contract compliance officer mentioned that, in some cases, contractors 
admitted to not having a clear understanding of what the ordinance‟s provisions actually 
were or meant.  Their lack of awareness was attributable to several reasons.  First, 
contract compliance officers believed that contractors were more interested in the 
contract amount awarded or were in too much of a hurry to attain the contract than focus 
on the living wage clauses in their contracts.  They simply ignored the requirements 
and/or argued that they did not pertain to contracted services even though in signing their 
contracts they agreed to understand and comply with the ordinance.  (Anonymous, 
personal communication, April 12, 2006)  Subcontractors also made the incorrect 
assumption that the services they were providing not amounting to $100,000 would 
exempt them from paying living wages.  If the overall contract is valued over $100,000 
then everyone under the umbrella of the contract is responsible for complying with the 
ordinance.  Contractors tended to argue that they were unaware of this provision; 
however, the County discussed the details of each contract at the pre-bid meetings.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, April 5 and 12, 2006) 
       Further, two contract compliance officers mentioned that the project managers in 
other departments utilizing the contracted services appeared to be misleading the 
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contractors and/or were not acting diligently to ensure the contractors are well informed.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, April 5 and April 12, 2006)  Even though DBD 
did have contract compliance officers that monitor compliance, DBD believed it was 
primarily the project managers in the County departments outsourcing the service who 
were directly responsible for every aspect of the contract.  As one contract compliance 
officer mentioned, the problem appeared to be that project managers believed keeping the 
contractors satisfied was more important than complying with the living wage: 
“They really need to help us do our job because they might know that the 
living wage might apply to something, but all they are interested in is who 
they contract and that they are getting the service they are paying for.  
They really have no interest, they really don‟t show any interest in that 
they care about the person that is not being paid the living wage because 
as long they are getting the services they are paying for, their job is done.  
What they need to understand is that if there is an ordinance enforcing a 
living wage, they don‟t have to do our job but they should encourage these 
venders to do the right thing.” (Anonymous, personal communication, 
April 12, 2006) 
 
Even though this contract compliance officer believed project managers are responsible 
for what is occurring, two other contract compliance officers mentioned there was a lack 
of effort on the part of each department as well exacerbating the situation.  (Anonymous, 
personal communications, April 12 and April 14, 2006)  Having other County 
departments commit themselves to providing clear and accurate information while 
holding their contractors accountable would help to curtail the rate of noncompliance 
hindering the implementation process. 
       It is the author‟s opinion that there appeared to be a communication gap both 
internally and externally in the process.  Internally, this was evident through the 
inaccurate information shared between DBD, project managers, and their contracted 
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vendors.  DBD wanted project managers to provide more accurate information regarding 
their contractors; however, the project managers were more concerned with ensuring 
contractors performed their contracted service than living wage compliance.  Two 
contract compliance officers mentioned that the lack of commitment by the project 
managers had been a source of frustration to DBD administrators.  Externally, contractors 
were difficult to deal with because they were not open or truthful about their disclosures.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, April 5 and April 12, 2006)  Employees also 
chose not to speak to County officials out of fear that they might lose their jobs.  A 
contract compliance officer mentioned that this was a critical challenge because the 
County relied mainly on contracted employee confidential admissions to remain aware of 
living wage noncompliance issues.  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 14, 
2006)  In addition, what made communicating with contractors challenging was the fact 
that certain contracted jobs occurred in different locations making it difficult to track 
down contractors at times.  For example, landscapers manage to perform services 
throughout the entire county.  Contractors forced contract compliance officers to track 
down some contractors to meet with them when they were not present at the time and 
location provided to the County.  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 5, 2006)   
       The majority of the contract compliance officers and a DBD manager believed that 
the process itself was a challenge because either penalties or enforcement was either too 
lenient and/or time-consuming.  (Anonymous, personal communications, January 29; 
April 5; April 12; April 14; July 10, 2006)  As one contract compliance officer 
mentioned, “For sure, we are way too lenient.  I‟ve been here for four years and I don‟t 
think that I have ever seen anybody get the hammer.  He might get a slap on the hand, but 
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that is way too lenient.”  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 12, 2006)  
Consider how the enforcement process occurred: (Anonymous, personal communication, 
April 5, 2006) 
 Upon discovering a violation, the County sends a “notice to cure” for the 
contractor to address the issue.  The contractor has 30 days to respond. 
 Contractors tend to provide the wrong information or incomplete documents.  The 
County notifies the contractors and offers an additional two weeks for them to 
provide the correct information. 
 If there is no response in 30 days of the “notice to cure,” the County calls the 
contractor directly as a courtesy. 
 Contractors at this point can be given additional time (2 weeks for payroll 
information due, 30 days for wages due). 
 If there is still no progress (at least 60 days from the initial “notice to cure”), the 
County sends an official violation letter to the contractor instructing them to 
comply within 30 days or the County takes further actions. 
 The County then reserves the right to stop payment on the contract and/or 
terminate it completely if the contractor does not comply. 
       Overall, the process can take up to 180 days
16
.  Contractors can continuously delay 
the process by providing inaccurate information that requires them more time to correct.  
A contract compliance officer admitted that contractors know this and use this to their 
advantage. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 12, 2006)  In the meantime, the 
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 As of January 2006, DBD took an average of 67 days to resolve a living wage violation successfully.  
(Miami-Dade County Department of Business Development, 2006) 
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more the contractors delayed the process, the more they save by failing to pay the living 
wage.  Even though the contractor was expected to pay all back wages, the County would 
rather negotiate a settlement rather than terminate the contract and be held responsible for 
having workers lose their jobs.  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 12, 2006)  
Moreover, the County department responsible for outsourcing the service must then find 
a new contractor to replace the previous one.  As another contract compliance officer 
explained, the County felt conflicted because of the contractors' entitlement to due 
process when appealing County decisions and simply terminating the contract would 
negatively affect too many individuals.  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 14, 
2006)  Ironically, these same contractors repeatedly violating the ordinance managed to 
renew or attain additional contracts.  BCC members rarely questioned the issue, if at all, 
because of the longstanding relationships some contractors had with the County and/or 
certain elected officials.  It was at this point in the process that half of the contract 
compliance officers became disillusioned and felt that the ordinance was ineffective.  
(Anonymous, personal communication, April 12, 2006) 
       Lastly, three contract compliance officers believed that the amount of resources 
dedicated towards enforcing the living wage was not sufficient to meet the demands of 
monitoring and enforcement.  (Anonymous, personal communications, April 5 and April 
12, 2006)  To begin with, contract compliance officers had a substantial amount of work 
related to each contractor.  Through site visits, certifying and auditing payrolls, and 
addressing complaints, the average amount of time it would take one contract compliance 
officer was approximately three days to conduct these actions for each contractor.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, April 5 and April 12, 2006)  This assumed that 
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the contractor was cooperating.  Site visits were challenging in some cases since Miami-
Dade County was one of the largest counties in the country geographically and 
compliance officers would have to travel over an hour each way to assess contractors.  In 
some cases, contractors were not even at the location(s) they specified.  In certifying and 
auditing payrolls, contractors were capable of providing incorrect or inadequate 
information that resulted in a lengthy battle to disclose the correct information.  
Complaints also took considerable time depending on the complexity of the situation.  
Once a compliance officer was aware of a violation, the investigation itself could take 
several days or weeks before reaching a conclusion.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, April 5, 2006)  In the meantime, DBD overlooked other contractors 
because there was not enough time or labor to handle every issue. 
       Contract compliance officers believed that contractors used the County‟s limited 
resources to their advantage.  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 5 and April 
14, 2006)  They learned the routines by each compliance officer and knew that once an 
assessment was completed, County officials would not be back for several months, if not 
longer.  Those that provided services far from County Hall in cities like Homestead and 
Florida City also used the distance to their benefit for the same reasons.  For contractors 
like landscapers, contract compliance officers normally had to call ahead to make sure 
they were able to perform their assessment and not waste time if they drove great 
distances to find no one available.  (Anonymous, personal communications, April 5 and 
April 14, 2006)  This eliminated the element of surprise random visits would have and 
gave contractors enough time to make their work areas appear compliant.  With four 
dedicated contract compliance officers and approximately 220 contracts, the 
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opportunities easily presented themselves where contractors could violate the ordinance 
without the County being aware.  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 5, 2006) 
       As a result, because contract compliance officers were overworked and faced the 
difficult challenges of monitoring the living wage, one officer admitted that there was 
low morale amongst the group.  Another officer described it as “All of us are frustrated 
because you try to do your best job and you‟re already starting out crippled.”  
(Anonymous, personal communication, April 5, 2006)  Turnover appeared to be an issue 
for two reasons.  First, the County trained contract compliance officers extensively and 
they eventually became well experienced, which made them attractive to other County 
departments to recruit.  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 14, 2006)  Second, 
some believed the best solution was to change jobs and leave the responsibilities to 
someone else.  There was too much of a work backlog and not enough support to address 
the matter.  As one contract compliance officer mentioned, “…it takes so much time to 
get results that you feel like you‟re working but not accomplishing anything.”  
(Anonymous, personal communication, April 12, 2006)  The impression by senior 
management was that morale was not an issue and while compliance officers might be 
overworked, it was not necessarily due to a shortage of officers, but simply the 
demanding nature of the work.  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 14, 2006)  
Regardless, every contract compliance officer interviewed agreed that with additional 
officers it would relieve part of the workload from the current officers and prevent the 
current officers from being overwhelmed.  Additional compliance officers would help the 
County‟s enforcement efforts as well to review more contractors at the same time.  
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(Anonymous, personal communications, January 29; April 5; April 12; April 14; July 10, 
2006)   
       Those interviewed cited some positives that have supported the ordinance.  Since its 
inception, the ordinance received support from County staff, particularly from the BCC.  
BCC support through the years has helped to strengthen the ordinance by amending it to 
clarify and broaden its scope.  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 12, 2006)  In 
addition, an organizational culture continued to emerge where more departments were 
becoming aware of the ordinance and willing to do their part to comply and support the 
legislation.  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 5, 2006)  DBD‟s senior 
management also acknowledged that the County‟s contract compliance officers were hard 
working and dedicated to enforcing the ordinance and commended their efforts for doing 
their part.  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 14, 2006)  DBD also credited 
the LWC for doing an excellent job in overseeing the execution of the ordinance and 
working with other departments to assist and coordinate in the implementation effort 
while addressing the concerns of the contractors and employees.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, July 10, 2006)  However, that lack of sufficient compliance officers and 
lenient penalties showed that the County was limited and some contractors used that to 
their advantage.  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 14, 2006) 
Summary of Findings 
       Similar to Broward‟s case, several themes emerged based on the interviews 
conducted.  This section highlights these themes as it related to this study in addition to 
outlining the accomplishments and deficiencies of Miami-Dade County‟s execution of 
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the living wage.  In light of those areas for improvement, this section also provides 
recommendations for improving the County‟s implementation efforts.  
       It is the author‟s opinion that Miami-Dade County demonstrated that both 
administrative and political factors affected the level of success in implementing the 
living wage.  As a positive influence, the administrative efforts by the County to amend 
the ordinance and dedicate staff to monitor and enforce the living wage have helped to 
keep most contractors in compliance.  On the other hand, there still appeared to be 
instances where the ordinance was open to interpretation.  Contract managers were not 
providing contractors or DBD with sufficient information.  Contractors took advantage of 
longstanding relationships with influential administrators throughout the County 
bureaucracy to evade living wage restrictions, in addition to, forcing County officials to 
negotiate pending penalties by placing their employees‟ jobs at stake.  Larger companies 
used their size as a bargaining ploy essentially having their employees as collateral to 
negotiate or avoid having to pay any penalties and/or repay back wages at some point
17
.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, February 1; March 17; April 5; April 12, 2006)  
Overall, senior-level DBD and DPM administrators and BCC members can investigate 
and address this matter, however, the County feared it could potentially lose business.  In 
the meantime, contractors lobbied County administrators to endorse a more business-
friendly approach to the living wage supporting fewer restrictions on wages and health 
benefits.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 1; February 10; March 17, 
2006) 
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 However, since the County implemented the LWO, it has not recovered all the lost wages contractors 
failed to pay.  Miami-Dade‟s County Manager reported in March 2008 that the County has successfully 
collected $180,935.65 in back wages out of a total $285,633.02.  In addition, since they began to uphold the 
penalties in 2007, the County collected $15,472.10 in sanctions.  (Miami-Dade County Manager, 2008) 
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       First, every LWC member stated that the ordinance‟s language was not clear.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, February 1; February 3; February 10; February 
15; March 2; March 17, 2006)  Because of the ambiguity in the policy, there were 
concerns related to acceptable levels of quality over healthcare and how the County 
interpreted and enforced the ordinance.  DBD questioned the employee probationary 
periods and the type of care provided by the health plans offered as being impractical 
and/or the reason for early terminations of some employees.  It was unclear whether 
particular services were applicable or not.  As a contract compliance officer explained, 
some “routine” services needed clarification, if only for the purpose of the County to 
know exactly what it should be enforcing.  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 
5, 2006)  Since the ordinance fell short of clearly outlining responsibilities, potential 
penalties, and specific criteria for living wage eligibility (in addition to a communication 
gap existing between County administrators and contractors), it is the author‟s opinion 
that it only supported the possibility that the implementation process could be highly 
politicized with equals being treated unequally, ineffective, and potentially biased.   
       As a result of the ambiguities in the policy, DBD was at odds with other departments 
since not only was it responsible for ensuring that contractors complied with the 
ordinance but that County departments fulfill their responsibilities throughout the process 
as well.  Two LWC members believed that either most departments did not take the 
living wage ordinance seriously or that implementing the LWO was mainly DBD‟s 
responsibility.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 1 and February 10, 
2006)  Even though DBD was dedicated to being hands-on with contractors, it needed the 
help from the contracting agents in other departments to supervise every contract with 
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limited resources.  Two contract compliance officers recommended that DBD be more 
assertive in informing contractors and the contracting agents in every department of what 
the living wage is, how it pertains to them, and the consequences involved in cases of 
noncompliance.  (Anonymous, personal communications, April 5 and April 12, 2006)   
       Miami-Dade County has made strides to strengthen its organizational structure.  A 
glaring flaw in its original arrangement was to have DPM and DBD coordinate the 
implementation of the living wage together.  Since placing the administrative 
responsibilities on DBD almost entirely, both LWC members and County administrators 
acknowledged an improvement in organization and compliance rates.  (Anonymous, 
personal communications, February 1; February 10; March 17; April 5, 2006)  Still, some 
departments saw the living wage as an inconvenience and just another issue for concern.  
Project managers in each department needed to cooperate more with DBD to inform and 
monitor contractors.  Unfortunately, as noted by the contract compliance officers, these 
departments were more concerned with hiring a contractor to provide a service and 
fulfilling their objectives than to work to assist DBD in theirs.  (Anonymous, personal 
communications, April 5 and April 14, 2006)  In addition, three LWC members believed 
that the BCC should act as a more unified front in support of the ordinance rather than 
have only one or two commissioners speak publicly in favor of it.  (Anonymous, personal 
communications, February 1; February 10; March 17, 2006)  DBD administrators stated 
that the lack of overwhelming support was ultimately tainting the credibility of the 
County‟s dedication to support the ordinance and it was evident in the limited resources 
currently dedicated to the living wage.  (Anonymous, personal communications, April 5; 
April 12; April 14, 2006) 
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       Several stakeholder groups played significant internal and external roles in the 
implementation process.  First, Miami-Dade County sought to execute, monitor, and 
enforce the ordinance and ensure a high rate of contract compliance.  Within the County, 
departments aside from DBD and DPM concerned themselves more with addressing their 
service demands and not prioritizing the living wage as DBD and DPM would expect.  
Outside the County, noncompliant contractors sought business from the County and 
attempted not to pay the living wage to earn higher profits.  Covered employees served a 
vital role to inform the County of violations in hopes of receiving the living wage and 
benefits they were entitled to earn.  Interestingly, competing businesses also reported 
noncompliant vendors to DBD and the LWC.  (Anonymous, personal communication, 
April 5, 2006)   
       It is the author‟s opinion that grassroots organizations played a minor role from a 
post-implementation standpoint (or at least a less visible function than they did to 
advocate for the living wage), LWC members represented them throughout the 
implementation process.  As mentioned, those LWC members involved with grassroots 
organizations worked towards expanding awareness of the living wage, advocated for 
better healthcare provisions, expanding the scope of the ordinance, and advised BCC 
members on the status of the ordinance‟s implementation.  In addition, the Coalition for a 
Living Wage (CCLW) also promoted the living wage through its website, newsletter, and 
meetings.  It also represented itself by having members as part of the LWC.  Even though 
politics has a reputation of acting more as a negative factor than a positive one, the 
grassroots involvement was a clear sign of how politics can positively influence the 
living wage.  This was why Luce (2004) and the majority of LWC members believed that 
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there needed to be a strong grassroots representation to ensure the living wage continues 
to progress.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 1; February 3; February 
9; March 17, 2006) 
       Similar to Broward County, there was a significant drop-off of grassroots 
participation in promoting the living wage once the Miami-Dade adopted its ordinance in 
1999.  Although LWC members represented several of those groups that helped to pass 
the ordinance, their roles evolved to where their focus now ensured that the County 
remained accountable for effectively implementing the living wage.  Luce‟s (2004) 
assumption in this case was correct, as grassroots organizations themselves do not have 
the same presence as they did prior to implementation.   
       It is the author‟s opinion that while the County should balance administrative and 
political influences when implementing the living wage, the resources it has at its 
disposal to carry out its objectives dictates its effectiveness.  Even though, the County‟s 
compliance rate is relatively high, the fact that contract compliance officers admit to not 
having the ability to constantly monitor the contractors begs the question how many other 
noncompliance cases go unnoticed.  Both LWC members and County personnel in this 
study unanimously agreed that the County should acquire additional compliance officers 
to effectively monitor and enforce the ordinance.  The fact that the County is operating 
with insufficient resources has attributed to lower compliance rates, overworked 
personnel, and low employee morale.  (Anonymous, personal communications, February 
1; March 17; April 5; April 12, 2006)  Overall, since 2006, the County‟s proactive actions 
resolved several ambiguities in the ordinance as well as instituted stricter sanctions on 
noncompliant contractors.  However, it is the author‟s opinion, that to sustain a high level 
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of compliance, the County should invest in additional compliance officers and coordinate 
with other departments to improve its enforcement efforts. 
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CHAPTER VI 
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
       This chapter presents the results obtained from the survey administered along with 
the statistical analysis techniques conducted.  First, this chapter provides a discussion of 
the survey‟s unit of analysis, sample characteristics, and response rate.  The second 
section describes the statistical methods used to test the study‟s hypotheses and the 
results.  The methods this study utilized included descriptive statistics, Chi Square, 
Cronbach‟s Alpha, and Spearman‟s Rank Correlation Coefficient (Spearman‟s rho).  The 
third section discusses the study‟s hypotheses and their relation to the quantitative and 
qualitative results.  The final section discusses the results generated from the open-ended 
questions utilized in the survey.  The author used SPSS and STATA to conduct the 
statistical analysis for this study. 
Sample Characteristics
18
 
       This section presents the demographic information of the jurisdictions that 
participated in the survey.  Along with presenting descriptives on the variables in Table 
6-1, Table 6-2 provides the Chi-Square statistics that demonstrate the relationship 
strengths among variables.  The Kurtosis and skewness values in Table 6-1 indicate that 
each variable‟s frequency distributions appear skewed and not normally distributed, thus 
supporting the need for Chi Square analysis.  Kurtosis and skewness tests help to verify 
the normality of each variable‟s frequency distribution.  (Gujarati, 2003)  Checking 
variable responses for normality is essential given the basic statistical assumption that 
one could easily infer the survey‟s results to be reflective of a larger population.  
                                                 
18
 Appendix C provides the descriptive survey results. 
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(Gujarati, 2003)  While a sample size of at least 19 as shown in Table 6-2 might arguably 
be too small for Chi Square tests to provide valid results, Howell (2002) states that 
conservative sample sizes of 20 are acceptable, however, statistical power might come 
into question.  Table 6-1 indicates that the skewness for the variables ranged from -2.87 
to 5.27 and Kurtosis ranged from -0.14 to 28.14.  This means that normal distributions 
hardly existed among the variables.  In cases where they existed, the distributions peaked 
away from the population mean.  Ideally, the targets for skewness and Kurtosis are 0 and 
3 respectively.  (Gujarati, 2003)  Overall, these statistics indicate considerable variation 
in the approaches jurisdictions implement their LWOs. 
Table 6-1: Sample Characteristic Kurtosis and Skewness Values  
Variable n Min Max Mean Median St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Years LW Implemented 27 2 10 6.47 6 1.94 0.69 -0.14 
LW Service Contracts 19 2 1000 160.05 50 255.02 2.49 6.46 
LW Compliance Rate 28 .4 1 .94 1 .14 -2.87 8.51 
LW budget 21 0 850,000 70565.79 5000 176218.30 3.98 17.25 
FTE Dedicated to LW 27 0 30 1.84 1 5.45 5.27 28.14 
        
       For Table 6-2, the purpose of utilizing and presenting the Chi-square statistics is to 
demonstrate that there is no relationship between the variables.  This measure ensured 
that the larger the difference existing between variables, the stronger the relationship 
actually was.  A weak relationship can be the result of a skewed distribution that can 
potentially threaten the validity of the survey results and any conclusions to reject, or fail 
to reject, the null hypotheses.  (Singleton, Straits, Straits, and McAllister, 1988)   
Table 6–2: Sample Characteristics Chi-Square Values 
Variable Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
Years LW Implemented 20.222 4 .000 
LW Service Contracts 46.667 7 .000 
LW Compliance Rate 16.333 1 .000 
LW budget 30.857 10 .001 
FTE Dedicated to LW 22.667 8 .004 
  120 
        
       As part of the survey, the author contacted each jurisdiction listed by ACORN on its 
living wage website (http://www.livingwagecampaign.org) by phone and/or email 
between June and October 2006.  Survey findings revealed that jurisdictions 
implementing a living wage ranged from one to nine years with the majority (89%) 
having done so for at least four years.  There were seven jurisdictions (26%) to report that 
they have no living wage contracts currently open.  Overall, the proportion of living wage 
contracts to all other service contracts averaged 15% amongst cities and counties.  Three 
jurisdictions (11%) reported having a living wage advisory board.  Nine jurisdictions 
(33%) admitted to dedicating no funding towards living wage implementation while one 
jurisdiction budgeted $850,000.  Overall, the average funding jurisdictions invested in the 
living wage is 8% of their current budget.  The majority of cities and counties (56%) 
dedicated at least one FTE to the living wage while five reported that they have none.  In 
regards to their compliance rate, 56% reported having 100% contract compliance.  This 
does not mean that they have perfect compliance, but rather that there were no instances 
of noncompliance reported.   
Constructs Reliability Tests 
       As discussed throughout this study, a successful living wage implementation strategy 
has to engage different factors.  Specific questions asked in the survey aimed to define 
and measure these constructs.   Ensuring construct validity is important because it 
confirms that the measures and contexts within the survey are consistent, accurate, and 
comparable to larger populations. (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002)   
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       Chapter 3 explained the importance of validity and reliability.  Reliability represents 
the level of consistency variables are capable of measuring a particular construct.  The 
author utilized Cronbach‟s Alpha to assess the reliability of the measures incorporated in 
this study.  Cronbach‟s Alpha is a statistical measure based on the correlations amongst 
specific variables.  In essence, the higher the alpha score, the better it reflects the 
consistency and reliability that the variables assumed would define a construct.  The 
highest Cronbach‟s Alpha value one can attain is 1 while values below 0.7 generally are 
not reliable. (Gujarati, 2003)  As shown below, each of the construct groups 
demonstrated to having Cronbach‟s Alpha scores of over 0.7. 
Policy Ambiguity 
       Policy ambiguity relates to unclear language within the ordinance that can contain 
loopholes where individuals can take advantage and avoid having to comply with the 
living wage.  In addition, a high level of uncertainty would provide a better opportunity 
for political influences to hamper the implementation process. 
       Respondents rated on a five-point scale the following statements related to political 
ambiguity.  The aim was to examine the extent which vague language in the ordinance 
can attract negative political influences and impede the implementation process.   
 LWO ordinance language and governing regulations are clear and unambiguous 
to all stakeholders. 
 LWO ordinance “loopholes” contribute to lackluster employer compliance. 
 Ambiguity in the LWO policy offers the opportunity for political interference. 
 Administrative orders and objectives are clear to those involved in monitoring and 
enforcing the LWO. 
 Contractors/vendors understand what the LWO is and what is required of them. 
 
       The author conducted a reliability test to confirm whether these variables as a group 
are capable of representing the political ambiguity construct.  As shown by the results in 
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Table 6-3, each variable shows at least borderline acceptable alpha scores thus ensuring 
that they suffice to represent the construct.  Overall, the Cronbach‟s Alpha score for 
construct variables as a whole defining political ambiguity was 0.764. 
Table 6–3: Policy Ambiguity Cronbach‟s Alpha Values 
Variable n Cronbach‟s Alpha 
Ordinance Language Clarity 28 .692 
Ordinance Loopholes 28 .680 
Ambiguity = Politics 29 .637 
Clear AO and Objectives 29 .733 
Vendors Understanding 29 .810 
 
Policy Conflict 
       Policy conflict relates to any forces challenging policy implementation because of 
poorly outlined organizational roles, responsibilities, procedures, etc.   
       The survey respondent the following questions on the same five-point scale to rate 
political conflicts: 
 Monitoring, and enforcement are met with vendor resistance. 
 Vendors are generally at odds over LWO regulations. 
 Contractors/vendors are constantly trying to find loopholes to avoid LWO 
obligations. 
 Contractors/vendors fulfill their obligations to inform employees about the LWO. 
 
Overall, in testing for internal consistency reliability as shown in Table 6-4, the 
Cronbach‟s alpha statistics reported that all four have strong relationships and generated a 
0.89 overall alpha score thus demonstrating that these variables were reliable to define 
this construct. 
Table 6–4: Policy Conflict Cronbach‟s Alpha Values 
Variable n Cronbach‟s Alpha 
Vendor Resistance 28 .866 
Vendor Conflict 28 .835 
Exploit Loopholes 28 .870 
Informing Employees 28 .866 
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Stakeholders 
       Stakeholders represent workers, labor groups, living wage advocates, and other 
groups and individuals directly impacted by the implementation of a living wage.  
Ideally, the higher degree of involvement by these groups would allow the 
implementation to be more effective, as there would be the possibility for open 
communication and cooperation.   
       Respondents were asked to rate the following stakeholder group on a five-point scale 
ranging from low to high as to their political influence in the implementation process: 
 Elected officials 
 Contractors 
 Grassroots groups (e.g. church, labor, and/or community action groups) 
 Bureaucratic politics (e.g. competition amongst government subdivisions) 
 
The following question allowed respondents to rate the extent living wage advisory 
boards affect the implementation process: 
 How active is the advisory board‟s role in enforcing and/or improving the LWO? 
Overall, Table 6-5 demonstrates how the variable group defining stakeholder influence 
earned a 0.828 Cronbach‟s alpha rating and proved to define this construct reliably. 
Table 6–5: Stakeholder Influence Cronbach‟s Alpha Values 
Variable n Cronbach‟s Alpha 
Elected Officials 29 .817 
Contractors 29 .804 
Grassroots 29 .762 
Bureaucratic Politics 29 .752 
LWAB Activity 20 .817 
 
Organizational Culture 
 
       For the purpose of this study, organizational culture represents the level of 
acceptance and commitment to which each jurisdiction implements the living wage.  
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There are two components of organizational culture measured in this survey.  First, 
information as to its accuracy and timeliness and the effect it potentially has on the 
implementation policy.  This is a critical factor given that how organizations 
communicate and utilize their information can determine the success of implementing a 
policy.  As shown in the case of Broward County, information gaps managed to 
complicate their process and lead to inaccurate assessments of the LWO‟s effectiveness.  
Second, the level of monitoring and enforcement demonstrates how committed a 
jurisdiction is to actually implementing the living wage.  This involves the time and 
efforts as demonstrated by Miami-Dade County to hold contractors accountable for 
providing living wages to employees.  In addition, the organizational culture can lead to 
political influences impeding the administrative process from ensuring compliance. 
       The survey asked respondents on a five-point scale how much they agreed or 
disagreed with the statements provided below.  The goal was to measure the value, 
access, use of information, and the quality of the communication channels in place. 
 We strive to improve the LWO based on past mistakes and current trends. 
 Information on program results is easily accessible and shared openly with ALL 
stakeholders. 
 We have sufficient data to monitor the effectiveness of our implementation of the 
LWO. 
 Policymaking reflects input provided by all stakeholders.  (e.g. elected officials, 
administrators, vendors, and grassroots groups) 
 
       In regards to monitoring and enforcement, respondents were asked on the same scale 
to rate their level of agreement on the following statements.  The aim measured how 
jurisdictions prioritize their monitoring and enforcement efforts in addition to penalizing 
noncompliant vendors.  These statements also weighed the political influence, if any, on 
monitoring and enforcement practices. 
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 Elected officials generally act quickly to resolve loopholes in the ordinance. 
 Enforcement of contract compliance is consistent regardless of the vendor. 
 We apply more stringent standards against repeat offenders. 
 Penalties for LWO noncompliance are fair with the gravity of the violation. 
 Upon being reported, violations are investigated in a timely manner. 
 Penalties are applied in a timely manner after adjudication. 
 
Table 6-6 demonstrates how the individual Cronbach‟s alpha scores and the overall .9036 
score verifies that information access, open communication, sufficient data, and efforts to 
continuously improve their practices are strong indicators defining the information 
component of the organization‟s culture.  Table 6-7 provides similar results for the 
monitoring and enforcement component of the organization‟s culture.  Overall, the 
variables for these groups demonstrated a strong internal consistency indicating that each 
variable is a reliable indicator for defining the monitoring and enforcement aspect of an 
organization‟s culture.  The Cronbach‟s alpha values were .904 and .944 for the 
information and monitoring/enforcement components respectively. 
Table 6–6: Org. Culture (Information) Cronbach‟s Alpha Values 
Variable n Cronbach‟s Alpha 
Efforts to Improve LW 28 .889 
Information Access 28 .890 
Sufficient Data 28 .889 
Stakeholder Input 29 .835 
 
Table 6–7: Org. Culture (Monitoring and Enforcement) Cronbach‟s Alpha Values 
Variable n Cronbach‟s Alpha 
Resolving Loopholes 27 .934 
Consistent Enforcement 29 .931 
Penalties for Repeat Offenders 27 .933 
Proportionate Penalties 29 .931 
Timely Investigations 29 .931 
Timely Penalties 26 .946 
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Organizational Capacity 
       The insufficient resources limiting the success of a living wage implementation 
policy define organizational capacity.  As shown in both Miami-Dade and Broward 
County cases, insufficient funding and personnel hindered county departments from 
evaluating, monitoring, and enforcing the ordinance.  Luce (2004) mentioned one needs 
adequate funding and personnel to implement a living wage in an effective way. 
       The following statements helped respondents confirm the level of staffing and 
funding their jurisdictions invested into implementing the living wage.  The survey asked 
respondents to rate on a five-point scale their level of agreement on the following: 
 We are understaffed and cannot implement the ordinance effectively. 
 The LWO receives sufficient funding for successful implementation. 
 
       Both managed to generate a high Cronbach‟s alpha confirming a strong internal 
consistency to define organizational capacity.  However, given that there are only two 
variables, STATA is only able to provide the average inter-item covariance and scale 
reliability coefficient for both together (.883).  Table 6-8 reflects these results. 
Table 6–8: Organizational Capacity Cronbach‟s Alpha Values 
Variable n Cronbach‟s Alpha 
Understaffing 28 .883 
Sufficient Funding 29 .883 
 
Organizational Politics 
 
       Organizational politics represent the dynamic relationships amongst the parties 
involved and how their roles affect the implementation process.  In some cases, 
organizational politics has been a positive influence by helping advance living wages 
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throughout the country.  However, it also caused several challenges to how its 
implementation as seen in the cases of Broward and Miami-Dade Counties.     
       Luce (2004) mentions that there is a trend where jurisdictions pass living wage 
ordinances yet fail to effectively plan for its implementation.  The survey provided 
statements to respondents to evaluate the validity of this claim and determine the extent 
politics affect the implementation process.  Based on a five-point scale, respondents rated 
their level of agreement on the following: 
 Elected officials support the passage of the LWO, but not its implementation. 
 Political influence limits the overall effectiveness of LWO implementation. 
 
Since there are only two variables defining this construct, STATA provided only the 
average inter-item covariance and scale reliability value of .999. 
Table 6-9: Organizational Politics Cronbach‟s Alpha Values 
Variable n Cronbach‟s Alpha 
Elected Official Support 28 .999 
Political Influence 28 .999 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 
       The purpose for testing reliability was to ensure that the measures operationalized to 
define the constructs were capable of doing so.  Given the reliability test results, the next 
step was to measure how these constructs (independent variables) correlated with the 
contract compliance rate (dependent variable).  Table 6-10 lists this study‟s hypotheses. 
Table 6-10: List of Null Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 
H1 Policy ambiguity has no effect on the compliance rate of a living wage contract. 
H2 Policy conflict has no effect on the compliance rate of a living wage contract. 
H3 Stakeholders have no effect on the compliance rate of a living wage contract. 
H4 An organizational culture promoting information sharing has no effect on the 
compliance rate of a living wage contract. 
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Table 6-10 (continued): List of Null Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 
H5 An organizational culture emphasizing monitoring and enforcement has no effect on 
the compliance rate of a living wage contract. 
H6 Inadequate organizational capacity has no effect on the compliance rate of a living 
wage contract. 
H7 Organizational politics has no effect on the compliance rate of a living wage contract. 
 
       To test these hypotheses, the author utilized Spearman‟s rho (or Spearman‟s rank 
correlation coefficient) to measure the correlation between the construct groups and the 
rate of compliance.  Spearman‟s rho is nearly identical to Pearson‟s Correlation, 
however, Spearman‟s rho substitutes raw scores with ranks to measure the linear 
relationships between two variables. (Howell, 2002)  The correlation coefficient ranges 
from -1 to 1.  The direction and magnitude measured the strength of the relation as well 
as its positive or negative correlation. 
       To measure the relationships between the construct groups to the dependent variable, 
the author totaled the responses from the independent variables defining each construct 
group to create a separate variable for each construct.  Table 6-11 presents the results.  
Each represents the bivariate correlation values of the aggregated construct variable as it 
related to the compliance rates provided by each responding jurisdiction. 
Table 6-11: Spearman‟s rho Values by Construct Group 
 n Sig. (2-tailed) 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Policy Ambiguity 22 0.008 -0.550** 
Policy Conflict 23 0.121 -0.333 
Stakeholders 15 0.631 0.135 
Org. Culture (Information) 21 0.084 0.386 
Org. Culture (Monitoring & Enforcement) 20 0.048 0.448* 
Org. Capacity 23 0.027 -0.460* 
Org. Politics 23 0.015 -0.501* 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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       Hypothesis H1 examined the effects policy ambiguity has on living wage 
implementation and contract compliance rates.  Specifically, the hypothesis is that policy 
ambiguity would have a negative effect on the compliance rate.  As shown in Table 6-11, 
policy ambiguity demonstrates having a significant negative effect. 
       In both case studies, the majority of living wage advisory board members and senior 
and mid-level county administrators admitted that the ordinance language and their stated 
policies and practices require corrections and/or amendments.  In some instances, some 
contract compliance officers in Miami-Dade admitted to either not being sure of what 
actions to take or that loopholes put them in a precarious situation of possibly 
overstepping their bounds to monitor and/or enforce. (Anonymous, personal 
communication, February 2; February 10; April 5; July 14, 2006)  Contract compliance 
officers in Miami-Dade believe that processes need to be more transparent as there are 
contractors claiming to be unaware of the living wage and its requirements.  Overall, 
because of the lack of clarity, it makes their jobs more frustrating.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, April 5 and April 14, 2006) 
       Hypothesis H2 examined the effects policy conflicts have on living wage 
implementation and contract compliance rates.  Specifically, the hypothesis is that policy 
conflict would have a negative effect on the compliance rate.  As shown in Table 6-11, 
this construct was unable to yield a significant result.   
       Consequently, although this construct emerged as an important role in the case 
studies, it failed to reject the null hypothesis.  It should be noted that by utilizing 
Spearman‟s rho on the individual variables defining this construct, contractors not 
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informing their employees of their living wage entitlements is a significant negative 
factor affecting the contract compliance rate (rs = -0.452; p = 0.03).  Conflicts on how to 
implement the ordinance can cause some friction as it did in both Miami-Dade and 
Broward Counties. (Anonymous, personal communication, March 17 and July 14, 2006)  
Challenges also stem from the lack of information shared between administrators. 
(Anonymous, personal communication, April 5 and July 14, 2006)  In Broward‟s case, 
conflict as to the extent contract administrators believe they should monitor contractors 
led to inaccuracies in its enforcement and compliance projections. (Anonymous, personal 
communication, September 29, 2006)   
       Hypothesis H3 examined the effects stakeholders have on living wage 
implementation and contract compliance rates.  Specifically, the hypothesis is that 
stakeholders in general would have a positive effect on the compliance rate.  As shown in 
Table 6-11, this construct was unable to yield a significant result.   
       To a certain extent, this result is not surprising given that the stakeholders identified 
(elected officials, contractors, grassroots organizations, and government administrators) 
have conflicting goals that impede the overall progress of the ordinance.  As Luce (2004) 
mentioned, the lack of grassroots involvement during the implementation process caused 
some LWOs to fail or lose its significance.  In fact, 67% of all jurisdictions surveyed 
noted a decrease in the grassroots involvement once the living wage became law.   
       Hypothesis H4 examined the effects an organizational culture promoting information 
sharing has on living wage implementation and contract compliance rates.  Specifically, 
the hypothesis is that information sharing would have a positive effect on the compliance 
rate.  As shown in Table 6-11, this construct was unable to yield a significant result.   
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       While the construct failed to reject the null hypothesis, there were two variables 
within the construct group that demonstrated significant correlations to the compliance 
rate.  Information access proved to be a positive factor (rs = 0.428; p = 0.042) as well as 
shared input by all stakeholders (rs = 0.464; p = 0.022).  Stakeholder input has shown, 
especially in Miami-Dade County, to be beneficial to improving the implementation 
process of the LWO.  Living Wage Commission meetings offer opportunities to have 
vendors and County departments share ideas, complaints, and so forth.  These open 
forums lead the County to amend the ordinance in several instances and update its 
policies and procedures.  Broward County‟s meetings are similar in form; however, 
external stakeholders have yet to play a significant role in advancing the ordinance. 
       Hypothesis H5 examined the effects an organizational culture emphasizing 
monitoring and enforcement as part of its policies and procedures has on living wage 
implementation and contract compliance rates.  Specifically, the hypothesis is that a 
commitment to monitoring and enforcement would have a positive effect on the 
compliance rate.  As shown in Table 6-11, organizational culture emphasizing monitoring 
and enforcement shows to have a significant positive effect. 
       The case studies pointed to elements of this construct.  First is the commitment by 
each county to monitor contracts and to penalize violations to the ordinance properly.  
Second, the effect lax penalties have to ensure proper compliance.  While the upper 
management in both counties believes monitoring and enforcement is a top priority, it 
seems to dissipate as one examines the lower administrative levels of the jurisdictions, 
specifically to the level of the contract administrators.  In Miami-Dade, LWC members 
believed that jurisdictions must execute more stringent penalties to reduce the likelihood 
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of contract noncompliance. Overall, a structured penalty scale based on the severity of 
the offense and contractor‟s record of accomplishment would help enforce any ordinance 
violations.  (Anonymous, personal communication, February 2 and February 10, 2006) 
       Hypothesis H6 examined the effects organizational capacity has on living wage 
implementation and contract compliance rates.  Specifically, the hypothesis is that 
organizational capacity would have a negative effect on the compliance rate.  As shown 
in Table 6-11, organizational capacity shows to have a significant negative effect.   
       In both case studies, Miami-Dade contract compliance officers and Broward 
Purchasing administrators admit to being overworked and understaffed. (Anonymous, 
personal communication, April 5 and July 13, 2006)  While much effort goes to passing 
the ordinance, it does not reflect the support to implement it effectively.  Follow-up 
emails to the surveyed jurisdictions reflected this sentiment.  Department directors in 
both counties stated that organizational capacity is the most important factor needing 
consideration but is unlikely to receive it. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 
14, 2006 and June 15, 2007) 
       Hypothesis H7 examined the effects organizational politics have on living wage 
implementation and contract compliance rates.  Specifically, the hypothesis is that 
organizational politics would have a negative effect on the compliance rate.  As shown in 
Table 6-11, organizational politics shows to have a significant negative effect.   
       The majority of those interviewed admitted that the implementation processes for a 
living wage is inherently political where longstanding business relationships and 
stakeholder self-interests are commonplace.  However, the case studies illustrated that 
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politics was a primary driver to getting the ordinance implemented in the first place 
through public rallies and local networking.  
Open-Ended Questions Results 
       The survey concluded with two open-ended questions to gather a more in-depth 
perspective on how jurisdictions currently implement their ordinance.  The first question 
asked respondents whether they believe government vending practices are an effective 
way to achieve social goals like the living wage.  Greenberg (2004) believes that policies 
like the living wage are likely to succeed more under the authority of an administrative 
department or agency better designed to oversee its implementation beyond purchasing 
departments, for example, a city/county manager‟s office.  However, in the case of 
Miami-Dade, such a situation can be somewhat misleading given that living wage 
responsibilities technically fall under the County Manager even though DBD and DPM 
are mainly responsible for managing and enforcing the LWO.  Nevertheless, the 
jurisdiction‟s purchasing or procurement-related departments manage the majority of 
living wage ordinances. 
Table 6-12 – Vending Solution for Social Goals Response Rate 
Do you think that vending is an effective way to achieve social goals like the living 
wage?  Why or why not?  (n=26) 
       Yes 42.3% 
       No 30.8% 
       No comment 26.9% 
 
       Table 6-12 shows that a plurality of those answering yes or no believe that vending 
practices address social goals like the living wage effectively.  Respondents answering 
“yes” support the notion that vending practices are important because it is an effective 
way to ensure that employers pay their employees a living wage.  They believe that it is a 
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legitimate way for government to apply some control for assisting those in need.  In 
addition, simply aiming to hire the lowest bidders on a contract is not always the best 
policy.  There needs to be a balance between cost and quality.  By paying a living wage, 
workers in most cases earn more than they would working elsewhere and this would give 
them the incentive to maintain a higher level of performance.  Besides, jurisdictions try to 
make their living wage provisions clear and vendors aware of them before finalizing 
contracts and vendors always have the option not to bid on the contract if they do not 
want to pay a living wage. 
       On the other hand, those opposed to the question in Table 6-12 believe that vending 
services should not be the primary method to implementing a living wage and feel that 
eliminating the ordinance and allowing free markets to dictate is a more rational and 
effective approach.  Moreover, respondents admitted there is pressure to “do more with 
less.”  Living wages make this difficult to achieve because they inflate the costs of 
contracts.  When analyzing the issue from a cost-benefit perspective, living wages are 
less practical given the cost and labor needed to help a relatively small group of 
individuals.  The overall rate of return would show from an economic standpoint that 
living wages are ineffective.   
       The second question asked respondents what else might help improve their 
implementation process.  Table 6-13 reports the frequency of responses grouped into 
major factors.  In some instances, respondents listed more than one major need.  
However, 20.7% of respondents mentioned that no additional steps would improve their 
implementation efforts.   
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Table 6-13 – Needs Proposed to Improve Implementation Process 
What else is needed to help your work unit become better capable of 
overseeing the implementation of the living wage ordinance? (n = 24) 
Need Percent 
Staffing 34.5 
None 20.7 
Greater Awareness 10.3 
Policy Support 10.3 
Additional Training 10.3 
LWO Expansion 6.9 
Stronger Penalties 3.4 
Better Planning 3.4 
       As noted in both cases, Miami-Dade and Broward Counties stated that the lack of 
sufficient staffing to monitor and enforce the LWO is perhaps the most critical issue each 
faces.  The majority of survey respondents appear to deal with the same issue.  This also 
supports Luce‟s (2004) argument that living wages for the most part are either not 
sufficiently funded, understaffed, or both.  One reason cited by respondents as to why 
additional staffing would help to relieve some of the administrative burden on those 
currently trying to manage it.  According to survey statistics, jurisdictions averaged 1.66 
FTE dedicated to monitoring the living wage with 34% of respondents claiming less than 
0.5 or zero FTEs and one jurisdiction reporting 30 FTEs while jurisdictions in general 
have 138 living wage contracts to manage.  According to one contract compliance officer 
in Miami-Dade County, monitoring one living wage contract from start to finish takes 
about 20 hours. (Anonymous, personal communications, April 5, 2006) 
       Several respondents suggested that a more aggressive awareness campaign would 
improve the implementation process – a point also mentioned by advisory board 
members in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties.  Luce (2004) also supports this idea.  
The fact that living wage campaigns emerge from grassroots campaigns demonstrates 
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that jurisdictions respond to organized public calls for better wages.  By the same 
process, jurisdictions need the same pressure to remain diligent in monitoring, enforcing, 
and expanding the living wage.  The majority of advisory board members in Miami-Dade 
and Broward Counties believe that if local community organizations and businesses 
become better informed and work with County leaders, the LWO in their respective 
counties would be more effective and help more people than they currently do.  However, 
one cannot be too optimistic to the likelihood of this occurring given that there is not a 
substantial movement in either county to support it. 
       The need to educate government personnel and contractors of the process, effects, 
and purpose of a living wage, especially penalties for noncompliance, are essential to 
implementing a more effective living wage policy.  As seen in the cases of the project 
managers and contract administrators in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties, the lack of 
knowledgeable administrators provided some contractors the opportunity to be 
noncompliant without fear of penalties or audits.  Contractors also need better training or 
education given that some claimed to being unaware of the ordinance and the 
expectations behind it.   
       Lastly, respondents suggested that living wage ordinances should have stricter 
penalties.  As seen in Miami-Dade County, the lack of strict enforcement has lead to 
some contractors to be in noncompliance with the ordinance and the County having a 
difficult time to maintaining contractors under compliance.  It would appear, given the 
respondents‟ emphasis on staffing rather than on planning and penalties, that jurisdictions 
concern themselves more with addressing the current policy rather than taking proactive 
steps to ensure the policy‟s success.  This is not to say that the sufficient staffing is not a 
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necessity for policy implementation, but having stricter penalties to dissuade contractors 
from purposely violating the ordinance and an organizational commitment to enforce 
these penalties would reduce the demand for added staffing.  For example, the Miami-
Dade County Manager‟s memorandum regarding the living wage‟s report on 
noncompliance mentioned that since Miami-Dade began enforcing its monetary sanctions 
for living wage violations, the ordinance‟s implementation is more effective.  (Miami-
Dade County Manager, 2008)  In fact, one contract compliance officer mentioned that 
contractors currently comply more with ordinance ever since Miami-Dade‟s enforcement 
efforts increased.  (Anonymous, personal communications, March 19, 2008) 
       Overall, the issues and suggestions cited by the respondents surveyed seem to 
compare to those identified in the cases of Miami-Dade and Broward Counties.  Most 
jurisdictions nationwide face similar issues that require policy changes suggested by 
administrators in both Counties.  For example, respondents cited the need for additional 
personnel and funding, more stringent penalties, and better organization of staff and 
information.  The responses also supported Luce‟s (2004) theory that living wage policies 
are inconsistent with the level of support and interest they generate during passage.  This 
also would support Matland‟s (1995) argument that situations where policy conflict and 
ambiguity exist diminish the amount of administrative organization and information 
management needed for effective implementation.     
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
       This chapter discusses the overall findings for this study.  The first section presents 
the conclusions to each hypothesis resulting from the surveys and interviews conducted.  
The second section presents the limitations of this study.  The final section summarizes 
policy recommendations for Miami-Dade and Broward Counties and presents a 
discussion for the need for future research.   
       The aim of this dissertation was to examine the living wage ordinances in Miami-
Dade and Broward Counties while identifying the primary drivers in their respective 
implementation processes.  Specifically, the focus was on evaluating how administrative 
and political factors influence a living wage policy.  Overall, the surveys and interviews 
conducted supported the proposed research framework discussed in Chapter 2.  Having 
surveyed jurisdictions nationwide implementing living wages also helped to infer that the 
majority of these primary drivers were common in most living wage policies. 
Findings 
       Table 7-1 provides a summary of this study‟s hypotheses and the findings developed 
through quantitative and qualitative methods.  Any hypothesis noted as being “supported” 
through quantitative measures demonstrated that a statistically significant relationship 
existed between the construct and the level of contract compliance at least at a .05 
significance level.  The qualitative results represented the coded case study results from 
Miami-Dade and Broward Counties.  The frequencies relating to certain factors provided 
the necessary evidence to support this study‟s assumptions. 
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Table 7-1: Summary of Findings 
 
Hypothesis 
Quantitative 
Study* 
Qualitative 
Study** 
H1 Policy ambiguity will have a negative effect on 
the compliance rate of a living wage-applicable 
service contract. 
Supported Supported 
H2 Policy conflict will have a negative effect on the 
compliance rate of a living wage-applicable 
service contract. 
Not Supported Supported 
H3 Stakeholders will have a positive effect on the 
compliance rate of a living wage-applicable 
service contract. 
Not Supported Supported 
H4 An organizational culture promoting information 
sharing will have a positive effect on the 
compliance rate of a living wage-applicable 
service contract. 
Not Supported Supported 
H5 An organizational culture emphasizing 
monitoring and enforcement will have a positive 
effect on the compliance rate of a living wage-
applicable service contract. 
Supported Supported 
H6 Inadequate organizational capacity will have a 
negative effect on the compliance rate of a living 
wage-applicable service contract. 
Supported Supported 
H7 Organizational politics will have a negative effect 
on the compliance rate of a living wage-
applicable service contract. 
Supported Supported 
  * Supported: Statistically significant (p< = .05). 
** Supported: Supported = high coded frequency  
 
Successful Implementation 
       As mentioned, the dependent variable to analyze each construct was the contract 
compliance rates for each jurisdiction.  One can analyze the effectiveness of living wages 
in different ways.  For instance, research developed by Brennan (2005) and Nissen and 
Borum (2006) identified living wage effectiveness as the effect the LWO had on the 
recipients‟ quality of life.  However, this study‟s focus was on the management of the 
LWO.  Given the literature analysis on New Public Management and its emphasis on 
performance measurements, it is the author‟s opinion that utilizing a jurisdiction‟s 
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contract compliance rate as the administrative indicator for policy effectiveness was 
sufficient.  Both counties utilize their compliance rate as an effectiveness measure.  
Administrators in both counties defined contract compliance as contractors paying their 
employees living wage rates on a consistent and timely basis, posting information 
regarding the ordinance where it is visible to employees, offering health benefits when 
applicable, and cooperating with any and all payroll audits by providing accurate payrolls 
for the County to review.  If a contractor fails to adhere to any of these conditions, 
Broward and Miami-Dade would consider them in violation of the LWO. 
Policy Ambiguity 
       An objective of this study was to assess the effect ambiguity had on the LWO 
implementation policies in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties.  Hypothesis H1 examined 
how ambiguities in the development and implementation of living wage policies and 
procedures interfered with the resulting management and enforcement of the ordinance.  
Matland (1995) stated that depending on the level of ambiguity the implementation 
approach one takes to executing a policy could vary.  Due to the lack in clarity, 
administrative policies and controls would be limited thus allowing the implementation 
process to be more prone to political influences.   
       Based on interviews of Broward and Miami-Dade Counties, it appeared that both 
possessed levels of ambiguity in their implementation processes that lead to 
implementation challenges.  Both counties cited concerns regarding uncertainties over 
which services to monitor and how to enforce contracts consistently.  This amounted to 
frustrations amongst administrators in both counties, mostly in Miami-Dade, while 
contractors took the opportunity to circumvent the ordinance.  Based on the surveys, 
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policy ambiguity proved a problem for other jurisdictions as well as it showed to have a 
statistically significant negative relationship with contract compliance rates.  In fact, 
several respondents felt that their jurisdictions should make a greater effort to clarify the 
language in their ordinances.  Doing so would allow for a better understanding of the 
expectations placed on the jurisdictions, its administrators, and contractors. 
Policy Conflict 
       An objective of this study was to identify potential policy conflicts in Miami-Dade 
and Broward Counties, their root causes, and the extent these conflicts affected the 
implementation process.  Hypothesis H2 examined how conflicts in administrative roles 
and responsibilities interfered with the management of the ordinance.  According to 
Matland (1995), conflicts cause policies to receive limited support due to opposing 
ideologies and priorities.  Ambiguity and conflicts present a vague delineation of 
authority and the likelihood that stakeholders would focus more on establishing their 
authority on the policy than its outcome. 
      While survey results failed to reject the null hypothesis, the interviews demonstrated 
that policy conflicts played a negative influence in implementing a living wage, 
especially in Broward County.  The LWAB was divided on its objectives and their 
priority.  Conflicts between members of the LWAB and Broward administrators caused, 
particularly those in Purchasing, the implementation process to stall in some cases.  Two 
LWAB members questioned the direction of the implementation policy.  Three other 
LWAB members doubted the efforts and intentions of the county administrators.  Two 
department directors questioned the overall purpose of the ordinance as well as the role 
and authority the LWAB should have over them.  In 2006, the state began its effort to 
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reform property taxes.  At least two Broward BCC members placed greater scrutiny of 
living wage contracts by questioning its relevance to improving quality of life and the 
LWO‟s priority over other County responsibilities.  Since its passage, the LWO caused 
tense relationships to develop and mixed support for its implementation. 
Stakeholders 
       An objective of this study was to identify the main stakeholders in Miami-Dade and 
Broward Counties and their roles in the implementation process.  Hypothesis H3 
examined how specific stakeholders (elected officials, contractors, grassroots 
organizations, etc.) influenced the implementation of a living wage.  The assumption was 
that each stakeholder would assist in some way to enhance and expand the LWO.  
However, given that each group had conflicting interests, this demonstrated to being 
unfeasible.   
       Interview results explained why the survey results failed to show any relationship.  
Given the stakeholders involved, their interests and actions conflicted with the LWO‟s 
purpose.  Proponents, opponents, and uninterested parties were responsible for 
overseeing the monitoring and enforcement of the LWO in both counties.  In Broward, 
LWAB members disagreed on the direction and purpose of the LWO, county 
administrators viewed the LWO as an administrative burden they were forced to manage, 
and one contract administrator did not view the LWO as a priority.  In Miami-Dade, 
DBD argued with the BCC for additional funding and with uninterested project managers 
to assist in the monitoring efforts.  The result is what Tullock (1965) described as parties 
maximizing their own utilities rather than focus on a collective effort to execute a policy.   
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Organizational Culture 
       The author examined two aspects of organizational culture in this study.  First, 
Hypothesis H4 examined whether prioritizing communication and information sharing 
and access played a positive role in the implementation process.  According to Daft 
(1998), the organization and its stakeholders should have a common understanding in 
supporting an idea like information sharing for it to succeed.  However, to develop a 
supportive culture for this, Trice and Beyer (1993) mention that the change must come 
through administrative policies and roles reflecting the organization‟s goals and 
priorities.  The importance of having clear information accessible reflects to Weber‟s 
(1946) belief that an organization requires accurate and organized information at an 
administrator‟s disposal to manage effectively. 
       This component failed to show any relationship; however, the information access and 
stakeholder input variables were significant among jurisdictions surveyed.  This 
demonstrated that communication was essential to maintaining productive working 
relationships with other stakeholders.  Both counties demonstrated the importance of 
open and clear communication during the interviews conducted.  Given that DBD in 
Miami-Dade County and Purchasing in Broward County relied on whistleblowers and 
other county personnel to notify them of noncompliance issues, the quality and timeliness 
of the information was critical to the policy‟s enforcement success. 
       The second aspect revolved around a jurisdiction‟s effort to monitor and enforce the 
ordinance.  Hypothesis H5 examined how prioritizing the monitoring and enforcement of 
the living wage would play a role in the implementation process.  In regards to the living 
wage, motivating departments to work together and provide the necessary resources to 
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implement the living wage effectively was a formidable challenge.  It is the author‟s 
opinion that without an organizational culture to promote widespread and consistent 
enforcement, the task of ensuring that contractors comply with living wage policies 
becomes ineffective.   
       According to the survey findings, a culture promoting the monitoring and 
enforcement of the ordinance was a statistically positive factor for the implementation 
process.  As noted in the interviews, with Miami-Dade County having a lax penalty 
structure and enforcement effort, some contractors tried to circumvent the ordinance.  
Two Miami-Dade contract compliance officers and LWC members mentioned that 
without a consistent and aggressive enforcement effort in place, contractors would 
continue to be noncompliant.  They proposed that Miami-Dade County must be diligent 
in its efforts to monitor the contractors and impose a structured and consistent 
enforcement policy that effectively penalizes noncompliant contractors based on the 
severity of the offense and repeat offenders.  (Anonymous, personal communications, 
February 10; March 2; April 5; April 12, 2006)        
       The interviews also examined organizational culture from the standpoint of how 
departments accepted their responsibilities to the implementation process.  While few 
administrators were opposed to the living wage‟s objective, many demonstrated some 
bitterness to the policy because of the resultant administrative burden.  In addition to the 
lack of noted results, the majority of the department directors and senior-level 
management interviewed in Broward County questioned whether the living wage should 
even continue.  To them, it only amounted to further frustrations given that many were 
  145 
working towards a policy they did not support or failed to see the results of their work.  
(Anonymous, personal communications, July 14; July 17; August 20, 2006)   
Organizational Capacity 
       An objective of this study was to examine the capacities Miami-Dade and Broward 
Counties had to implement their living wages and the extent to which limited resources 
affected their efforts.  Ulrich and Lake (1990) mentioned that for an organization to 
respond to demands and changes in its internal and external environments effectively, it 
needs the proper resources to do so.  Luce (2005) mentioned a jurisdiction‟s capabilities 
were limited to the capacities set by the personnel and funding dedicated to managing a 
living wage – a common problem in living wage policies.  As Swanson (1996) stated: 
“A popular saying comes to mind: Pit a good performer against a bad 
system and the system will almost always win.  How else to explain the 
failure of high-aptitude experts?  When the work system ties the hands of 
competent persons behind their backs and then punishes them for doing 
their best, they either quit and leave or quit and stay!  Likewise, when a 
well-designed work process is coupled with organizational policies and 
procedures that hire employees lacking the capacity to perform the work, 
no reasonable amount of training will get the employees up to required 
performance standards.”  (p. 51) 
 
       As noted in the interviews, morale amongst contract compliance officers in Miami-
Dade and department directors in Broward were low given their overwhelming 
responsibilities to the living wage they had aside from their other tasks.  This was 
preventing them from taking more aggressive and/or proactive steps to monitor and 
enforce the living wage.  To them, their actions reflected the amount of support they felt 
was inadequate to implementing the LWO.  As one Broward department director 
mentioned: 
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“Government keeps preaching that we have to do more with less and they 
keep pouring more and more on us and expect to do it with even less.  
Everything cumulatively is seriously impacting our abilities to serve our 
best to the agencies and get things done.  We do need more resources, 
and so far, they are not forthcoming.  You can only stretch it so thin and 
still try to do things effectively and we are reaching that point where we 
are behind and we are not generally as effective as we could be or should 
be.”  (Anonymous, personal communication, July 17, 2006)  
 
In addition, a Miami-Dade contract compliance officer mentioned that there was turnover 
due to the workload.  (Anonymous, personal communication, April 12, 2006)  It is the 
author‟s opinion also that there were LWAB members that lacked the capacity to assess 
the implementation process adequately and it caused tension and low morale amongst 
other Board members. 
       Hypothesis H6 examined to what extent limited resources affected a jurisdiction‟s 
ability to monitor and enforce a living wage.  Interviews revealed that living wages in 
both counties did not receive the necessary administrative support and resources to 
implement it effectively.  In both counties, the responsibilities of implementing the living 
wage were handed down to DBD and Purchasing without much consideration as to the 
effect it might have on their abilities to handle the LWO and other responsibilities at the 
same time.  What frustrated the department directors and senior management 
administrators interviewed was that dealing with the living wage brought about 
occasional criticisms from elected officials and other administrators in regards to policy 
shortcomings.  (Anonymous, personal communications, July 14; July 17; August 20, 
2006)  The response usually given by DBD and Purchasing was that departments were 
shorthanded and could not address all the demands to implement the ordinance.  Elected 
officials, in response to additional funding requests, questioned why a program should 
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receive additional funding without proving it was effective in the first place.  
(Anonymous, personal communication, July 17, 2006)  The result was that departments 
like DBD in Miami-Dade and Purchasing in Broward remained understaffed and without 
sufficient funding while still having the expectations of effectively implementing the 
ordinance.  Survey findings supported the interviews by showing that the lack of 
organizational capacities proved to be a significant negative factor in the implementation 
process.   
Organizational Politics 
       An objective of this study was to examine how organizational politics affects the 
living wage implementation processes in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties.  Pfeffer 
(1981) mentioned that politics generally plays a critical role in policy implementation.  
Organizations routinely jockey to improve and preserve their decision-making authority 
resulting in the combination of negotiations and management of diverse interests that 
amounts to organizational actions.  Hypothesis H7 examined the effect organizational 
politics had on the implementation of a living wage. 
       Based on the survey findings, organizational politics was a significant negative factor 
in the implementation process.  One administrator involved with living wages in another 
jurisdiction mentioned that the “devil is in the details” and that politics, while helpful at 
times, tended to stray the policy from its original intention.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, July 19, 2007)  The interviews highlighted the fact that organizations 
faced internal and external political forces during the implementation process.  
Specifically, it is the author‟s opinion that Miami-Dade seemed to be face external 
political challenges while Broward‟s challenges were internal. 
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       Miami-Dade County demonstrated it publicly supported the living wage.  In some 
cases, the County amended its ordinance in order to clarify its requirements and expand 
its scope, during which, the LWC played an active role in overseeing the implementation 
process.  However, Miami-Dade failed to provide the necessary resources DBD and DPM 
needed to adequately monitor and enforce the contract.  According to two contract 
administrators, in regards to the LWO‟s enforcement, politics played an important role in 
the way contractors dealt with LWO violations and penalties.  Those found noncompliant 
went through a lengthy and time-consuming County process to bring contractors back 
into compliance before penalizing them.  The contractors normally appealed and 
negotiated the penalties.  In some cases, contractors with longstanding relationships 
involved project managers, department directors, Commissioners, County Manager‟s 
Office, and/or the Mayor‟s Office to resolve the matters for them.  This resulted in 
contractors being relieved of the penalties owed and repaying back wages at their 
convenience.  (Anonymous, personal communications, April 5 and April 12, 2006) 
       There appeared to be a divide in Broward between opponents and proponents of the 
living wage in both the BCC and LWAB.  Conflicting interests in the LWAB forced 
Board members to deviate from its set goals and purpose because they spent more time 
arguing rather than evaluating the County‟s implementation process.  Since approving the 
ordinance on a 5-4 vote, Broward administrators have had mixed feelings on their 
feelings toward the policy as well and that prevented there from being significant gains 
implementing the ordinance. 
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Living Wages and Learning Organizations 
       On May 9, 2000, LWC member Michael Ozegovich presented Miami-Dade‟s BCC 
with the LWC‟s first annual report.  During his presentation, he asked the BCC “what are 
we supposed to be oversighting?”  He continued by mentioning that the ordinance‟s 
language was “broad” and asked what the BCC‟s intention was for the ordinance and 
who the beneficiaries were because the LWC was not sure of how to evaluate the LWO.  
(Miami-Dade County, television broadcast, May 9, 2000)  Since its passage, Miami-Dade 
County‟s implementation policy continued to evolve by establishing precedence on 
compliant services and addressing the requests made by the LWC.  In fact, Purchasing 
administrators admitted to experiencing their own “growing pains” when learning to 
develop its living wage policy.  (Anonymous, personal communications, July 12 and July 
14, 2006)  In comparing the state of the LWOs in both counties at its infancy to their 
current forms, they illustrated the qualities expressed by Senge (1990) as examples of 
learning organizations. 
       Daft (1998) mentioned that a learning organization involves a paradigm shift where 
organizations accept and adapt a new way of thinking and/or acting.  How an 
organization does this depends on its learning capabilities.  The capabilities involve the 
financial and administrative capabilities as well as a supportive organizational culture 
willing to apply the change.  Figure 6 illustrates how various organizational elements 
combine to develop an organization‟s initiative to learn.  
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Figure 6 – Learning Organizational Elements (Daft, 1998) 
 
       Daft (1998) believes that an employee appropriately trained and informed on his/her 
role and responsibilities understands to act accordingly to meet the organization‟s 
expectations.  Policy evaluations are an important component of the policy process where 
organizations must be willing to identify strengths and weaknesses in the policy and 
understand how to address them – a measure supported by Schön (1983).  At this point, 
organizations should be open to applying new methods and ideas.  This depends on 
having accurate information at the organization‟s disposal to assess the demands by each 
stakeholder and the organizations capacity to act.  These factors can only succeed with an 
organization culture that would permit it.  Given the organization‟s leadership and how it 
prioritizes the need for the policy‟s success, an organization only can go so far as the 
administrative support would allow.  Part of the culture also involves coordinating with 
departments/agencies/stakeholders that can provide their expertise to develop a 
comprehensive and effective policy.  As Senge (1990) mentioned, individuals within an 
organization learn best by sharing their experiences.  By sharing information and 
supporting open ideas and communication, an organization is able to understand the 
dynamics of the policy at hand.  (Oshry, 1995) 
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       Since the author conducted the interviews of Broward and Miami-Dade Counties 
administrators in 2006, there were several administrative and political challenges 
identified at the time affecting the implementation policies in both counties.  Figure 7 
illustrates the challenges noted in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties and how they 
related.  Both Counties had a conflictive organizational culture regarding the LWO.  
Broward‟s BCC occasionally questioned the applicability of the living wage and its 
overall purpose.  There were department directors and other senior management 
personnel in Broward who did not support the ordinance and preferred it eliminated.  
Senior management in DBD and several contract compliance officers in Miami-Dade 
questioned its overall purpose resulting in low morale due to the arduous effort it took to 
enforce it while receiving little credit in return.  The monitoring efforts were inconsistent 
because of the limited resources in Miami-Dade and contract administrators, unclear on 
their role, in Broward failed to properly review and report payroll audits.  Enforcement 
was also inconsistent given that contractors often negotiated their ways out of paying 
penalties and some wages in Miami-Dade while Broward claimed to have perfect 
compliance. 
 
Figure 7 – Living Wage Implementation Challenges 
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       Table 7-2 presents the living wage contract compliance rates in Miami-Dade since 
2004 based on the violation reports provided by DBD to the LWC.  Even though the 
number of service contracts increased almost annually, the compliance rate managed to 
do so as well.  In addition, the proportion of payrolls reviewed to total contracts increased 
during this time.  A contract compliance officer mentioned that this is attributable to the 
County exhibiting less tolerance on noncompliant contractors.  Contractors penalized 
have less success negotiating their fines since they must appeal to hearing officers that 
rarely overturn penalties
19
.  In addition, the BCC amended ordinance in 2006 to 
incorporate a penalty schedule that escalates based on the severity and violation 
repetitions.  (Anonymous, personal communications, March 18, 2008) 
            Table 7-2: Miami-Dade County Compliance Rates 
Report Date
20
 
Total 
Contracts 
Payrolls 
Reviewed Violations 
Compliance 
Rate
21
 
August 2004 133 93 10 89% 
June 2005 246 208 23 89% 
January 2007 200 200 18 91% 
February 2008
22
 221 200 11 94% 
 
       Since 2006, both counties made several improvements to limit its policy ambiguities, 
resolve conflicts, and improving its enforcement and monitoring efforts.  This provides 
evidence that over time both counties learned from prior experiences to correct their 
policies.  For example: 
                                                 
19
 Since Miami-Dade County implemented stricter penalties, it has collected over $15,000 in penalties. 
 
20
 Miami-Dade County Department of Business Development, Living Wage History of Violations, 2008. 
 
21
 The compliance rate consists of the number of violations based on the payrolls reviewed. 
 
22
 The information provided in the violation report in March 2008 is incomplete.  The author compared the 
violation lists from previous meetings and noted that several companies were missing and did not match the 
latest report.  The author notified a contract compliance officer about the missing information and was told 
that DPM would investigate the issue. 
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 The county attorneys for both counties continue to provide legal opinions as to the 
scope of the ordinance and applicability.  One Broward County Attorney 
administrator mentioned that policy ambiguities become less of a factor over time 
given precedence set in specific cases.  (Anonymous, personal communications, 
August 20, 2006) 
 Miami-Dade County conducted an impact analysis through the work of Nissen 
and Borum (2006) to assess the impact the LWO had on the quality of life of its 
recipients. 
 In 2006, Miami-Dade County also amended its ordinance to clarify the health 
benefit requirements applicable to living wage recipients as well as establishing 
90-day probationary periods whereby these health benefits would be available to 
the recipients. 
 In March 2008, Broward conducted a workshop to propose new initiatives 
intended to enhance their LWO.  Among the changes recommended, the Broward 
County Auditor is to review compliance reports, Purchasing is to develop an 
impact study and utilize an automated system for data collection and storage.  
(Del Marcus, 2008) 
       It is the author‟s opinion that factors like policy ambiguity and conflict are 
significant problems in living wage implementation in the early stages.  However, 
assuming there is a commitment to support the LWO and improve its policy efforts, 
ambiguity and conflict are manageable in time.  By examining Broward and Miami-Dade 
Counties, jurisdictions face somewhat of a learning curve when implementing a LWO.  It 
is the author‟s opinion that both counties continue to deal with several challenges; 
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however, by utilizing a rational management process in addition to administrative 
support, they can eventually correct their measures. 
Limitations 
       Every research method and approach has its strength and weaknesses.  While the 
triangulation of methods helped to incorporate the strengths of each to develop a more 
comprehensive and rigorous approach, some limitations remained.  The following were 
the limitations that emerged while conducting this study: 
 Interview access to contractors – One objective was to interview contractors 
contracted with Miami-Dade and/or Broward County required to pay the living 
wage.  Similar to the approaches taken to examine county administrators and 
advisory board members, the purpose of interviewing these contractors was to 
gain their perspective into the process and to have a better understanding as to 
why contractors become noncompliant with the ordinance.  While the author did 
not conduct any formal interviews with the contractors, there were several 
informal discussions with some business owners that declined to participate in 
interviews.  The information generated through those discussions helped to 
develop the limited perspective contractors have on the living wage for this study. 
 Quality of survey data – During the interviews conducted in Broward County, 
each administrator mentioned that there were no cases of noncompliance to date.  
However, a report by the Broward County Auditor revealed that there were 
noncompliant contractors overlooked.  (Broward County Office of the County 
Auditor, 2006)  Based on a random sample of 10 contracts taken by the County 
Auditor, three of the contracts were noncompliant.  This challenged the survey 
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finding that 56% of jurisdictions surveyed also mentioned having perfect 
compliance records and compliance rates.  This was a significant limitation 
because the rate of compliance was the dependent variable used for this study‟s 
statistical analysis.   
 Comparisons to other jurisdictions – A limitation with case study research is 
one‟s ability to generalize the findings in this study to other jurisdictions.  Further 
comparisons drawn with jurisdictions noted for their successes, like Boston 
(Brenner, 2005), or failures like any jurisdictions that repealed its LWO would 
enhance this study‟s findings.  Comparing the results from Broward and Miami-
Dade Counties to other jurisdictions would provide an added perspective noting 
the effectiveness, or lack thereof, in relations to policies in place nationwide. 
Policy Recommendations 
       Because of the interviews and surveys conducted, the author provides the following 
policy recommendations to improve the management and implementation of the living 
wage ordinances in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties. 
       Divisions need more resources - This recommendation applies more to Miami-Dade 
than Broward County; however, both jurisdictions admitted that they were operating at or 
near capacity without considering their LWO responsibilities.  Accurately monitoring and 
enforcing a living wage contract can be an arduous and time-consuming process because 
of the efforts needed to track down contractors and verify that the information they 
provided was accurate.  The need for more resources is simply to meet the demand for an 
effectively implemented ordinance.  One contract compliance officer mentioned that it 
normally takes about two weeks to conduct a thorough payroll audit.  (Anonymous, 
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personal communications, April 5, 2006)  One Broward Purchasing administrator 
dedicated more than 30% of a week dealing with living wage issues.  (Anonymous, 
personal communications, July 14, 2006)  The survey supported the fact that jurisdictions 
do not allocate the necessary resources to monitor and enforce the living wage seeing as 
the average jurisdiction dedicated one FTE per 80 living wage contracts.  It is the 
author‟s opinion that Broward needs an administrator solely committed to overseeing all 
living wage issues while Miami-Dade should provide sufficient personnel where contract 
compliance officers handle no more than 40 to 45 contracts annually.  
       Simplify the coverage - In several occasions, there were contracted services 
applicable to the living wage that were already paying above the stated rate beforehand.  
These services, like elevator and auto repair, technically apply to the living wage because 
of the general classification under “routine” services or maintenance.  Aside from 
improving on the ordinance‟s language, a waiver should be available for contractors and 
specific services that prove they were paying employees above the living wage before the 
contract‟s effective date.  This move would help make the implementation process more 
efficient because it would eliminate superfluous work and allow jurisdictions to focus 
solely on those contracts that need closer monitoring.   
       Contract administrators need to play a more significant role - While both counties 
have administrators dedicated to examining the progress of the ordinances, the fact is that 
the contract administrators and/or project managers interact with contractors on a closer 
basis than will any other department in either county.  In addition, it was the original 
intentions of both Counties to have their contract administrators and project managers 
assist in monitoring contracts.  (Anonymous, personal communications, April 5 and July 
  157 
14, 2006)  It is the author‟s opinion that the first step needed is to streamline the process 
where these groups would be more involved in communications with contractors and 
other county administrators.  The second step is to hold the contract 
administrators/project managers accountable for management of service contracts.  
Verifying the information and administrative actions by contract administrators/project 
managers is critical.  These steps would result in each county‟s expansion of their 
monitoring and enforcement coverage.  Broward County took preliminary steps to doing 
this by proposing that the County Auditor review compliance reports.   
       Improve the whistleblower policy and monitoring - Since both counties do not have 
the necessary resources to monitor each contractor constantly, both relied heavily on 
workers to notify them of noncompliance issues.  Both counties should take more 
aggressive measures to educate workers of their living wage rights and options.  By 
leaving this responsibility to employers, the possibility exists for workers to receive 
inaccurate information, if any at all.  (Anonymous, personal communication, March 2, 
2006)  Providing living wage information on paychecks every six months is not enough.  
The biggest challenge is that workers normally fear losing their jobs if they report their 
employers and these workers are not entirely sure of their rights.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, April 5, 2006)  It is the author‟s opinion that the process is either too 
confusing or intimidating for anyone to come forward with information.  Both Counties 
should develop better methods for whistleblowers to report noncompliant contractors that 
would ensure their protection. 
       Increase awareness – Ever since the BCC threatened to eliminate Broward‟s LWO 
there has been an emerging movement to save it.  In fact, commissioners were under fire 
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by local proponents in 2007 for suggesting the possibility of repealing the ordinance.  
The special workshop in March 2008 provided evidence of local support given the 
relatively large attendance from various proponents.  Luce (2004) stressed that a key 
ingredient to the living wage‟s success is continued public support.  It is the author‟s 
opinion that while both counties made an effort to educate contractors and workers on the 
living wage, they both need additional steps to increase the awareness in local 
communities as well, however, this responsibility should fall mainly on the LWAB and 
LWC members.  An informed community would help maintain the ordinance as a priority 
to elected officials.  It also helps potential contractors understand the living wage and 
their role before bidding on a contract.  Increasing awareness could also help to improve 
the compliance rates since workers would be more conscious of what their rights are.  
However, awareness campaigns mainly reflect the interest by each county and their 
advisory boards.  Without an overwhelming support internally for the ordinance could 
limit the extent counties would support its awareness. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
       According to the survey findings, Miami-Dade and Broward Counties represented 
two distinct cases comparable to other jurisdictions; however, the survey results showed 
that each situation was unique.  Living wage ordinances bring about the promise of 
improving quality of life for many workers but it comes at a cost to local jurisdictions and 
taxpayers.  If such a policy is to exist and enforced effectively, it must be some sort of 
assurance that it is addressing a social need as intended. 
       In passing living wage legislation, there are generally two parties involved – 
grassroots advocates and elected officials.  While both might not admit to it, their actions 
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reflect that each was mainly concerned with short-term results.  As Downs (1957) 
predicted, elected officials wish to receive the credit from passing a politically appealing 
law while advocates are mainly concerned with creating the ordinance assuming their 
fight has been won and the ordinance would be implemented as proponents expect.  Luce 
(2004) mentioned that interest on both sides drops dramatically from that point after.  It is 
no coincidence that the crux of living wage research originally focused on the potential 
impacts of the ordinance with hardly any mention as how to implement it.  Since then, 
literature emerged highlighting the social benefits living wages can have on local 
economies.  (Brenner, 2005, and Nissen and Borum, 2006)  Still, there appeared to be a 
research gap regarding the practice of implementing living wages this study helped to fill 
by identifying the administrative and political factors that exist in the process and better 
practices to implement a living wage effectively. 
       Nevertheless, there are still some policy questions and concerns that would require 
further research to better assess living wage policies and processes.  The following are 
those questions/concerns: 
 How many workers does the living wage affect and to what degree? 
 What is the total administrative cost of implementing a living wage? 
 What is the total cost to implement a living wage? 
 How does a living wage affect businesses and their efforts to bid on 
government contracts? 
 What effect would have a living wage have on the local working poverty 
level? 
 
       Each of these questions were posed to Miami-Dade and Broward County 
administrators to which no one was able to provide a definite answer.  This study 
determined that an accurate measure for living wage implementation should be the rate of 
contract compliance.  However, it is the author‟s opinion that to expand this to a policy 
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perspective focused on determining if the living wage is effectively helping to meet the 
needs of local households at or near the poverty level, jurisdictions should be able to 
answer these questions with relative ease.  Results need to be consistent with the rational 
implementation model discussed by Daft (1998) and Bowsher (1985).  Policy ends and 
means need to be clear; sufficient resources must be allocated; and comprehensive and 
timely evaluations need to be conducted to improve the implementation process.  It is the 
author‟s opinion that jurisdictions either do not have the information available, have not 
attempted to evaluate their living wage policy, and/or believe (based on inaccurate data) 
that their policy is successfully meeting its objectives.  These five questions should be 
fundamental for any jurisdiction to answer in gauging what actions it should take to 
improve, maintain, or eliminate its living wage.  In the end, the policy costs jurisdictions 
significant amounts each year without any way to determine the rate of return on the 
policy.   
       As of July 2007, Broward County was working towards developing a comprehensive 
report to answer these fundamental questions.  This came after determining that the living 
wage enforcement was ineffective and faced recent political pressure to eliminate it as a 
cost-saving measure (Wyman, 2007).  In Miami-Dade County, the study conducted by 
Nissen and Borum (2006) examined the effect the living wage had on workers.  However, 
their sample size of 78 was not sufficient to infer statistically to the larger population of 
contracted workers.  It is the author‟s opinion that the study was a good start to 
evaluating the impact of the living wage in Miami-Dade County.  It should serve as 
supplementary information to gauge the ordinance‟s outcomes.  Miami-Dade County, 
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like Broward, should be able to answer the questions listed to justify the living wage‟s 
purpose and need for further funding or termination.   
       To answer these questions accurately, the author believes that both counties should 
invoke the New Public Management ideals and practices Kettl (2000) and Osborne and 
Plastrik (2000) discussed.  The public expects government to be more results-oriented, 
transparent, and accountable for its actions.  To do so, governments need to align 
resources and organizational climate to accomplish its goals and objectives.  Failing to do 
so can lead to an abandonment of the policy.  Ultimately, governments need to dedicate 
more time and resources towards implementing performance measurements and 
conducting systematic evaluations.  Their focus needs to be on the outputs and outcomes 
of their implemented policies.  
       While living wage policies are growing in numbers throughout the country, it also 
has quickly become a hotly debated issue as well.  It is the author‟s opinion that 
regardless of the fact whether one is in favor or opposed to it, elected officials making 
policy decisions without having critical data to support their actions is an example of 
poor governance.  These actions support Luce's (2004) argument that once a government 
passes a LWO, the ordinance does not receive the same level of attention and effort for 
implementation as it did originally.  However, this study supported Luce‟s (2004) claim 
that grassroots organizations are responsible for the success of the living wage as much as 
anyone else because without public support before, and more importantly after the law is 
created, living wages will be in a state in which operating results fail to square with 
legislative expectations. 
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INSTRUCTIONS TO SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 
 
[NAME], 
 
Several weeks ago, I contacted you regarding a survey I am conducting for my 
dissertation research on the implementation of living wages to which you expressed 
interest in participating.  This email is to notify you that the survey is complete and is 
available online at the following address: 
 
http://chua2.fiu.edu/faculty/carrascot/livingwage/ 
 
The survey should take you no more that 20 minutes.  The first set of questions will ask 
you specific questions on your monitoring and enforcement practices.  The rest of the 
questions will gauge your opinion on the operating environment.  Again, this survey is 
confidential and voluntary. 
 
You will be prompted to provide a username and password.  Please provide the following 
information: 
 
Username: [USERNAME] 
Password: [PASSWORD] 
 
I would like to thank you in advance again for taking part in the survey.  Your 
contribution will play an important part of my study‟s ultimate findings.  If you have any 
questions, feel free to email me at ppp78@msn.com or call me at 305-609-3391. 
 
Sincerely, 
  
Theo Carrasco 
Doctoral Candidate, Florida International University 
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SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Thank you again for taking the time to participate in this study.   
 
This set of questions focuses on the technical aspect of how your jurisdiction implements 
its living/prevailing wage ordinance (LWO).  This section requires specific information 
on contract and budget totals.  Please be as specific as possible. 
 
1. What year was the LWO passed? 
2. Given the expiration of contracts after that date, what year did the LWO actually 
cover all employers (contractors, vendors, etc.) and workers it was intended to 
cover? 
3. How many total service contracts does this jurisdiction currently have? 
4. How many of those contracts are covered by the LWO? 
5. What percentage of covered employers (contractors, vendors, etc.) do you 
estimate are adhering to LWO regulations? 
6. Do you have a living wage advisory board? 
7. What is the total operating budget for your work unit?  (Estimate if precise figures 
are not available.) 
8. What is the budget for monitoring, enforcement, and/or evaluation of the LWO?  
(Estimate if precise figures are not available.) 
9. How many employees do you have dedicated to monitoring, enforcing, and 
evaluating the LWO?  (For less than a full-time employee, use a percentage.  
Estimate if you have to.) 
10. How often are vendor payrolls reviewed? 
11. How often are random site visits performed? 
12. Do you have information on the LWO posted online?  What is the website 
address? 
 
This portion of the survey focuses on the operating environment for the jurisdiction‟s 
living/prevailing wage ordinance (LWO).  The goal is to have a better understanding of 
the influential factors driving the implementation process of the living/prevailing wage.   
 
Political Factors – The aim of this section is to examine how political influences might 
affect administrative action.  For the purposes of this study, “political influence” may 
include such factors as elected official override of traditional personnel processes, 
influence over program audits, ignoring/downplaying technical advice on program 
operations, and failure to incorporate workforce demographics and area economic trends 
into program operations. 
  
[1-Strongly Disagree - 5-Strongly Agree] 
 
13. Elected officials support the passage of the LWO, but not its implementation. 
14. Political influence limits the overall effectiveness of LWO implementation 
efforts. 
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15. The LWO receives sufficient funding for successful implementation. 
16. LWO ordinance language and governing regulations are clear and unambiguous 
to all stakeholders. 
17. LWO ordinance “loopholes” contribute to lackluster employer compliance. 
18. Elected officials generally act quickly to resolve loopholes in the ordinance. 
19. Ambiguity in the LWO policy offers the opportunity for political interference. 
 
[1-Low - 5-High] 
 
20. Please rate the political influence each of the following groups has on the 
implementation process: 
a. Elected officials 
b. Contractors 
c. Grassroots groups (e.g. church, labor, and/or community action groups) 
d. Bureaucratic politics (e.g. competition amongst government subdivisions) 
21. How active is the advisory board‟s role in enforcing and/or improving the LWO? 
 
Organizational Culture and Dynamics – This survey examines factors within your work 
unit and jurisdiction overall.  The management and enforcement component inquires 
about the implementation effort.  The contractors/vendors section examines the 
relationship between them and your jurisdiction in the context of LWO implementation. 
 
[1-Strongly Disagree - 5-Strongly Agree] 
 
Jurisdiction 
22. We strive to improve LWO implementation based on past mistakes and current 
program trends. 
23. Information on program results is easily accessible and shared openly with ALL 
stakeholders. 
24. We have sufficient data to monitor the effectiveness of our implementation of the 
LWO. 
25. Policymaking reflects input provided by all stakeholders.  (e.g. elected officials, 
administrators, vendors, and grassroots groups) 
26. Administrative orders and objectives are clear to those involved in monitoring and 
enforcing the LWO. 
 
Monitoring and Enforcement 
27. Enforcement of contract compliance is consistent regardless of the vendor. 
28. We apply more stringent standards to invoke and implement penalties against 
repeat offenders.  
29. Penalties for LWO non-compliance are fair with the significance of the violation. 
30. Upon being reported, violations are investigated in a timely manner. 
31. Penalties are applied in a timely manner after adjudication. 
32. Businesses frequently attain waivers to avoid paying the living/prevailing wage. 
33. We are understaffed and cannot implement the ordinance effectively. 
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Contractors/Vendors 
34. Changes to the LWO, its monitoring, and enforcement are met with vendor 
resistance 
35. Vendors are generally at odds over LWO regulations. 
36. Contractors/vendors understand what the LWO is and what is required of them. 
37. Contractors/vendors are constantly trying to find loopholes to avoid LWO 
obligations.  
38. Contractors/vendors fulfill their obligations to inform employees about the LWO. 
 
Grassroots Involvement – This section looks at grassroots organizations (church, labor, 
union groups, etc.) that might have an interest in the living/prevailing wage.   
 
[1-Lowest - 5-Highest] 
 
39. How would you rate the involvement of grassroots organizations during passage 
of the ordinance? 
40. How would you rate their current level of involvement? 
 
[Open-ended] 
41. Some would argue that achieving best practice (i.e. obtaining lowest price bids 
from as many vendors as possible) in the procurement process conflicts with 
other policy objectives, such as, implementing a LWO.  Do you think that 
vending is an effective way to achieve social goals such as a living wage?  Why 
or why not?  
42. What else is needed to help your work unit become better capable of overseeing 
the implementation of the LWO? 
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Appendix C 
Survey Frequency Results 
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Sample Characteristics 
Statistics
29 23 26 30 25 30
3 9 6 2 7 2
6.41 173.17 .9338 .13 75431.32 1.79
6.00 50.00 1.0000 .00 15000.00 1.00
1.900 245.341 .14303 .346 175871.1 5.364
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Std.  Dev iation
Years of  LW
Implementati
on
Total LW
Contracts
Compliance
Rate
Presence of  a
LW Ov ersight
Board
Total LW
Budget
Total FTE
dedicated
to LW
 
Years of LW Implementation
1 3.1 3.4 3.4
2 6.3 6.9 10.3
7 21.9 24.1 34.5
6 18.8 20.7 55.2
6 18.8 20.7 75.9
3 9.4 10.3 86.2
1 3.1 3.4 89.7
3 9.4 10.3 100.0
29 90.6 100.0
3 9.4
32 100.0
2
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulat iv e
Percent
 
Total LW Contracts
1 3.1 4.3 4.3
1 3.1 4.3 8.7
1 3.1 4.3 13.0
1 3.1 4.3 17.4
1 3.1 4.3 21.7
1 3.1 4.3 26.1
1 3.1 4.3 30.4
1 3.1 4.3 34.8
1 3.1 4.3 39.1
1 3.1 4.3 43.5
2 6.3 8.7 52.2
1 3.1 4.3 56.5
1 3.1 4.3 60.9
1 3.1 4.3 65.2
1 3.1 4.3 69.6
1 3.1 4.3 73.9
1 3.1 4.3 78.3
2 6.3 8.7 87.0
1 3.1 4.3 91.3
1 3.1 4.3 95.7
1 3.1 4.3 100.0
23 71.9 100.0
9 28.1
32 100.0
2
4
5
14
15
16
26
32
40
45
50
69
70
128
217
230
250
300
500
620
1000
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulat iv e
Percent
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Compliance Rate
1 3.1 3.8 3.8
1 3.1 3.8 7.7
2 6.3 7.7 15.4
2 6.3 7.7 23.1
2 6.3 7.7 30.8
2 6.3 7.7 38.5
16 50.0 61.5 100.0
26 81.3 100.0
6 18.8
32 100.0
.40
.60
.80
.90
.95
.99
1.00
Total
Valid
99.00Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulativ e
Percent
 
Presence of a LW Oversight Board
26 81.3 86.7 86.7
4 12.5 13.3 100.0
30 93.8 100.0
2 6.3
32 100.0
no
yes
Total
Valid
NAMissing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulat iv e
Percent
 
Total LW Budget
11 34.4 44.0 44.0
1 3.1 4.0 48.0
3 9.4 12.0 60.0
2 6.3 8.0 68.0
1 3.1 4.0 72.0
1 3.1 4.0 76.0
1 3.1 4.0 80.0
1 3.1 4.0 84.0
1 3.1 4.0 88.0
1 3.1 4.0 92.0
1 3.1 4.0 96.0
1 3.1 4.0 100.0
25 78.1 100.0
7 21.9
32 100.0
0
5000
15000
50000
56000
60000
65000
121760
125000
158023
300000
850000
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulat iv e
Percent
 
Total FTE dedicated to LW
5 15.6 16.7 16.7
1 3.1 3.3 20.0
2 6.3 6.7 26.7
3 9.4 10.0 36.7
2 6.3 6.7 43.3
10 31.3 33.3 76.7
3 9.4 10.0 86.7
3 9.4 10.0 96.7
1 3.1 3.3 100.0
30 93.8 100.0
2 6.3
32 100.0
0
0
0
1
1
1
2
2
30
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulat iv e
Percent
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Political Factors 
Statistics
28 28 28 28 28 27 29
4 4 4 4 4 5 3
2.32 2.61 2.71 2.64 2.21 3.30 2.28
2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00
1.188 1.286 1.213 1.162 .917 .993 1.032
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Std.  Dev iation
Elected
of f icials
support the
passage of
the LWO,
but not its
implementa
tion.
Political
inf luence
limits the
overall
ef f ectiveness
of  LWO
implementat i
on ef f orts.
The LWO
receives
suf f icient
f unding f or
successf ul
implementa
tion.
LWO
ordinance
language and
governing
regulations
are clear and
unambiguous
to all
stakeholders.
LWO
ordinance
“loopholes”
contribute to
lackluster
employer
compliance.
Elected
of f icials
generally  act
quickly  to
resolve
loopholes in
the ordinance.
Ambiguity  in
the LWO
policy  of f ers
the
opportunity
f or political
interference.
 
Elected officials support the passage of the LWO, but not its implementation.
9 28.1 32.1 32.1
8 25.0 28.6 60.7
4 12.5 14.3 75.0
7 21.9 25.0 100.0
28 87.5 100.0
4 12.5
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Political influence limits the overal l effectiveness of LWO implementation efforts.
7 21.9 25.0 25.0
8 25.0 28.6 53.6
3 9.4 10.7 64.3
9 28.1 32.1 96.4
1 3.1 3.6 100.0
28 87.5 100.0
4 12.5
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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The LWO receives sufficient funding for successful implementation.
5 15.6 17.9 17.9
8 25.0 28.6 46.4
7 21.9 25.0 71.4
6 18.8 21.4 92.9
2 6.3 7.1 100.0
28 87.5 100.0
4 12.5
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
LWO ordinance language and governing regulations are clear and unambiguous to all
stakeholders.
4 12.5 14.3 14.3
11 34.4 39.3 53.6
6 18.8 21.4 75.0
5 15.6 17.9 92.9
2 6.3 7.1 100.0
28 87.5 100.0
4 12.5
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
LWO ordinance “loopholes” contribute to lackluster employer compliance.
7 21.9 25.0 25.0
10 31.3 35.7 60.7
9 28.1 32.1 92.9
2 6.3 7.1 100.0
28 87.5 100.0
3 9.4
1 3.1
4 12.5
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Total
Valid
99
Sy stem
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Elected officials generally act quickly to resolve loopholes in the ordinance.
1 3.1 3.7 3.7
4 12.5 14.8 18.5
11 34.4 40.7 59.3
8 25.0 29.6 88.9
3 9.4 11.1 100.0
27 84.4 100.0
4 12.5
1 3.1
5 15.6
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99
Sy stem
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Ambiguity in the LWO policy offers the opportunity for political interference.
8 25.0 27.6 27.6
9 28.1 31.0 58.6
8 25.0 27.6 86.2
4 12.5 13.8 100.0
29 90.6 100.0
3 9.4
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Stakeholders 
Statistics
29 29 29 29 20
3 3 3 3 12
3.28 2.03 3.14 2.10 1.95
4.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 1.50
1.437 1.210 1.356 1.319 1.050
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Std.  Dev iat ion
Please rate
the political
inf luence
each of  the
f ollowing
groups has
on the
implementati
on process -
elected
of f icials
Please rate
the political
inf luence
each of  the
f ollowing
groups has
on the
implementati
on process -
contractors
Please rate
the political
inf luence
each of  the
f ollowing
groups has
on the
implementati
on process -
grassroots
Please rate
the political
inf luence
each of  the
f ollowing
groups has
on the
implementatio
n process -
bureaucracy
Please rate
the political
inf luence
each of  the
f ollowing
groups has
on the
implementatio
n process -
LW adv isory
boards
 
Please rate the poli tical influence each of the fol lowing groups has on the
implementation process - elected officials
6 18.8 20.7 20.7
2 6.3 6.9 27.6
5 15.6 17.2 44.8
10 31.3 34.5 79.3
6 18.8 20.7 100.0
29 90.6 100.0
3 9.4
32 100.0
Low
2
3
4
High
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulat iv e
Percent
 
Please rate the poli tical influence each of the fol lowing groups has on the
implementation process - contractors
13 40.6 44.8 44.8
8 25.0 27.6 72.4
3 9.4 10.3 82.8
4 12.5 13.8 96.6
1 3.1 3.4 100.0
29 90.6 100.0
3 9.4
32 100.0
Low
2
3
4
High
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulat iv e
Percent
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Please rate the poli tical influence each of the fol lowing groups has on the
implementation process - grassroots
6 18.8 20.7 20.7
3 9.4 10.3 31.0
4 12.5 13.8 44.8
13 40.6 44.8 89.7
3 9.4 10.3 100.0
29 90.6 100.0
3 9.4
32 100.0
Low
2
3
4
High
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulat iv e
Percent
 
Please rate the poli tical influence each of the fol lowing groups has on the
implementation process - bureaucracy
14 43.8 48.3 48.3
5 15.6 17.2 65.5
5 15.6 17.2 82.8
3 9.4 10.3 93.1
2 6.3 6.9 100.0
29 90.6 100.0
3 9.4
32 100.0
Low
2
3
4
High
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulat iv e
Percent
 
Please rate the poli tical influence each of the fol lowing groups has on the
implementation process - LW advisory boards
10 31.3 50.0 50.0
2 6.3 10.0 60.0
7 21.9 35.0 95.0
1 3.1 5.0 100.0
20 62.5 100.0
12 37.5
32 100.0
Low
2
3
4
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulat iv e
Percent
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Organizational Culture 
Statistics
28 28 28 29 29
4 4 4 3 3
3.71 3.43 2.89 3.28 2.41
4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 2.00
1.013 .920 .994 .922 1.053
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Std.  Dev iat ion
We strive to
improve LWO
implementatio
n based on
past mistakes
and current
program
trends.
Inf ormation on
program
results is
easily
accessible
and shared
openly  with
ALL
stakeholders.
We hav e
suf f icient data
to monitor the
ef f ectiveness
of  our
implementatio
n of  the LWO.
Policymaking
ref lects input
prov ided by all
stakeholders.  
(e.g. elected
of f icials,
administrator
s, v endors,
and
grassroots
groups)
Administrative
orders and
objectiv es are
clear to those
involved in
monitoring
and enforcing
the LWO.
 
We strive to improve LWO implementation based on past mistakes and current
program trends.
1 3.1 3.6 3.6
3 9.4 10.7 14.3
4 12.5 14.3 28.6
15 46.9 53.6 82.1
5 15.6 17.9 100.0
28 87.5 100.0
4 12.5
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Information on program results is easily accessible and shared openly with ALL
stakeholders.
6 18.8 21.4 21.4
6 18.8 21.4 42.9
14 43.8 50.0 92.9
2 6.3 7.1 100.0
28 87.5 100.0
4 12.5
32 100.0
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulativ e
Percent
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We have sufficient data to monitor the effectiveness of our implementation of the
LWO.
2 6.3 7.1 7.1
8 25.0 28.6 35.7
10 31.3 35.7 71.4
7 21.9 25.0 96.4
1 3.1 3.6 100.0
28 87.5 100.0
4 12.5
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Policymaking reflects input provided by all stakeholders.   (e.g.  elected officials,
administrators, vendors, and grassroots groups)
1 3.1 3.4 3.4
6 18.8 20.7 24.1
6 18.8 20.7 44.8
16 50.0 55.2 100.0
29 90.6 100.0
3 9.4
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Administrative orders and objectives are clear to those involved in monitoring and
enforcing the LWO.
4 12.5 13.8 13.8
16 50.0 55.2 69.0
3 9.4 10.3 79.3
5 15.6 17.2 96.6
1 3.1 3.4 100.0
29 90.6 100.0
3 9.4
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Statistics
29 27 29 29 26 28 29
3 5 3 3 6 4 3
4.00 2.85 3.48 3.59 3.31 1.96 3.24
4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 3.00
.964 1.027 .911 .946 .928 1.036 1.327
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Std.  Dev iation
Enf orcement
of  contract
compliance is
consistent
regardless of
the vendor.
We apply
more
stringent
standards to
invoke and
implement
penalt ies
against
repeat
of f enders.
Penalties
f or LWO
non-compli
ance are
proportionat
e with the
seriousnes
s of  the
v iolation.
Upon being
reported,
v iolations are
investigated in
a timely
manner.
Penalties are
applied in a
timely  manner
af ter
adjudication.
Businesses
f requently
attain waivers
to avoid
paying the
liv ing/prevailin
g wage.
We are
understaf f ed
and cannot
implement the
ordinance
ef f ectively .
 
Enforcement of contract compliance is consistent regardless of the vendor.
3 9.4 10.3 10.3
4 12.5 13.8 24.1
12 37.5 41.4 65.5
10 31.3 34.5 100.0
29 90.6 100.0
3 9.4
32 100.0
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulativ e
Percent
 
We apply more stringent standards to invoke and implement penalties against repeat
offenders.
3 9.4 11.1 11.1
6 18.8 22.2 33.3
11 34.4 40.7 74.1
6 18.8 22.2 96.3
1 3.1 3.7 100.0
27 84.4 100.0
5 15.6
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Penalties for LWO non-compliance are proportionate with the seriousness of the
violation.
1 3.1 3.4 3.4
2 6.3 6.9 10.3
11 34.4 37.9 48.3
12 37.5 41.4 89.7
3 9.4 10.3 100.0
29 90.6 100.0
3 9.4
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Upon being reported, violations are investigated in a timely manner.
1 3.1 3.4 3.4
2 6.3 6.9 10.3
9 28.1 31.0 41.4
13 40.6 44.8 86.2
4 12.5 13.8 100.0
29 90.6 100.0
3 9.4
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Penalties are applied in a timely manner after adjudication.
1 3.1 3.8 3.8
2 6.3 7.7 11.5
14 43.8 53.8 65.4
6 18.8 23.1 88.5
3 9.4 11.5 100.0
26 81.3 100.0
6 18.8
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Businesses frequently attain waivers to avoid paying the living/prevail ing wage.
12 37.5 42.9 42.9
8 25.0 28.6 71.4
5 15.6 17.9 89.3
3 9.4 10.7 100.0
28 87.5 100.0
4 12.5
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
We are understaffed and cannot implement the ordinance effectively.
4 12.5 13.8 13.8
4 12.5 13.8 27.6
8 25.0 27.6 55.2
7 21.9 24.1 79.3
6 18.8 20.7 100.0
29 90.6 100.0
3 9.4
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
Statistics
28 28 29 28 28
4 4 3 4 4
2.57 2.82 2.21 2.68 2.64
2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.50
1.103 1.090 .774 1.124 .951
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Std.  Dev iation
Changes to
the LWO, its
monitoring,
and
enforcement
are met with
vendor
resistance.
Vendors are
generally  at
odds over
LWO
regulations.
Contractors/ve
ndors
understand
what the LWO
is and what is
required of
them.
Contractors/v
endors are
constantly
try ing to f ind
loopholes to
avoid LWO
obligations.
Contractor
s/vendors
f ulf ill their
obligation
s to inf orm
employee
s about
the LWO.
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Changes to the LWO, its monitoring, and enforcement are met with vendor resistance.
4 12.5 14.3 14.3
12 37.5 42.9 57.1
5 15.6 17.9 75.0
6 18.8 21.4 96.4
1 3.1 3.6 100.0
28 87.5 100.0
4 12.5
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Vendors are generally at odds over LWO regulations.
3 9.4 10.7 10.7
9 28.1 32.1 42.9
7 21.9 25.0 67.9
8 25.0 28.6 96.4
1 3.1 3.6 100.0
28 87.5 100.0
4 12.5
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Contractors/vendors understand what the LWO is and what is required of them.
2 6.3 6.9 6.9
22 68.8 75.9 82.8
3 9.4 10.3 93.1
1 3.1 3.4 96.6
1 3.1 3.4 100.0
29 90.6 100.0
3 9.4
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Contractors/vendors are constantly trying to find loopholes to avoid LWO obligations.
5 15.6 17.9 17.9
7 21.9 25.0 42.9
9 28.1 32.1 75.0
6 18.8 21.4 96.4
1 3.1 3.6 100.0
28 87.5 100.0
4 12.5
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Contractors/vendors fulfill their obligations to inform employees about the LWO.
2 6.3 7.1 7.1
12 37.5 42.9 50.0
9 28.1 32.1 82.1
4 12.5 14.3 96.4
1 3.1 3.6 100.0
28 87.5 100.0
4 12.5
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Grassroots 
Statistics
27 29
5 3
4.15 2.31
5.00 2.00
1.199 1.442
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Std.  Dev iation
How would
you rate the
involvement of
grassroots
organizations
during
passage of
the
ordinance?
How would
you rate their
current level of
involvement?
 
How would you rate the involvement of grassroots organizations during passage of
the ordinance?
2 6.3 7.4 7.4
5 15.6 18.5 25.9
5 15.6 18.5 44.4
15 46.9 55.6 100.0
27 84.4 100.0
5 15.6
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
How would you rate their current level of involvement?
13 40.6 44.8 44.8
4 12.5 13.8 58.6
5 15.6 17.2 75.9
4 12.5 13.8 89.7
3 9.4 10.3 100.0
29 90.6 100.0
3 9.4
32 100.0
Strongly  Disagree
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
Strongly  Agree
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Sum of all Variables 
Statistics
27 28 20 26 25 28 28
5 4 12 6 7 4 4
11.85 10.71 12.70 13.19 22.36 5.93 4.93
11.00 11.00 13.00 13.00 22.00 6.00 5.00
3.559 3.660 4.497 2.857 3.839 .900 2.159
Valid
Missing
N
Mean
Median
Std.  Dev iation
Sum of  all
policy
ambiguity
variables
Sum of  all
policy  conf lict
variables
Sum of  all
stakeholder
variables
Sum of  all org.
culture
(informat ion)
variables
Sum of  all org.
culture
(monitoring)
variables
Sum of  all
org. capacity
variables
SUm of  all
org. politics
variables
 
Sum of al l policy ambiguity variables
1 3.1 3.7 3.7
2 6.3 7.4 11.1
1 3.1 3.7 14.8
3 9.4 11.1 25.9
6 18.8 22.2 48.1
1 3.1 3.7 51.9
2 6.3 7.4 59.3
3 9.4 11.1 70.4
1 3.1 3.7 74.1
2 6.3 7.4 81.5
1 3.1 3.7 85.2
2 6.3 7.4 92.6
1 3.1 3.7 96.3
1 3.1 3.7 100.0
27 84.4 100.0
5 15.6
32 100.0
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulat iv e
Percent
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Sum of al l policy conflict variables
1 3.1 3.6 3.6
2 6.3 7.1 10.7
1 3.1 3.6 14.3
1 3.1 3.6 17.9
3 9.4 10.7 28.6
2 6.3 7.1 35.7
2 6.3 7.1 42.9
4 12.5 14.3 57.1
5 15.6 17.9 75.0
1 3.1 3.6 78.6
2 6.3 7.1 85.7
2 6.3 7.1 92.9
1 3.1 3.6 96.4
1 3.1 3.6 100.0
28 87.5 100.0
4 12.5
32 100.0
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
20
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulat iv e
Percent
 
Sum of al l stakeholder variables
2 6.3 10.0 10.0
1 3.1 5.0 15.0
1 3.1 5.0 20.0
1 3.1 5.0 25.0
3 9.4 15.0 40.0
1 3.1 5.0 45.0
3 9.4 15.0 60.0
3 9.4 15.0 75.0
1 3.1 5.0 80.0
1 3.1 5.0 85.0
1 3.1 5.0 90.0
1 3.1 5.0 95.0
1 3.1 5.0 100.0
20 62.5 100.0
11 34.4
1 3.1
12 37.5
32 100.0
5
7
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
17
18
19
23
Total
Valid
99
Sy stem
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulativ e
Percent
 
  196 
Sum of al l org. culture (information) variables
1 3.1 3.8 3.8
1 3.1 3.8 7.7
1 3.1 3.8 11.5
1 3.1 3.8 15.4
4 12.5 15.4 30.8
2 6.3 7.7 38.5
4 12.5 15.4 53.8
6 18.8 23.1 76.9
4 12.5 15.4 92.3
1 3.1 3.8 96.2
1 3.1 3.8 100.0
26 81.3 100.0
5 15.6
1 3.1
6 18.8
32 100.0
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
15
16
17
18
Total
Valid
99
Sy stem
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulativ e
Percent
 
Sum of al l org. culture (monitoring) variables
1 3.1 4.0 4.0
1 3.1 4.0 8.0
1 3.1 4.0 12.0
2 6.3 8.0 20.0
1 3.1 4.0 24.0
5 15.6 20.0 44.0
2 6.3 8.0 52.0
3 9.4 12.0 64.0
1 3.1 4.0 68.0
3 9.4 12.0 80.0
2 6.3 8.0 88.0
2 6.3 8.0 96.0
1 3.1 4.0 100.0
25 78.1 100.0
5 15.6
2 6.3
7 21.9
32 100.0
13
16
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
31
Total
Valid
99
Sy stem
Total
Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulativ e
Percent
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Sum of al l org. capacity variables
1 3.1 3.6 3.6
7 21.9 25.0 28.6
15 46.9 53.6 82.1
3 9.4 10.7 92.9
2 6.3 7.1 100.0
28 87.5 100.0
4 12.5
32 100.0
4
5
6
7
8
Total
Valid
99Missing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulat iv e
Percent
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
 
ASSESSING ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL FACTORS  
IN IMPLEMENTING A LIVING WAGE ORDINANCE 
 
You are being asked to be in a research study. The investigator of this study is Teodoro 
Carrasco and he is a doctoral student at FIU. The study will include about 70 people who 
are the involved with implementing a living wage ordinance. Your participation will 
require 1 hour of your time. We are looking to examine how Miami-Dade and Broward 
County implement their respective living wage ordinances. The results of the study will 
aid the development of better implementation efforts for living wage policies. 
 
At an agreed upon site and time convenient for you, the investigator will ask you 
questions about your views on the living wage ordinance, what is your involvement in its 
implementation, your opinion on how it is implemented, and whether improvements, if 
any, need to be made. The interview will last a maximum of 1 hour.  
 
Your interview will be identified by a random number not your name. All of your 
answers are private and will not be shared with anyone unless required by law. Your 
responses will be compared to those of the other respondents. We will present the 
research results as a group. You may ask questions about the study at any time. You may 
also choose to stop your participation before you finish the interview. 
 
If you would like more information about this research after you are done, you may 
contact Dr. Howard Frank at 305-348-0410. If you would like to talk with someone about 
being a subject in this study you may also contact Dr. Jonathan Tubman, the Chairperson 
of the FIU Institutional Review Board at 305-348-3024 or 305-348-2494. 
 
Your signature below indicates that all questions have been answered to your liking. You 
are aware of your rights and you would like to be in the study. 
 
_____________________________ __________________________ ________________ 
Signature of Participant                                        Printed Name                             Date 
 
I have explained the research procedure, subject rights and answered questions asked by 
the participant. I have offered him/her a copy of this informed consent form. 
 
___________________________________________ _____________ 
Signature of Witness                                                              Date 
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